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This thesis examines the behaviour of retail petroleum markets, with a case study 
examining prices in Perth, Australia.  The aim of the thesis is two-fold.  Firstly, it aims to 
extend the Edgeworth Cycles literature by showing how a simple, distance-based model 
of duopolistic competition can give rise to Edgeworth Cycles.  Secondly, it makes use of 
the results of this model to build a model of the structure of the Perth market and to 
explore competition in that network.   
 
In the empirical component of the thesis, I explore whether network structure influences 
both the prices charged by each retail petroleum outlet and the shape of price cycles 
exhibited by each retail petroleum outlet.  In addition, having performed a spectral 
analysis on prices and finding that most retail petroleum outlets do not follow a single 
cycle, but in fact use cycles of differing lengths, mostly seven and ten-day cycles, I 
explore whether network structure influences these choices or not.  In the empirical 
analysis, I find evidence that network structure does, in fact, influence both price and the 
nature of cycles. 
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Chapter One: Thesis Overview 
Competition in retail petroleum markets is a complex, multi-level phenomenon.  
Refineries have significant economies of scale and high fixed costs, and are influenced by 
the transportation options open to them.  The former means larger refineries often have 
significantly lower costs than smaller ones and the latter means that refineries will often 
seek to maximise outputs, offloading product in other markets or through other 
distribution channels (independent outlets, which often cluster around refineries for this 
purpose, for example) when demand in their local markets falls.  The potential market 
which can be serviced by a given refinery depend upon the transport opportunities 
available to it; Scherer (1996) suggests that the cost of shipping a barrel of petroleum a 
thousand miles in the US ranges from four cents for a 150,000 ton tanker on a 3,000 mile 
journey to US$5.11 for a 15 ton truck travelling 50 miles.  The wholesale market often 
also has a complex competitive structure, with wholesalers using price discrimination to 
charge differential prices in markets often only a few miles wide, in order to maximise 
profits (see Comanor & Riddle, 2003, for an account of this in California).  At the retail 
level, a diversity of brands and ownership types (including supermarkets) again results in 
a complex competitive field. 
 
In Australia, the main focus of competition is at the retail level.  There are at most two 
refineries per capital city, and these cities are thousands of kilometres apart, so 
competition between Australian refiners is rare.  The Australian refining market is 
contestable, however, due to the much larger refineries operating throughout Asia which 
can export to Australia.  Price discrimination at the wholesale level is less prevalent than 
 8 
in other markets, such as the US, and does not exist in the case study Perth.  Retail 
competition, however, is just as complex as it is in Europe and North America, with 
many similar patterns of ownership and control, and indeed many of the same vertically-
integrated players.  I thus focus on retail competition. 
 
In Perth, the case study for this thesis, a unique regulatory environment called FuelWatch 
exists.  Under its auspices, every retailer must set its price for 24 hours (so there are no 
intra-daily price movements) and inform FuelWatch of that price a day prior to it being 
set.  FuelWatch then makes that price publicly available, effectively providing perfect 
price information for consumers.  It also creates a census of prices, which makes it useful 
in economic analysis, and this is why Perth is chosen as the case study for this thesis. 
 
The prices of most retail petroleum outlets in Perth follow a saw-tooth pattern; rising 
sharply over a day or two, and then declining slowly over the course of a week.  Perth is 
not unique in this pattern of pricing, Sydney, Melbourne, Adelaide and Brisbane exhibit 
similar patterns, as do a number of cities in Europe and North America.  In fact, there is a 
growing literature studying such retail petroleum markets, and the pricing patterns are 
referred to as Edgeworth Cycles, after Edgeworth (1925).  It is to this literature that the 
thesis hopes to make a contribution, by positing a networked model of spatial competition 
which admits such cycles as an equilibrium, and then examining the extent to which 
network structure influences both price choice, and the pattern of price paths.   
 
The aim of exploring competition in this way is to inform policy.  Competition 
authorities examining mergers often require the merging parties to divest themselves of 
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particular assets to preserve competition.  In perhaps the most pervasive industry 
reorganisation it has attempted, the Australian Competition and Consumer Commission 
(ACCC) required Caltex and Ampol to divest themselves of a number of import 
terminals, retail outlets and other assets before it would allow the merger to proceed (see 
Walker & Woodward, 1996).  It did not specify which retail outlets needed to be divested 
but, this thesis suggests that it might be possible to do so by exploring a methodology 
which characterises competition at a fine-grained level. 
 
Chapter Two of the thesis explores the retail petroleum market in Australia, incorporating 
an analysis of its historical development, its major players and the regulatory structure 
within which it operates.  This includes an in-depth analysis of the Perth market.   
 
Chapter Three reviews the rather large literature which has informed this thesis.  This 
includes not only the Edgeworth cycles literature and the literature on retail petroleum 
markets, but also parts of the literature on spatial competition and literature from social 
networks and geography which underpins the technical tools used in this thesis to explore 
network structure. 
 
Chapter Four develops an analytical model which shows how Edgeworth Cycles can arise 
when two spatially separated duopolists interact.  The relationship between the price 
minima of each station in this model forms the basis in the later empirical chapters for 
concluding whether or not two retail petroleum outlets are competing, and thus develops 
a network which summarises the competitive structure of the market. 
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Chapter Five provides an overview of the data used in the empirical analysis of the 
following chapter, and provides an overview of how the network and sub-networks are 
constructed.  It also gives an account of cycles in the Perth retail petroleum market, using 
spectral analysis to shed light on the issue, and to show how, in fact, most outlets do not 
follow cycles of a set length.   
 
Chapter Six empirically examines the influence of network structure on prices, utilising 
Hansen‟s (1996, 1999, 2000) Threshold Regression Model to examine the influence of 
network structure on prices, and simple linear regression to explore the influence of 
network structure on pricing patterns.   
 
Chapter Seven concludes with a discussion of the ramifications of the model for both 
economic analysis and for policymakers. 
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Chapter Two: The Australian Retail Petroleum Industry 
This chapter provides an overview of the Australian petroleum industry.  The first section 
provides a brief history of the development of the industry, and its current characteristics.  
This includes a discussion on then upstream refining and distribution sectors, and on the 
regulatory environment.  Since the focus of the case study is the Perth market, the next 
section focuses on characteristics of the Perth market which differentiate it from other 
cities in Australia.  This includes a discussion on the regulatory environment in Perth and, 
in particular, the FuelWatch scheme. 
History and Characteristics 
The Australian retail petroleum market has a history which closely matches, albeit at a 
lag, the development of the industry in the US and Europe.
1
  The first refined petroleum 
products for use in automobiles began arriving in Australian in the latter years of the 19
th
 
Century.  The first unbranded pumps for dispensing petroleum arrived in 1916, and the 
first branded pumps, carrying the Neptune brand, in 1924.  This marked the first 
investment in retailing by one of the then Majors of the industry.   
 
Initially, the pumps of several different brands were located in the same garage, but this 
proved inefficient and, in 1951, Shell and Mobil introduced solus-trading.  Other brands 
followed, and the 1950s and 1960s witnessed a fight for market share which saw the 
development of considerable over-capacity in the Australian marketplace; by 1970, there 
were more than 20,000 retail petroleum outlets in Australia, a number which declined by 
roughly 3.5 percent per annum to reach roughly 6,500 today (ACCC, 2007). 
                                                 
1
 See Wilkinson (1983) for an account of the history of the Australian industry and Dixon (1964) for an 
account of the first 50 years of development in the US.  The parallels between the two are clear.  
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The most important players in the retail petroleum market in Australia, as elsewhere in 
the world, are the Majors; vertically-integrated firms with upstream refining and often 
crude production operations in Australia.  Today, the Majors are Shell, BP, Caltex and 
Mobil,
2
 but in the past Total, Esso and Ampol have also been active in Australia.  
Complementing the Majors are the independents; usually much smaller firms with no 
upstream operations, and often focussing on price competition.  There have been many 
independent brands through Australia‟s history, beginning with Golden Fleece in 
Melbourne in the 1920s.  In the 1980s and 1990s, Solo, Burmah and Liberty were the 
major players, but the former two were taken over by Ampol (in 1990) and BP (in 2000) 
respectively, whilst the latter has become an independent fuel wholesaler.
3
  Today, Gull 
(particularly in Western Australia), Matilda, United, Neumann Petroleum, 7-Eleven, Peak 
and Wesco are important independent players.  Additionally, a number of single-outlet 
independents remain, particularly in Sydney, but these are slowly disappearing as they 
become unviable (ACCC, 2007). 
 
The major supermarket chains, Coles and Woolworths, have developed an increasing 
presence in petroleum retailing over the past decade, mirroring trends overseas.  
Woolworths entered the Australian retail petroleum market in 1996 on its own and 
expanded to 290 sites, before entering into a joint venture with Caltex in 2003 and 
expanding to 500 sites.  Coles entered the market in March 2004 through a joint venture 
with Shell and now operates around 600 sites Australia-wide.  Between the two, the 
                                                 
2
 After its merger with Ampol in 1995, Caltex kept the Ampol branding on some outlets.  These are slowly 
disappearing, but some still remain. 
3
 Many of the outlets it supplies carry its branding, but they are independently-owned and operated. 
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supermarkets have taken a share of roughly 50 percent of the market by volume (ACCC, 
2007).  Both operate shopper-docket schemes, providing discounts on fuel consequent 
upon a certain amount being spent in their supermarkets.  Other supermarket chains have 
followed, and the ACCC has records of some 600 schemes operating at around 1000 
outlets in addition to those operated by Coles and Woolworths (ACCC, 2007). 
 
In addition to the different brands, there are also a number of different ownership types:
4
 
 Branded Independents, who own the service station, but who are contracted to sell a 
certain brand of petrol and may be supplied either directly by the refinery or by 
distributors of that brand of petrol.  These contracts are typically short term.  All of 
the Majors and some of the independents make use of this form of contract. 
 Franchisees, with greater ties to the brand owner whose brand they sell and which has 
generally contributed substantially to the capital costs of the service station.  Such 
contracts are typically for longer periods of time.  They may cover a single site or, as 
is becoming more common, be multi-site franchises.  BP, Mobil and Shell all use 
multi-site franchises, but Caltex does not, as it was prohibited from doing so under 
the terms of its 1995 merger with Ampol. 
 Distributor retailers, who purchase petroleum products in bulk from a refinery and 
sell some (or all) of it in service stations they own, either under their own brand, or 
under the brand of one of the Majors.  These have largely disappeared from cities, but 
are still prevalent in rural and regional areas. 
                                                 
4
 These often reflect historical solutions to the principal-agent problems associated with fuel-brand owners 
endeavouring to effectively monitor their retail petroleum outlets.  Shepherd (1993) examines similar issues 
in the US context in some detail. 
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 Outlets owned and operated by the brand owners.  All of the supermarket-branded 
sites use this form of ownership, and it is widespread amongst independents too.  
However, the Majors make scant use of it, due in part to the restrictions of the Sites 
Act discussed below.  
 
Regardless of the type of ownership used, the brand owner is able to influence prices 
charged through the wholesale price.  In particular, the Majors operate price support 
schemes (see Wang, 2005a, for an illustration).  Under these schemes, the wholesaler 
provides rebates or discounts to a retailer who sets price below a certain level. The 
schemes are used to support outlets during price wars, so that the brand-owner does not 
lose market share.  The ACCC has yet to prohibit price supports as resale price 
maintenance, but has examined them extensively (see ACCC, 1996 or 2007 for details). 
 
The result of this diversity of players, ownership structures and pricing schemes is a 
complex and dynamic retail market.  Before turning to the prices which result from this 
interaction, however, it is worthwhile pausing for a moment and examining three other 
factors which influence retail markets, the upstream activities of refiners and importers, 
the activities of distributors and wholesalers, and regulatory regimes imposed by 
government. 
Refining and Imports 
Australia‟s first refineries were established in the 1920s, and for the next 40 years (until 
1966) new refineries were added to each state as demand grew, and crude oil was 
discovered in Australia in the 1960s.  Today, each capital city (with the exceptions of 
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Hobart, Darwin and Canberra) has at least one refinery, and Brisbane, Melbourne and 
Sydney have two.
5
  These are shown in Figure 2.1. 
 
Figure 2.1:  Australian Petroleum Refineries 
 
  Source: Australian Institute of Petroleum (2007) p4 
 
In the past, Australian refineries were required by law to process Australian crude for 
Australian markets, but these laws were rescinded in the 1980s as Australia‟s crude 
output began to slow.  Now, overseas crude has become far more dominant, and this has 
required considerable investment, as it is commonly far heavier and contains more 
sulphur compared to Australia‟s domestic crude. 
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No Major has refining capacity in more than two states, but all have retail operations 
across Australia.  Until 2002, the Majors operated refinery exchange agreements which 
allowed BP (say) to swap petroleum refined in Perth and sold by Shell-branded retail 
outlets in Perth, for petroleum refined by Shell in Sydney and sold by BP through its 
retail outlets there.  These agreements allowed the Majors to avoid the cross-border 
transportation costs, and are common around the world.  They rely, however, upon fuel 
standards being similar or at least similar in the cost of processing and a change in WA 
emissions laws in 2002 meant that this was no longer the case.  BP therefore abandoned 
them in 2002.  They have been replaced by long-term buy-sell contracts, which operate in 
a roughly similar fashion, but with the value of the fuel taken into account.  The 
ramifications of these buy-sell contracts, as well as competition concerns raised by them, 
are discussed in detail in ACCC (2007). 
 
Although competition between refineries in Australia is rare, this does not mean they face 
no competition at all.  Throughout Asia, though most particularly in Singapore, there are 
a number of refineries much larger than those in Australia.  Moreover, independently-
owned importing terminals are located in Perth, Sydney, Melbourne and Brisbane.  
Whilst actual importing of fuel into these terminals is rare, they render the refinery 
market contestable, if not competitive, and act to cap the refinery prices.   
Wholesaling and Distribution 
The wholesale and distribution markets in Australia are generally much less complex 
than in more densely populated markets such as the US or Europe.  Most population 
centres are on the coast, and are served by coastal ships operating in “milk runs” from the 
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nearest refinery to the various coastal terminals in the relevant state (see Figure 2.1).  
Inland towns are generally smaller, and are served by rail or, increasingly, by large trucks 
operating along similar milk-runs. 
 
In all capital city markets, terminal gate prices (tgps) are used at the wholesale level, 
allowing anyone with the requisite trucking equipment to purchase a tanker-load of fuel 
at the published price.  The tgp schemes are legislated in Victoria and WA, but voluntary 
elsewhere, and they do not preclude discounts.  An earlier, failed attempt at tgps is 
reviewed by the Industry Commission (1994). 
Regulation 
In the past, price regulation was pervasive in the petroleum industry, with the last retail 
price controls (in South Australia) disappearing in 1973, and wholesale price caps only in 
1998 (see ACCC, 1996).  However, regulation of other kinds still pervades the industry, 
influencing competition.   
 
One important influence comes from environmental regulation.  During the early part of 
this century, Australian emissions standards were stricter than those elsewhere in the 
world, and within Australia, WA, SA and Queensland had stricter standards than the rest 
of the country and different standards from each other.  The result was isolation of each 
market from others, both here and overseas.  If, for example, a much larger, highly 
efficient Singapore refinery wished to  produce fuel for the WA market, it would have to 
produce a relatively small batch, given the size of the market, and might not thus be able 
to reach the same economies of scale as are possible if it is producing fuel at its capacity 
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level.  This limits, to some extent, the ability of Singaporean (and other) refineries to 
render the Australian refining market contestable.  The SSCE (2006), which provides 
further details on Australian fuel standards and their potential to island markets within 
Australia, notes that Australian fuel standards had largely been harmonised by 2006, and 
that international standards were also approaching the Australian norm.  However, during 
the period of analysis covered in this case study, islanding due to environmental 
restrictions may have been affecting fuel markets in Australia. 
 
Perhaps the two most important direct controls over the industry in recent years have 
been the Petroleum Retail Marketing Sites Act 1980 (the Sites Act) and the Petroleum 
Retail Marketing Franchising Act 1980 (the Franchising Act).  Both came out of the 
recommendations of the Royal Commission on Petroleum (1976), which heard 
complaints of price discrimination by the Majors against lessees in favour of branded 
resellers and of unfair practices by the Majors.  Each Act was intended to curb this 
behaviour; the Franchising Act was intended to set basic fair conditions for retail 
petroleum franchisees, and the Sites Act limited the numbers of outlets the Majors could 
own directly in order to prevent them from substituting ownership for franchising.  Both 
Acts were repealed in 2007 and replaced by a mandatory industry code, the Oilcode, 
under Section 51D of the Trade Practices Act.
6
  Industry and government had been 
attempting to do this since 1989, but could not agree on an appropriate framework.  The 
Oilcode, administered by the ACCC, is described in detail in ACCC (2007). 
 
                                                 
6
 In part due to the growing power of the supermarkets, which are not bound by the Sites Act. 
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The Sites Act restricted the Majors (collectively) to direct ownership of no more than five 
percent of retail outlets; roughly half their share prior to the passage of the Act.  
However, in more recent years, the Majors have not taken up even this limited quota.  In 
2001, they had direct ownership over only 300 sites, or three-quarters of their quota, and 
by 2006, this had fallen to only 189 sites, or half their quota for that year.
7
   
 
Between 2001 and 2006, BP maintained roughly the same number of directly-controlled 
sites, but the other Majors reduced their holdings.  Caltex and Shell did so as part of their 
joint ventures with Woolworths and Coles (respectively).  Mobil moved a single multi-
site franchise (held by Strasburger Enterprises) that now covers all sites formerly owned 
by Mobil around the country.  This move to multi-site franchising, practised by BP and 
Shell as well (though not Caltex) was perhaps driven to some extent by the requirements 
of the Sites Act, although the fact that it emerged almost 20 years after the Sites Act 
suggests that other factors are also at play, such as the inability of the Majors to price 
discriminate amongst their franchisees due to the requirements of the Franchising Act.     
 
The Franchising Act was introduced to redress power imbalances between the Majors 
and their franchisees, and the harsh conduct sometimes exhibited by the Majors,
8
 by 
providing certain minimum terms for franchising agreements, including restrictions upon 
price discrimination between like-branded retail outlets by the Major which supplied 
them.  The Industry Commission (1994) suggests that it has not been particularly 
                                                 
7
 Data supplied in a personal communication from the Department of Industry, Science and Tourism, which 
collected such data prior to the repeal of the Sites Act. 
8
 Shepard (1993) provides details on the US Federal Petroleum Marketing Practices Act 1978 which 
provides similar kinds of protections to dealers in the US. 
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effective in achieving its aims, and that, even then, it had largely been superseded by the 
advent of multi-site franchises and a franchising Code of Practice under the auspices of 
the Trade Practices Act.   
 
The final piece of regulation which is of crucial importance in WA and thus to the case 
study of this thesis is the FuelWatch scheme.  FuelWatch operates under the auspices of 
the Petroleum Products Pricing Regulations 2000 which sit under the Petroleum 
Products Pricing Act 1983, which gives the Government broad powers to regulate retail 
petroleum prices and obtain information from petroleum retailers.  It came about as one 
of the recommendations of the Select Committee on Pricing of Petroleum Products 
(SCPPPWA, 2000), reacting to a perception of motorists‟ anger over frequent intra-daily 




Under the FuelWatch scheme, each retail petroleum outlet in WA must report the price it 
will charge each day by 2pm of the previous day.  The price is then made public at 6pm 
(when it is available on the FuelWatch website), and the price change itself occurs at 6am 
the following day.  That price is then fixed for 24 hours.  FuelWatch has operated since 
January 2001.  At the wholesale level, regulated wholesale price caps were introduced in 
April 2001, but proved unworkable.  They were replaced in December 2001 by tgp 
arrangements whereby wholesalers must publish their tgp, but its level is not subject to 
regulation.  The practical upshot of these changes is that, from the beginning of 2003, one 
                                                 
9
 The Committee also made a number of other recommendations, such as retail price caps in regional areas, 
which were not implemented by government. 
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has both a daily retail price for every outlet in Perth, and also a proxy for their marginal 
cost; the tgp.  It is for this reason that I use Perth as a case study in this thesis. 
 
The FuelWatch scheme has been widely studied by government bodies around Australia 
since its inception (ACCC, 2001, 2002, 2007 and SSCE, 2006).  In its first studies, the 
ACCC (2001, 2002) found that FuelWatch had increased prices in WA relative to what 
they would have been in its absence and in comparison with prices on the East Coast, but 
it had reversed its position by its third study (ACCC, 2007).  This lead to the new Labor 
government of Kevin Rudd considering a nation-wide rollout of FuelWatch.  However, 
the econometric modelling upon which the ACCC (2007) had based its conclusions came 
in for considerable criticism (see, for example, Harding, 2008a,b, or Davidson, 2008 for a 
review) and the Federal Government has since backed away from its earlier plans, instead 
creating a Petrol Monitoring Section in the ACCC. 
The Retail Petroleum Market at Present 
In this section, I provide a brief overview of the market as it exists at present, focusing on 
demand, supply, prices and profitability.  I close with a more in-depth overview of the 
Perth market, which is supplemented by a much more comprehensive overview for the 
period under analysis in Chapter Five. 
Demand and Supply 
Figures 2.2 and 2.3 provide an overview of production and consumption of refined 
petroleum products in Australia.  Figure 2.2 provides overall results including imports, 
whilst Figure 2.3 breaks domestic results down into different fuel types.  Note that 
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imports have been relatively unimportant for most of the past 40 years, but that they have 
risen sharply in the last few years.  This appears to be due to diesel fuel imports, as diesel 
consumption has risen, without a concomitant increase in production.  Singapore appears 
to have been the main beneficiary of this trend; its exports of diesel to Australia have 
risen from 2600 Ml in 2000/01 to 10,000 Ml in 2007/08 (Australian Bureau of 
Agricultural and Resource Economics, various years a). 
 
Figure 2.2:  Australian Refined Petroleum Production, Consumption, Import and 
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Figure 2.3: Refined Petroleum Production and Consumption – 1993 to 2007 
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For motorists, petroleum and diesel are the most important fuels.  Figure 2.4 shows the 
rise in consumption of each, highlighting the switch from leaded to unleaded fuels from 
the mid 1980s.  The rise in diesel fuel consumption, by contrast, appears to be linked to 











































































Diesel Leaded Unleaded  
Source: ABARE (various years b) Table K 
 
Figure 2.5 shows the per-capita demand for unleaded and leaded petroleum and diesel on 
a state-by-state basis since 1984.  In general, fuel consumption is steady, until the end of 
the period, when high fuel prices appear to have attenuated demand somewhat.  Diesel 
sales are more constant, which is to be expected if its main use is in road-freight 
transport.  This is further exemplified by the fact that the states and territories with the 
                                                 
10
 The correlation between diesel fuel sales and road freight net-tonne km (Bureau of Transport and 
Regional Economics, 2006) from 1960 to 2003 is roughly 97 percent.  
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largest land area and sparsest populations (WA and the Northern Territory) have the 
highest per-capita diesel usage. 
 
Figure 2.5: Per Capita Demand for Petroleum and Diesel by State – 1984-2007 
 
Source: ABARE (various years b) Tables K2 to K8 
There is very little consistent data on market share in Australia, which tends to get 
surveyed sporadically with each government investigation of the industry, rather than 
recorded regularly by any statistical agency.  Figure 2.6, however, provides a recent 
overview.  The left hand side of Figure 2.6 shows the market share by branding, based 
upon the volume of fuel sold.  The right hand side of Figure 2.6 shows the numbers of 












































Source: ACCC (2007) p76     Source: Macfarlane (2006) p6 
The relatively small share of Shell is due primarily to the fact that many of its outlets 
have become Coles Express outlets.  Caltex has also had a number of its sites rebranded, 
but not as many, and it had more sites than Shell to begin with.   
Pricing 
I now turn to pricing.  Figure 2.7 provides an overview of quarterly prices of unleaded 
petrol in each of Australia‟s capital cities.  To remove the effect of inflation, prices are 
expressed in 2008 dollars.  The thick black line across the bottom is the price of the 
World Trade-Weighted Index for crude oil, converted from US$ to A$, adjusted from 
dollars per barrel to cpl and expressed in 2008 A$.  Australian retail petroleum prices 
track the world price of crude; the correlation coefficient between each capital city price 
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Source: Australian Bureau of Statistics various years) for retail and ABARE (various years a)Table 319  
for crude prices. 
 
Although quarterly average prices might be closely linked to crude prices, daily prices are 
not.  In fact, they tend to cycle over the course of roughly a week, shooting upwards in 
the first day or so, before falling more gently for the remainder of the week.  Cycles exist 
in Perth, Adelaide, Sydney, Melbourne and Brisbane.  Moreover, they have existed in 
Australia for some time.  Since these cycles can result in prices shifting upwards by ten 
percent in a single day, they have been a source of great frustration for motorists, and this 
has driven an interest in them by policymakers.  Perhaps the most comprehensive recent 
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review of price cycles in Australia has come from the ACCC (2007), from which much of 
the data in this section has been drawn.   
 
Figures 2.8 and 2.9 show the length and amplitude of price cycles in each of the five 
cities discussed above from 1993 to the present day.  Each figure also shows the advent 
of FuelWatch in WA.  After the advent of FuelWatch, price cycles lengthened (in WA), 
and their amplitude decreased.  However, the latter is true in each of the five cities, and 
both occurred at something of a lag from the introduction of the scheme.  This is part of 
the controversy associated with the ACCC‟s analysis discussed previously.   
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Source: ACCC (2007) p159 
 
A more detailed snapshot for the latter half of 2007 was provided by the ACCC (2007), 
and is outlined in Table 2.1 below.  It shows that cycles exhibit quite a degree of 
variation in their amplitude, though not in their duration. 
 
Table 2.1: Price Cycles, January to June 2007 
  Sydney Melbourne Brisbane Adelaide Perth 
Number of Cycles 24 24 24 24 11 
Amplitude (cpl)           
Smallest 1.6 3.8 4.6 1.4 3.1 
Largest 13.4 14 13 15.3 10.2 
Average 8.6 9.5 8.4 8.8 7.7 
Duration (days)           
Average Trough to Peak 2.2 2 1.9 2.1 4.3 
Average Peak to trough 5.1 5.3 5.4 5.2 10.9 
Average price cycle 7 7 7 7 13 
Most common day for peaks Thursday Thursday Thursday Thursday Thursday 
Most common day for troughs Tuesday Tuesday Tuesday Tuesday Sunday 




The ACCC (2001,2007) has also provided some information on the distribution of days 
upon which cycles begin.  This is reproduced in Table 2.2. 
 
Table 2.2: Trough days 
City 1998 2001 2007 
 Day % of troughs Day % of troughs Day 
Sydney Sunday 50 Monday 60 Tuesday 
Melbourne Tuesday 41 Wed/Thurs 37 (each) Tuesday 
Brisbane Monday 50 Monday 43 Tuesday 
Adelaide Monday 63 Wednesday 47 Tuesday 
Perth Tuesday 42 Tues/Sun 33 (each) Sunday 
Source: 1998 and 2001 data; ACCC (2001p19&20), 2007 data; ACCC (2007, Appendix P) 
 
In its earlier publication, the ACCC (2001) provides details on the proportion of cycles 
which begin one each day, and rarely does a single day exceed more than half of the total 
cycles.  By the same token, the distribution of starting days is not random; some days are 
more frequent than others.  This is taken up in Chapter Five.   
 
A key question is why such price cycles occur.  It does not appear to be due to 
information advantages enjoyed by the Majors.  In all states, the Majors subscribe to an 
information service provided by Informed Sources, which gives them high-frequency, 
real-time data on some 3,500 retail petroleum outlets around Australia.  This gives them a 
considerable informational advantage.  However, cycles exist in WA, where they enjoy 
no such informational advantage, so this cannot be the sole reason.  Moreover, the 
downward phases of cycles are often initiated by independents, who do not have access 
to Informed Sources data.  Market size also does not appear to be crucial either, as cycles 
exist in almost all of the capital cities, regardless of size differences.  
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As part of its study, the ACCC (2007, pp170-4) asked market participants their views 
about why cycles occur.  Each of the Majors expressed similar views, suggesting that 
cycles are due to competition.  BP suggests that prices reduce to gain market share, and 
then increase when there are no further benefits to be had from increasing volume.  It 
suggests that in the past, independents drove prices downwards, but that now all 
competitors do so.  Caltex suggests they are due to two different groups of competitors in 
the marketplace; the discounters and the non-discounters; the former leading prices down 
and the latter following until price reductions cannot be sustained.  Shell suggests that 
high fixed costs drive a need to maximise throughput, leading to cycles.  It also suggests 
that cycles may persist even now that they are not driven by independents as much, due 
to some form of entrenched behaviour.  Woolworths suggests that independents drive 
prices downwards because they do not have the brand recognition of the Majors, but that 
the Majors follow them downwards, until margins are no longer profitable for them.   
 
One independent suggested they had tried to post and hold a given price, but that this did 
not work, as others simply matched prices and then pushed them lower.  Another said 
that if it did not follow the Majors upwards, its prices were simply matched and it 
received no benefits from lower prices.   
 
A number of commentators give examples where independent new entry has caused 
previously stable prices to start cycling, and one independent operator suggests that 
cycles in Victoria were triggered by the entry of Solo into the market 15 years ago and 
have persisted even though it has now left.  Some independents suggest that price 
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supports drive cycles, because Majors withdraw them, driving prices back upwards again, 
and Coles suggests that local refineries with excess refined fuel to sell can also initiate 
cycles by discounting such fuel.   
 
With such a diversity of views, it is difficult to pin down a causal factor, and indeed the 
ACCC (2007) fails to do so, noting that they are an enigma.  In the academic literature, 
Maskin and Tirole (1988) introduce the notion of Edgeworth Cycles; price cycles are the 
equilibrium which markets with certain characteristics will obtain, and they are no more 
enigmatic than any other kind of equilibrium.  This thesis (Chapter Four) introduces a 
model of spatial competition which admits Edgeworth cycles as an equilibrium, 
suggesting that small amounts of localised market power may facilitate their creation. 
Profitability 
There is very little reliable information on the profitability of an individual retail 
petroleum outlet; even gross margins based on the difference between tgps and retail 
prices provide only limited information, as wholesale prices are often discounted  
However, the Australian Institute of Petroleum does collect some data on profitability for 
its members (the Majors) and their profitability.  This is summarised briefly below, from 
the AIP‟s most recent version of its Downstream Petroleum Industry (2007).  Note that 
the figures are for refining and retailing; no separate figures are available publically. 
 
The industry has substantial assets, valued at $16.6 billion in 2007, an increase of roughly 
six billion dollars (in nominal terms) from a decade previously.  It‟s annual investment, 
and profits, tend to fluctuate quite substantially, as Figure 2.10 shows. 
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Figure 2.10: Australian Petroleum Industry, Investment and Profits ($ mil) 
 
Source: AIP(2007) p11 
 
With profits fluctuating, much of this investment is funded by debt.  In 2006, total 
borrowings fell to $5.65 billion, down from almost $7 billion the previous year, but up 
from the ten year average of $4.9 billion. 
 
In terms of its profitability, the industry does less well, with average EBIT being only 
slightly above the bond rate over most of the past decade (AIP, 2007 p12).  Profitability 
is largely driven by overseas capacity and crude prices.  When overseas capacity is loose 
(as in the late 1990s), the contestability of the Australian market means that domestic 
refiners are wary of raising margins for fear that overseas refiners will export refined 
product to Australia.  When it is tight, margins increase, aided by rising crude prices, 
which increase the value of crude stocks held by the Majors.   
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The Perth Market 
I turn finally to the Perth market, which is also summarised in more detail for the period 
of the case study in Chapter Five.  Perth is the most isolated capital city in the world; it is 
too far to receive competitive supply from elsewhere in Australia and is thus supplied 
almost exclusively by the BP refinery in Kwinana
11
.  It is thus unaffected, largely, by 
refinery competition from other markets.  At the wholesale level, Perth has six wholesale 
terminals, all of which are supplied by the BP refinery in Kwinana, most of them by 
pipeline.  Four of them (owned by Caltex, BP, Shell and Mobil) are located in the same 
place; North Fremantle.  BP has an additional terminal in Kewdale, an industrial area, 
and Gull has a terminal at Kwinana which can take fuel imports.  There is, however, very 
little variation between tgps, with the correlation between each pair of terminals 
exceeding 99 percent during the period under study (see Table 5.12).   
 
Competition is focussed at the retail level.  There are, at present, roughly 350 retail 
petroleum outlets in Perth.  Each of the Majors have a presence, as do Woolworths and 
Coles, which each operate their own shopper discount scheme.  There are also three 
relatively large chains of independents, Gull, Peak and Liberty.
12
  Gull is particularly 
important, both for its relatively large network of outlets (roughly 50) and for the fact that 
it owns an import terminal, providing some degree of independence from the BP refinery.  
Finally, there are a collection of smaller independent brands, Amgas, Better Choice, 
Kleenheat, Kwikfuel, Oasis and Wesco, as well as a small number of independent stores 
                                                 
11
 Singaporean refineries can contest the Perth market, and restrain the refinery pricing of the incumbent to 
some degree.  There is also occasional import from overseas through Gull‟s independent terminal. 
12
 Peak was taken over by Gull in 2008, but continues to operate as an independent brand. 
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with no branding.  Figure 2.11 provides an overview of the changing brand profile in 
Perth over a five year period. 
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Source: FuelWatch data 
 
BP, Mobil and Shell all make use of multi-site franchising in Perth.  All of the Shell and 
Mobil sites in Perth that they do not own outright, and which are not branded 
independents, are controlled through a single head lease.  BP has three such head-leases 
(Wang, 2006).   
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Compared with the Eastern States, Perth is a relatively small market, comprising less than 
one-fifth of overall Australian fuel sales.  Figure 2.12 provides an overview of fuel sales 
in recent years in WA, broken down into different fuel types.  The picture is similar to the 
Australian total, except for marginally more usage of aviation fuels and fuel oil, 
associated with WA‟s sometimes remote industrial locations. 
 

















































































LPG Leaded Petroleum Unleaded Petroleum Aviation gasoling
Aviation Turbine Fuel Lighting Kerosene Power Kerosene Heating Oil





Source: ABARE (various years b) Table K5 
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Chapter Three: Literature Review 
The analytical and theoretical models explored in this thesis draw upon a rather wide 
literature, from both within economics and outside it.  This chapter summarises the 
relevant literature, under four broad headings: 
 General literature on retail petroleum market behaviour 
 Edgeworth cycles 
 Spatial competition 
 Literature from outside economics 
 
The wide focus of the literature review reflects the breadth of the inputs into the 
analytical and empirical models used in this thesis.  The literature on petroleum market 
behaviour contributes to the analysis here and also guides expectations about empirical 
findings.  I also focus on the Australian literature, most of it from government studies, 
which provides important contextual background for the empirical work later in the 
thesis.  The Edgeworth cycle literature is particularly important because price paths at 
most of Perth‟s retail petroleum outlets match those predicted by Edgeworth‟s (1925) 
theory.  The section on spatial competition is very brief and is intended only to provide 
background to the spatial model developed in Chapter Four, that admits Edgeworth 
cycles as an equilibrium.  Finally, I make use of a number of empirical techniques in 
Chapter Six which are not commonly used in economics, particularly network centrality.  
I thus devote some space to explaining the literature underpinning these techniques. 
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Retail Petroleum Market Behaviour 
A major focus of this thesis is on Edgeworth Cycles in retail petroleum prices as an 
explanation for their movement.  The literature on Edgeworth Cycles is relatively recent, 
and is addressed as a separate topic below.  However, there is also a large literature 
positing other influences of retail petroleum prices that largely predates the Edgeworth 
Cycle literature, and offers important insights of its own.  I summarise this literature here 
under five sub-headings: 
 Regulation: and its effect on retail petroleum prices. 
 Rockets and Feathers: a literature which explores how shocks in upstream prices are 
transmitted through to retail prices. 
 Elasticity: with a special focus on the drivers of elasticity, and hence demand. 
 Market Behaviour Models: a very brief overview of a very large literature positing 
different models for retail petroleum markets. 
 Australian Government Studies: A brief overview of key studies by government 
bodies in Australia, which provide background information for the current study. 
Regulation 
The literature on regulation and its impacts on retail petroleum markets focuses largely 
on case studies from the US.  Not only is US data comparatively good, but there is 
considerable heterogeneity amongst US states in terms of their regulatory structure, 
which provides important variation for estimating regression coefficients.   
 
Chouinard & Perloff (2004, 2007) undertake wide-ranging studies incorporating many 
differences in markets and regulatory structures in the US including crude prices, heating 
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degree days (to assess the impacts of special fuels required in cold weather), monthly and 
seasonal dummies, demographic factors, taxes and fuel emissions standards.  At the 
national level, they find that only crude prices and seasonal dummies are important.  
However, they find considerably more sources of variation at the state level, with demand 
and supply factors being important in explaining differences between fuel prices in 
different states 
 
Regulation is often employed to protect smaller independent operators from the anti-
competitive practices of their larger rivals.  Three forms of regulation common in the US 
are divorcement,
 
 self-service bans and the prohibition of sales below cost.
 13
  Blass & 
Carlton (2001) find that divorcement legislation leads to less investment in retail 
petroleum by the Majors, whilst Vita (2000) finds that it adds two to three cents per 
gallon (cpg) to the price of fuel.  Vita (2000) also examines the impacts of self-service 
bans, finding that they add a further three cpg to the price of fuel, whilst Johnson & 
Romeo (2000) find that such bans reduce the number of self-service outlets compared 
with market preferences, but do not prevent the Majors from dominating the given market 
at the expense of smaller independents. 
 
Sales below cost laws are designed to prevent larger operators from predating upon 
smaller ones, but Blair & Dougherty (2003) present anecdotal evidence from Florida that 
                                                 
13
 Divorcement prohibits firms with refining interests from owning retail outlets.  The Royal Commission 
on Petroleum (1976) whose recommendations led eventually to the Sites Act and Franchising Act also 
examined the possibility of divorcement, but instead opted for restricted ownership of retail outlets by the 
Majors.  Self service bans prohibit customers from pumping their own petroleum at a retailer, and sales 
below cost laws prevent retailers from selling petroleum at a price below the efficient cost benchmark 
determined by a regulator. 
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in fact the Majors often use such laws to bring cases against independents engaging in 
fierce price competition.  Anderson & Johnson (1999) find that these laws add 1.6 cpg to 
the price of fuel, which is less than the 6.3 cpg they find for self-service bans.  Skidmore, 
Peltier & Alm (2005), who use a larger dataset and test for longer-term effects, find that 
prices actually reduce by one cpg five years after the introduction of sales below cost 
laws, an effect they ascribe to such laws preserving more independent operators.   
 
Environmental regulations can result in markets being “islanded” when differing fuel 
standards mean refiners from outside the jurisdiction in question can no longer sell their 
fuel there.  The result is market power for the refiners which are active in the market.  
Two studies that focus on this effect are Brown, Hastings, Masur & Villa-Boas (2008) 
and Chakravorty, Naughes & Thomas (2008).  Although each uses different methods, 
they both find that prices rise when environmental standards isolate markets. Chakravorty 
et al (2008) find that price increases are greater when surrounding states do not follow the 
state tightening its standards, leading them to suggest that higher, uniform standards 
impose costs initially as the refineries re-tool, but might lead to lower prices in the 
longer-term than piecemeal changes in standards by differing jurisdictions at different 
times. 
 
Government policy changes can also influence retail petroleum markets.  In the 
Australian context, Delpatchirya & Beal (2001) suggest that wholesale price deregulation 
in 1998 reduced slightly the degree to which Australian retail prices follow the Singapore 
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benchmark and increased the time it takes for shocks to that benchmark to be passed 
through to Australian retail prices.   
 
In some cases, policy does not need to change to have an effect.  Driffield & Ionnadis 
(2000) find that the 1979 inquiry into the UK petroleum industry by the Monopolies and 
Mergers Commission depressed industry profits when it was announced, and continued to 
do so for two and a half years; longer than the inquiry itself, which in any case suggested 
no major changes to industry structure.  The authors find no similar effects for later 
inquiries, and suggest that the large effect for the 1979 inquiry was due to uncertainty 
about its outcomes. 
 
Merger policy can have significant effects when it prevents or allows vertically integrated 
firms to merge.  Hastings (2004), examining a merger between an independent and a 
vertically-integrated refiner in California, finds that the merger increased prices by four 
to six cpg in the markets where the two firms previously competed.  Gilbert & Hastings 
(2005) find that another Californian merger between two vertically-integrated firms 
raised wholesale prices by three cpg in markets where the merged firm faced strong retail 
competition.  Outside the US, Coloma (2002, 2003) finds that the merger between Repsol 
and YPF in Argentina increased prices by five percent, whilst Hyde (2002) finds that 
successive mergers in Australia may have simultaneously decreased efficiency and 
increased market power.
14
  However, Simpson & Taylor (2008), examining the effects of 
a merger between Ashland and Ultramar Diamond Shamrock on prices in Michigan 
                                                 
14
 Although his data make firm conclusions difficult to make, as Hyde himself suggests. 
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compared with prices outside the state not affected by the merger find that the merger had 
no appreciable effect. 
 
The primary aim of merger policy is to increase competition in the market concerned.  
However, government often resorts to more direct means of increasing competition.  One 
proposed scheme in California (which did not become legislation) would have required a 
branded wholesaler to supply any retailer carrying its brand at the same price from a 
given wholesale rack.  This would have removed the ability of wholesalers to price 
discriminate across markets in California through the delivered prices they charge to their 
lessee dealers.  A special issue of the International Journal of the Economics of Business, 
which centres on an article by Comanor & Riddle (2003), examines the law.   
 
Comanor & Riddle (2003) look at its effects by assuming that, at each rack, the 
wholesalers using that rack would adopt Ricardian pricing, and by using information on 
transport costs, they establish that the new rack price plus transport costs would increase 
existing delivered prices to lessee dealers by between 1.5 and 1.8 cpg for branded 
retailers, with effects being three times as large for unbranded retailers.  Commentary on 
the article is given by Keely & Elzinga (2003) (who examine the welfare consequences of 
uniform pricing), Langenfeld, Li & Schink (2003) (who examine the consequences of the 
legal changes which would remove scope for price discrimination) and Marvel (2003) 
(who shows how allowing arbitrage by retailers can actually increase prices). 
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Rockets and Feathers 
One area which has attracted a great deal of attention in the literature is the question of 
whether retail prices respond more quickly to an increase than to a decrease in crude 
prices.  The issue is the topic of a recent special issue of the Journal of Industrial 
Economics (see Hubbard, 2008, Verlinda, 2008, Deltas, 2008, Balmaceda & Soruco, 
2008 and Lewis, 2008a) and is known as the “rockets and feathers” debate.  The first to 
notice this pattern was the UK Monopolies and Mergers Commission (1990), but the first 
to put it to an analytical test, and to coin the phrase, was Bacon (1991).  Bacon (1991) 
uses a quadratic adjustment model, but most of the literature follows the error correction 
model, of Borenstein, Cameron & Gilbert (1997). 
 
As the literature has developed, the empirical models have become more complex.  
Balke, Brown & Yucel (1998) allow for changes in the short and long-term relationship, 
Bachmeier & Griffin (2003) develop the error-correction term via a two-stage least 
squares approach whilst others use a single step, often incorporating threshold regression 
to account for differences in positive and negative shocks (see Godby, Lintner, Stengos & 
Wandschneider, 2000 or Chen, Finney & Lai, 2005) or incorporate state variables 
(Radchenko, 2005a).  Recent studies have used vector auto-regression models (Balke et 
al 1998 and Radchenko, 2005b) or models that incorporate momentum in the pass-
through of price shocks (Al-Gudhea, Kenc & Dibooglu, 2007). 
 
Findings are sensitive to model specification (see, for example, work by Bachmeier & 
Griffin, 2003 and Balke et al, 1998) and to the periodicity of data; more frequent data 
generally providing less evidence of asymmetry.  Sometimes, the day of the week upon 
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which data are collected matters, as Bettendorf, Van De Geest & Varkevisser (2003) find 
with Dutch data.  Noel (2009) points out that one must first disentangle the effects of 
Edgeworth Cycles from high frequency data, and presents a methodology for doing so. 
 
The rockets and feathers response also seems to differ across countries. Bacon (1991) 
finds that it exists in the UK. Borenstein et al (1997) find evidence in the US of 
asymmetries in the link between crude and gasoline spot markets and wholesale to retail 
but not between spot and wholesale markets, whilst Balke et al (1998) find rather more 
mixed results. Kirchgasser & Kubler (1992) find evidence from Germany in the 1970s of 
a reverse asymmetry (a faster response to crude price decreases than increases). Duffy-
Deano (1996) finds evidence of asymmetries in Salt Lake City.  Godby et al (2000) find 
no evidence of asymmetry in Canada and Galeotti, Lanza & Manera (2003) find evidence 
of both long and short-run asymmetries in Germany, the UK, Italy and Spain. 
 
There is considerable debate about what might cause the asymmetric adjustments.  Noel 
(2009), suggests that retail price cycles might play a role.  Borenstein et al (1997) suggest 
that focal point equilibria (based upon Green & Porter‟s, 1984, trigger price model) might 
slow the response to downward cost shocks, or that inventory effects might be 
asymmetric, or that volatile crude prices might cause a signal extraction problem for 
consumers that lowers the payoff from search and thus the incentive to lower retail 
prices.  Brown & Yucel (2000) suggest that inventory effects might be credible but that, 
if they are, then market power is not the main issue, and endeavours to ameliorate 
asymmetries might have unforeseen effects on responses to crude price shocks.  Johnson 
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(2002) makes use of the fact that diesel buyers (in the US at least) are usually commercial 
operators who buy in volume and are thus better informed that petroleum buyers to test 
whether diesel prices have less asymmetric responses to crude price shocks, and finds 
that they do, supporting a signal extraction explanation.  Radchenko (2005b) adopts a 
more complex Bayesian updating model for consumer search, and finds that both this and 
a tacit collusion model are credible explanations, based upon the inverse relationship he 
finds between asymmetries and the variability of input prices. 
Elasticity of Demand and Drivers of Petroleum Demand 
Limited literature exists on elasticity of demand at the level of the individual retail 
petroleum outlet.  Slade (1986) estimates own and cross-price elasticity for 13 outlets in 
Vancouver in 1983, finding that the own-price elasticity ranges from -0.4 to -7.7 (mean -
4.5) and the cross-price elasticity ranges from 0.8 to 8.8 (mean 6.9).  Barron, Umbeck & 
Waddell (2002) estimate own price elasticity of between -2.012 and -5.045 and cross-
price elasticity of between 2.0 and 4.9, depending upon the grade of petroleum and 
whether the retail petroleum outlet was in a low density, medium density or high density 
area (based upon the number of nearby alternative sellers) in Los Angeles.  More 
recently, Wang (2009) uses data from eight outlets in Perth and estimates own price 
elasticities ranging from -5.51 to -18.41 (mean -8.99) and cross price elasticities range 
from 0.21 to 11.39 (mean 3.46). 
 
The literature on the elasticity of demand for retail petroleum at the level of the market is 
much larger.  Dahl & Sterner (1991) conduct a meta-analysis based on more than 100 
studies, and Graham & Glaister (2002) update the work with studies undertaken since 
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1992.  Epsey (1996,1998) and Goodwin, Dargay & Hanly (2004) also conduct meta-
analyses, and Brons, Njiekamp, Pels & Reitveld (2006) and Breunig & Gisz (2009) are 
two more recent examples that include Australian data.   
 
The market-level literature is useful because it provides an understanding of which 
demand-side factors influence elasticity, and hence demand for retail petroleum.  This 
then forms an input into Chapter Six.  Table 3.1 provides an overview of demand-side 
factors which have been found to be important in the elasticity literature. 
 




Monthly expenditure on fuel, total household expenditure, number of cars per 
household, number of cylinders per car, fuel prices, prices of other goods, 
female/non-white/unemployed household head, age and education of household head 
and others in family, number and age of children, location (rural or urban). 
Baltagi & Griffin 
(1983) 
petroleum price and consumption, income, number of cars per capita. 
Gallini (1983) fuel efficiency, vehicle speeds, petroleum price and consumption, income, car prices, 
unemployment rates, characteristics of the automobile stock (such as weight, age and 
proportion of new cars), fuel efficiency of cars, wage rates, scrap values of cars.  
Puller & Greening 
(1999) 
Price of fuel, income, female/non-white/unemployed/retired household head, age, 
employment status and education of household head and others in family, vehicle 
miles travelled, car maintenance costs, price of new cars, number of wage-earners in 
household 
Kayser (2000) petroleum price and consumption, income, non-white/unmarried/female/unemployed 
household head, location (rural or urban and what part of the US), number of 
(employed) adults and children in the house, number of cars, quality of public 
transport, fuel efficiency, automobile stock.  
Nicol (2001) household type, household expenditure, housing tenure type, age and employment of 
household head and members, tobacco consumption, consumption of other goods (in 
six categories), immigration, vehicle ownership, price of fuel and other goods, 
occupation type, income, number of children, location. 
Storchman (2005) per-capita income, annual fixed cost of new cars, price of petroleum, population 
density, country dummy, income distribution by country, fuel consumption, levels of 
urbanisation, private per-capita income, cars per head of population, new car 
registrations, share of imported cars.  
Li, Von Haefen & 
Timmins (2008) 
New vehicle sales, vehicle registrations by location and model, household income, 
population, average household size, depth of snow in winter, fuel prices, fuel taxes, 
vehicle fuel efficiency. 
Breunig & Gisz 
(2009) 




Market Behaviour Models 
There is a large literature which develops models of retail petroleum markets and their 
behaviour.  Hosken, McMillan & Taylor (2008) explore five different models (static pure 
strategy, static mixed strategy, dynamic collusion, dynamic path-dependency and 
Edgeworth Cycles) but find that none explain the Washington market they study 
adequately.  Similar work has been done by Borenstein & Shepard (1996), Rotemberg & 
Saloner (1986) and in a series of papers by Slade (1986, 1987, 1989, 1990 & 1992), who 
all examine different dynamic models of market behaviour in retail petroleum markets, 
finding rather more support for their models than Hosken et al (2008) do. 
 
The spatial nature of retail petroleum markets has also been explored to some extent.  
Spiller & Huang (1986) examine arbitrage between geographic areas in the North-Eastern 
United States and endeavour to separate out distinct markets.  Cooper & Jones (2007) 
take a more micro-view, examining competition along radial commuter routes in 
Lexington Kentucky, and ascertaining whether outlets compete more fiercely with rivals 
located closer to the centre than themselves.  Netz & Taylor (2002) look specifically at 
spatial models in the tradition of Hotelling (1929) to explore whether agglomeration or 
dispersion is prevalent in retail petroleum markets, finding that the latter dominates in the 
Los Angeles market they study.  Many authors examine seller density and its effects on 
market interaction, including Sen (2003) in Canada, Clemenz & Gugler (2006) in Austria 
and Van Meerbeck (2003) in Belgium.  These three authors find that seller density has an 
impact on pricing, and it has been used by others as a proxy for the competitiveness of 
local markets by other authors, including Hastings (2004) and Barron & Umbeck (2000). 
 48 
 
Some authors have also examined whether the presence of convenience stores influences 
price, and whether fuel is a loss-leader for higher-margin convenience store items.  
Adams (1997) finds that it is not, by examining the correlation between fuel prices and 
the prices of convenience store items.   
 
Fuel is generally considered to be an homogenous product, but retail petroleum outlets 
can make use of price discrimination.  Barron, Taylor & Umbeck (2000) examine the 
differences in pricing of premium and regular petroleum in the US, finding evidence that 
the two have different elasticities of demand, and that the latter is more responsive to 
competitive pressures.  Borenstein (1991) examines price differences between leaded and 
unleaded fuel prices in the US in the 1980s, when the former was being phased out.  He 
finds some evidence that the differences in retail prices between the two types of fuel, are 
due to rising search costs for leaded fuel as the number of suppliers decreased.  Shepard 
(1991) examines the differences in prices of full service and self-service at outlets which 
offer only one of these services compared with those which offer both, finding that the 
differences are greater at the latter, suggesting that such outlets are using the price of the 
different levels of service to sort customers. 
Australian Government Studies 
Retail petroleum pricing is an issue of great concern to consumers and voters.  It has thus 
been subject to many inquiries by different Australian government departments over the 
past few decades, as Table 3.2 shows. 
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Table 3.2: Government Petroleum Industry Inquiries (1970-2008) 
National Petroleum Pricing Inquiries 
Year Name of Report 
1984 PSA, Inquiry in Relation to the Supply of Petroleum Products 
1988 TPC, Study into Market Practices and Government Regulation in the Petroleum Industry 
1989 PSA, Inquiry into Petroleum Product Prices 
1990 PSA, National Inquiry into Petroleum Product Prices 
1990 PSA, Review of LPG Pricing 
1991 
PSA, Report to Government on the Recommendations of the Caucus Special Committee of Inquiry (the Wright Committee) 
into Aspects of the Australian Petroleum Industry 
1996 ACCC, Inquiry into the Petroleum Products Declaration 
1999 ACCC, Increase in the Average Retail Prices in Australia Compared with the Rise in International Prices 
2000 ACCC, Report on the movement in fuel prices in the September Quarter 2000 
2001 ACCC, Reducing fuel price variability 
2004 ACCC, Assessing shopper docket petrol discounts and acquisitions in the petrol and grocery sectors 
2007 ACCC, Petrol Prices and Australian Consumers: Report of the ACCC inquiry into the price of unleaded petrol 
Regional Petroleum Pricing Inquiries 
Year Name of Report 
1987 PSA, Inquiry in Relation to the Supply of Petrol in the ACT 
1990 PSA, Inquiry into Tasmanian Petrol Prices 
1991 PSA, Regional Study of Petrol, Distillate and LPG Prices in Mildura 
1992 PSA, LPG Pricing in Western Australia 
1994 PSA, LPG Pricing in Tasmania 
1994 PSA, Inquiry into the LPG Declaration in Western Australia 
1997 ACCC, Autogas Pricing in Geelong 
1998 ACCC, Victorian LPG Autogas Prices 
1999 ACCC, Review of LPG Autogas Prices and LPG Cylinder Prices in Western Australia 
2002 ACCC, Terminal gate pricing arrangements in Australia and other fuel pricing arrangements in Western Australia 
State & Territory Inquiries  
State Year Name of Report 
NSW 1995 Commission of Inquiry into Petrol Prices in Rural NSW 
NSW 1999 NSW Dept of Fair Trading, Inquiry into Petrol Price Signs 
NSW 1999 
Australian Centre for Co-operative Research and Development, Development of Co-operative-Type Structures for 
Lowering Petrol Prices in Rural NSW 
NSW 1999 Western Research Institute, Enhancing Competition in the Petroleum Industry - The Role of Co-operatives 
Vic 1993 
Victorian Coalition Backbench Committee, Discussion Paper on the Disparity between Country and 
Metropolitan Fuel Prices 
Vic 2001 
Consumer and Business Affairs Victoria, Information on Fuel Price Trends in Victoria: Victorian Fuel Price 
Monitoring Initiative 
Vic 2001 Economic Development Committee, Impact of GST in Victoria 
Vic 2006 Consumer Affairs Victoria, Report on Automotive Fuel Prices in Victoria 
Qld 2000 Fuel Taskforce Report 
Qld 2006 Queensland Legislative Assembly, Inquiry into petrol pricing in Queensland 
Qld 2007 QLD Treasury, Queensland Treasury Fuel Subsidy taskforce Report 
Qld 2007 Queensland Fuel Subsidy Commission Inquiry Report 
WA 2000 
Legislative Assembly of WA, Select Committee on Pricing of Petroleum Products, Getting a Fair Deal for 
Western Australian Motorists 
SA 2001 NCP Review of the Petroleum Products Regulation Act 1995 
SA 2001 Select Committee on Petrol, Diesel and LPG Pricing Report 




Table 3.2: Government Petroleum Industry Inquiries (1970-2008) continued 
State & Territory Inquiries continued. 
State Year Name of Report 
Tas 1995 Tasmanian Legislative Council Select Committee on Petrol Pricing Report 
ACT 1992 ACT Government Working Group on Petrol Prices Report 
ACT 1997 ACT Legislative Assembly Select Committee, Inquiry into Petrol Prices in the ACT 
ACT 2001 ACT Independent Competition & Regulatory Commission, Summary Report: Inquiry into Motor Vehicle Prices 
NT 2005 Northern Territory Government, Inquiry into fuel prices in the Northern Territory 
Commonwealth inquiries other than pricing 
Year Name of Report 
1976 Royal Commission on Petroleum. Report No. 4. The Marketing and Pricing of Petroleum Products in Australia. 
1976 Royal Commission on Petroleum. Report No. 6. The Use of Liquefied Petroleum Gas in Australia, 
1980 Senate Standing Committee on National Resources, Replacement of Petrol by Alternative Sources of Energy 
1985  Joint Committee of Public Accounts, Excise and Deferred Customs Duties, Report No. 224 of 1985. 
1986 Industries Assistance Commission, Certain Petroleum Products - Taxation Measures, Report No. 397, 5 November 1986 
1987 Auditor-General, Report of an Efficiency Scrutiny - Diesel Fuel Rebate Scheme, March 1987 
1991 Auditor-General, Australian Customs Service - Diesel Fuel Rebate Scheme, Audit Report No. 27 of 1990-91. 
1994 Industry Commission, Petroleum Products, Report No. 40, 5 July 1994. 
1996 Australian National Audit Office, Diesel Fuel Rebate Scheme: Australian Customs Service, Report No. 20 of 1995-96. 
1999 Department of Industry, Science and Resources, Downstream Petroleum Products Action Agenda. 
1999 Senate Rural and Regional Affairs and Transport Legislation Committee, Report on the Provisions of the Petroleum Retail 
Legislation Repeal Bill 1998 
1999 Senate Economics Legislation Committee, Consideration of Diesel and Alternative Fuels Grants Scheme (Administration 
and Compliance) Bill 1999 
2000 Senate Economics Legislation Committee, Consideration of Petroleum Excise Amendment (Measures to Address Evasion) 
Bill 2000 
2001 Senate Economics References Committee, Inquiry into the provisions of the Fair Prices and Better Access for All 
(Petroleum) Bill 1999 and the practice of multi-site franchising by oil companies. 
2002 Commonwealth of Australia, Fuel Tax Inquiry Report 
2003 Senate Environment, Communications, Information Technology and the Arts Legislation Committee report, Provisions of 
the Fuel Quality Standards Amendment Bill 2003 
2005 Report of the Biofuels Taskforce to the Prime Minister 
2006 Senate Economics Legislation Committee, Inquiry into the provisions of the Fuel Tax Bill 2006 and the Fuel Tax 
(Consequential and Transitional Provisions) Bill 2006 
2006 Senate Standing Committee on Economics, Petrol Prices in Australia 
2006 Senate Economics Legislation Committee, Provisions of the Petroleum Retail Legislation Repeal Bill 2006 Report 
2008 Senate Standing Committee on Economics, Inquiry into the National FuelWatch (Empowering Consumers) Bill 2008 
Source: SSCE (2006) Appendix Four plus author‟s own research.  TPC = Trade Practices Commission, 
PSA = Prices Surveillance Authority, ACCC = Australian Competition and Consumer Commission.    
 
Although there is considerable repetition in findings, and not all of the studies listed in 
Table 3.2 are relevant to this thesis, the table is useful as it shows the sheer volume of 
government inquiries into the industry over the past three decades.  Pertinent points from 
the more important of the studies in Table 3.2 are highlighted below. 
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The Industry Commission (1994) and ACCC (1996) reports were written prior to 
wholesale price deregulation in 1998 and during a period of over-capacity in refining in 
Asia which restricted profits for Australian refiners.  They devote considerable space to 
both issues, and both advocate wholesale price deregulation, whilst the Industry 
Commission also advocates the abolishment of the Laidley Agreement (abolished in 
1997) which restricted access to wholesale terminals.  The ACCC (1996) advocates the 
use of import competition to restrict the ability of refiners to leverage market power 
downstream.  This advocacy may reflect the then recent decision by the ACCC to require 
Ampol and Caltex to divest themselves of several import terminals in order to facilitate 
competition, pursuant to their 1995 merger proposal. 
 
Both reports cover retail petroleum prices, and note the presence of cycles, but neither 
makes firm conclusion as to their genesis.  The IC (1994) suggests they are initiated by 
independents and exacerbated by the use of price supports by the Majors, whilst the 
ACCC (1996) suggests that they are used by the Majors to squeeze the independents.  
Neither, however, recommends market intervention to alleviate cycles. A decade later, 
the Senate Sub-Committee on Economics (2006) reached roughly similar conclusions, 
suggesting that cycles are driven by competition for market share, demand variation and 
wholesale price variation.
15
  However, in the intervening decade, supermarkets had taken 
a substantial market share, and the SSCE (2006) suggests that they now drive prices 
downwards.  Like the ACCC (1996) and IC (1994), the SSCE (2006) did not find that 
                                                 
15
 The Labor senators on the committee dissented, suggesting that cycles are driven by market manipulation 
on the part of the Majors. 
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cycles were anti-competitive and suggested that, where anti-competitive practices existed 




The Department of Industry, Science and Resources (1999) and Department of Industry 
Tourism and Resources (2002) have released two reports focussing on industry 
performance.  These reports note the low profitability in the 1990s due to overcapacity in 
Asia and recommend more co-ordination of industry policy to improve efficiency.  Part 
of this policy framework is the industry code of practice, the Oilcode, first proposed in 
1989 to replace the Sites Act and Franchising Act, but not actually implemented until 
2007.  DISR (1999) also addresses the issue of import competition, but is more sanguine 
about its effectiveness than the ACCC (1996), noting that its effectiveness hinges upon 
the independent importer having the ability to on-sell the fuel in a reasonable timeframe.  
This, it suggests, may be difficult given the limited number of independent chains of 
retailers not tied to the Majors.  By 2007, the ACCC (2007) is also less enthusiastic about 
import competition, given that very little independent importing had occurred in the 
decade since its 1996 report. 
 
The IC (1994), ACCC (1996), DISR (1999) and DITR (2002) reports are all written by 
Federal Government agencies, and each advocates roughly similar positions, particularly 
in respect to regulation of the industry, which none support.  The report by the Western 
Australian Parliamentary Select Committee on Petroleum Prices (2000) takes a rather 
different tone, describing the WA context thus:  
                                                 
16
 Several of the senators on the Committee disagreed with these findings. 
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“The marketing and pricing of fuel is fraught with deeply entrenched problems 
which seriously restrict competition, resulting in market manipulation and 
excessive prices, especially in country areas” (p.ix) 
 
Its response was also quite different, strongly advocating considerable re-regulation of 
the industry including metropolitan price monitoring, regional retail price controls, 
maximum wholesale price caps, price monitoring of the refineries and a prohibition of 
Majors owning retail outlets.  Few of its recommendations became law, however; the 
only lasting legacies of the report are the FuelWatch scheme and a watered-down version 
of its envisaged wholesale price caps (the tgp scheme described in Chapter Two).  Each is 
very important for the WA retail petroleum market, but neither is as far-reaching as the 
committee wished. 
 
The FuelWatch scheme and tgps (the latter also implemented in Victoria at roughly the 
same time, and adopted voluntarily around Australia during 2002) attracted considerable 
interest around Australia, and the ACCC released two reports (ACCC, 2001, 2002) 
addressing these issues.  The 2001 report focuses more on FuelWatch and the 2002 report 
more on tgps, but both reports cover both issues.  The ACCC (2001, 2002) did not 
support FuelWatch, finding that it likely contributed to a rise in fuel prices in Perth 
relative to the period prior to its imposition and compared with Sydney and Melbourne, 
and also that it was largely unnecessary to restrict price changes given that there was only 
an average of 1.16 price changes per day prior to the implementation of FuelWatch.  It 
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was, however, more optimistic about tgps, suggesting they had likely improved 
transparency in the industry, without adversely influencing retail prices. 
 
In 2007, the ACCC released its most comprehensive review of the retail petroleum since 
its 1996 report.
17
  This report (ACCC, 2007) finds a basically competitive industry, 
particularly at the retail level, which had undergone considerable structural change over 
the past decade as supermarkets increased their market share.  It notes concentration in 
the refining sector but also notes that prices still followed the Singapore benchmark and 
generally react symmetrically to shocks to this benchmark. 
 
From the perspective of this thesis, perhaps the most important aspect of the ACCC‟s 
(2007) report is its focus on price cycles.  Many of its findings are presented in Chapter 
Two, and the report represents the first time the term “Edgeworth cycles” has entered the 
Australian policymaking lexicon.  It finds that the extent of cycling in Australia is quite 
distinctive internationally,
18
 but it does not find that the cycles are caused by the activities 
of any of the Majors, nor by price-support schemes.  It does find, however, that the Major 
with a refinery in the city in question is often the one which initiates a price rise.  
Moreover, the Majors are, in general, not aggressive in reducing price, preferring to 
price-match rather than undercutting.
19
  This accords with Eckert‟s (2003) prediction 
                                                 
17
 It is this report which formed the basis of the Federal Government‟s proposal to expand Fuelwatch across 
the country.  However, as noted in Chapter Two, the econometric modelling upon which this conclusion is 
based is subject to considerable criticism, and the policy roll-out has stalled at the time of writing. 
18
 Though it does not reach any firm conclusions as to why this might be the case, citing a number of 
possible reasons, but clearly identifying none of them. 
19
 However, the ACCC also notes that both the supermarkets and independent retailers follow strategies of 
price matching, and one is left wondering who precisely drives cycles downwards.  The only candidates 
appear to be the larger independent chains, but even they appear to temper their reactions for fear of 
retaliation by the supermarkets (ACCC, 2007, p137). 
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about large firms, which is discussed further below.  Beyond that, the ACCC makes few 
strong conclusions about cycles.  In fact, it concludes that the cycles are an “enigma”.  It 
is likewise unable to conclude whether the cycles benefit retailers or consumers.
20
   
Edgeworth Cycles Literature 
In 1925, Edgeworth published his Theory of Monopoly, in which he addresses Cournot‟s 
model of duopolists competing to sell an identical good.
21
  He explores the case of 
decreasing returns, where each firm can produce up to a limit and no further.  In the case 
of these two capacity-constrained firms, instead of reaching equilibrium as Cournot 
suggested, prices will instead oscillate.  This oscillation has subsequently become known 
as an “Edgeworth cycle”. It has a distinct saw-toothed pattern, as shown in Figure 3.1, 










                                                 
20
 The survey commissioned by the ACCC for its 2007 study found that around three quarters of consumers 
try to buy when petrol is cheapest, but 28 percent bought when they needed it.  55 percent of motorists buy 
their petrol on a particular day, because they believe that day is cheapest. 
21
 The 1925 publication, which is widely cited in the literature (including by Maskin & Tirole, 1988), is a 
translation of Edgeworth‟s Teoria Puradel Monopolio, published in the Giornade degli Economisti in 1897. 
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Figure 3.1: A Diagrammatic Representation of an Edgeworth Cycle 
 
The driving force behind this pattern of pricing is the trade-off inherent in the capacity 
limits each firm faces.  When prices are high, each firm can serve most, or even all of the 
market demand at the higher prices and hence, if each moves sequentially, it pays to try 
and undercut one‟s rival, and thus steal their market share.  However, as prices diminish, 
the firms are no longer able to serve all of market demand alone at the prevailing price.  
The lowest-priced firm captures as much demand as is it can serve at the prevailing price, 
and the other firm then faces the residual demand.  Since the first firm is already 
producing at capacity, the second firm is a monopolist for the residual demand. The 
second firm will thus find it profitable to price as a monopolist, hence its price rises to the 
top of the cycle.  The first firm can then raise its price to a level just below the second 
firm‟s high price and still maintain market share, and hence it does so.  Now one is back 
at the top of the cycle, and each firm has an incentive to undercut again.  The result is not 





Levitan & Shubik (1972) provide a formal model of this form of capacity constraint basis 
for Edgeworth Cycles, and show how a mixed strategy equilibrium involving relenting to 
the higher price can emerge.  Other authors have also explored mixed-strategy games 
with Edgeworth Cycles, and Vives (1993) explores this literature in some detail, but the 
contribution which is most frequently cited, at least within the literature dealing with 
empirical evidence of Edgeworth Cycles in retail petroleum markets is that of Maskin & 
Tirole (1988).  In this paper, the authors provide theoretical foundations for Edgeworth 
Cycles and kinked demand curves as equilibia to an infinite, alternating move game 
between two symmetric duopolists producing the same good for the same marginal cost 
with sufficiently high discount rates who use Markov-Perfect strategies, and who choose 
prices from a finite grid (rather than an assumption of continuous prices, which would not 
give the same results).  Unlike supergame models (see for example, Green & Porter, 
1984, which assumes demand uncertainty and asymmetric information), Maskin & Tirole 
do not require exogenous shocks in order to generate price variation, which is driven by 
the alternating move and Markov strategy assumptions.  In contrast to Edgeworth (1925) 
and Levitan & Shubik (1972), Maskin & Tirole (1988) do not require the firms to be 
capacity-constrained in order for prices to cycle.     
 
In the Markovian framework of Maskin & Tirole‟s model, each player moves alternately 
(which the authors explain proxies the use by firms of strategic commitment in a 
simultaneous-move game), and the set of payoff-relevant state variables consists just of 
the price last charged by the rival firm.  Profits are determined as follows: 
 
 58 





































, 21        (3.1) 
 
Where ct are marginal costs (set equal by Maskin and Tirole, 1988), the profit function is 
strictly concave, D(.) refers to market demand and θi is the share of the market served by 
firm i when prices are equal, and is equal to 0.5 in Maskin and Tirole‟s (1988) model.  
The form of the model shown here is a slightly generalised version of that shown in 
Maskin & Tirole (1998), and can be found in Noel (2008).   
 
Instead of the higher-priced firm serving residual demand as occurs in Levitan & Shubik 
(1972), in this environment of no capacity constraints, it serves no demand at all.  This, 
along with assumptions on discount rates and on price choices being discrete, is the 
source of the cycle.  If prices are currently high, and it is the turn of Firm One to choose 
its price, it will choose a price just below that which it has observed for Firm Two last 
round, in the expectation that for a single period, it will serve the entire market at a price 
above marginal cost, before its rival does the same to it the following period.  Since there 
are no capacity constraints, each firm needs to undercut their rival by only a very small 
amount (one square on the grid) in order to capture the whole market.  Moreover, each 
will do so, in preference to price matching, because capturing the whole market is better 
than capturing only half of it, when prices differ by only one unit.  This, then, gives rise 
to the gradual downward movement of prices.  As prices trend downwards in small 
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increments, the returns from being the lowest-priced firm diminish, and hence there is 
pressure for prices to rise.  The firms play a “war of attrition” at the minimum of the price 
cycle, each waiting for the other to raise prices.  They do not wait because they fear their 
rival will not follow the price rise upwards; to the contrary, since a price only slightly 
below that just set will capture the whole market, each firm knows that, if it relents, the 
rival firm will follow.  Instead, they wait because any price increase will be followed by 
two periods of zero profits; one when the firm raising price does so and one when its rival 
chooses a price just below that which the relenting firm had initially raised the price to.  
For this reason, there is value in making large increases in price, so that the third-period 
profit (when the original relenting firm is finally able to recoup benefits from its strategy) 
can outweigh the two periods of zero profit.  By the same token, this strategy is in itself 
only valuable when discount factors are high, and hence the value of third-period returns 
outweigh two periods of zero-returns. 
 




, are defined by: 
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These functions contain the optimal responses in each round of the game for each firm.  
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Where V indicates the forward-looking value in the period where Firm i makes the 
pricing decision, and W indicating forward-looking value in the period when it does not, 
and the subscripts t and s refer to the time periods when Firm i is and isn‟t the one 
choosing price respectively.  In Noel (2008), the expectation over c incorporates a 
stochastic element associated with marginal cost (see discussion of extensions below) 
which is not present in Maskin & Tirole‟s (1988) original model, and δ refers to the 
discount rate.   
 
Maskin & Tirole (1998) go on, within this framework, to show that there is a certain 
interval of prices within which there will be a focal price (where firms will earn two-
thirds of the monopoly profits), corresponding to the kinked demand curve, and that there 
exists an Edgeworth Cycle that comes about from the best-response functions, wherein 
each party earns a quarter of monopoly profits.  They also show that there is only one 
focal-point Markov Perfect equilibrium, and that a given Markov Perfect equilibrium 
cannot contain both a focal point and an Edgeworth Cycle.
22
  Thus, a Markov Perfect 
equilibrium to the duopoly game outlined above is either a kinked demand curve or an 
                                                 
22
 They do not show that it cannot contain more than one Edgeworth Cycle. 
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Edgeworth Cycle; it does not degenerate into the standard Bertrand result whereby profits 
are zero, and nor does it degenerate into a collusive outcome with monopoly prices. 
 
Eckert (2003) extends Maskin & Tirole‟s (1988) framework by considering firms of 
differing size; in the context of retail petroleum markets, the independents and the 
Majors.  Like Maskin & Tirole (1988) he assumes the lowest-priced firm will serve the 
entire market, regardless of size.  However, if the two firms have the same price, he 
suggests that their market share will be a reflection of their relative size (number of 
outlets) rather than the even split Maskin & Tirole (1988) assume.  The result is that, as 
the large firm becomes larger, the differences in rewards from price matching and 
undercutting to serve the whole market diminish.  At a market share of greater than three-
quarters, price matching becomes the dominant strategy for prices in the lower range of 
the cycle, and this strategy becomes dominant at progressively higher prices as the 
market share of the large player increases further.  Eckert (2003) thus suggests that larger 
firms will be more likely to relent and to price match on the downward phase of the price 
cycle, whilst smaller independents will be more likely to undercut, a finding he tests 
empirically. 
 
Eckert also finds that Maskin & Tirole‟s (1988) focal point equilibrium will disappear at 
a market share of two-thirds for the larger firm.  This occurs because, when capacity 
shares are sufficiently skewed, there is no randomisation between the focal price and a 
lower punishment price that the smaller firm can make which will leave the larger firm 
indifferent between these two prices in the following period.   
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Noel (2008) introduces a number of extensions to Maskin & Tirole‟s (1988) model.  
Firstly, instead of a constant marginal cost, he allows marginal cost to vary according to a 
random draw.
23
  This means that there are now two payoff-relevant variables; the price 
charged last round by the firm‟s rival and the firms‟ current marginal cost.  The added 
complication of variable marginal cost means that Noel (2008) does not prove his results 
per se, but the computational approach he follows leads, in all cases, to an Edgeworth 
Cycle. 
 
Noel (2008) also allows for differing elasticities of demand, asymmetric strategies, 
differentiated products (a more general approach than my spatial competition in Chapter 
Four) and capacity constraints.  He finds that elasticity of demand influences the 
aggressiveness with which firms undercut each other, with higher elasticity inducing 
smaller cuts.  Asymmetric strategies have the effect of one making one firm consistently 
relent, whilst the other consistently begins the process of leading prices downwards.  
Finally, capacity constraints limit the ability of a firm to respond to the price charged by 
its rival, and thus attenuate cycles until, when the constraints are sufficiently tight, only 
focal-price equilibria remain. 
 
In the same paper, Noel (2008) examines the consequences of there being three, rather 
than two firms.  Now, in order for a cycle to obtain, the firm which raises price first 
incurs an extra period of losses, and needs to be sure that both rivals will follow it 
                                                 
23
 Eckert (2004) also explores a model where marginal costs are constant across firms and time, but subject 
to stochastic shocks. 
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upwards.  The result is still an Edgeworth Cycle, but one with more delayed and false-
starts as co-ordination becomes more difficult.  He finds this result robust to the 
perturbations to Maskin & Tirole‟s (1988) assumptions outlined in the previous 
paragraph.  He also suggests that empirical observations of false and delayed starts may 
be due to pricing games being played by three or more players. 
 
One final extension is that of Lau (2001) who shows that it is not necessary to assume 
that the firms play a sequential game.  Provided the firms exhibit strategic 
complementarity, follow Markov strategies and choose price levels, short-run 
commitment (fixing prices for two periods) can arise endogenously.  In fact, he shows 
that non-synchronisation is the equilibrium for a game where strategic complementarity 
and positive externalities exist.  Intuitively, each firm has an incentive to try and undercut 
one another when they move simultaneously (hence offsetting each other an moving 
prices to marginal costs immediately), and this therefore leads to a lower-payoff 
equilibrium than would be the case if they moved sequentially.  Realising this, firms have 
an incentive to commit to prices for more than one period, and to thus move sequentially, 
even when not required to do so. 
 
Empirical Evidence for Edgeworth Cycles 
Empirical evidence for the existence of Edgeworth Cycles is a small, but growing field, 
and most of the examples have come from examination of retail petroleum markets.
24
  
                                                 
24
 There is also a small literature in experimental economics, where researchers construct oligopoly games 
and observe the outcomes when such games are played.  One such outcome is Edgeworth cycles.  Kruse, 
Rassenti, Reynolds & Smith (1994), Cason, Friedman & Wagener (2005) and Leufkens & Peeters (2008) 
are three examples from this literature. 
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The first paper to explicitly reference the work of Maskin & Tirole (1988) in the context 
of retail petroleum prices is that of Castanias & Johnson (1993),
25
 who note that the 
Maskin & Tirole model is the only one of several reviewed that is capable of describing 
the price wars observed in their data (Los Angeles retail petroleum prices from 1968 to 
1975).  They find asymmetries in retail price cycles, as Maskin & Tirole (1988) predict, 
and find further that this asymmetry is not due to changes in wholesale prices. 
 
The first paper to explicitly test for Edgeworth Cycles is Eckert (2003), who tests his 
small-firm, large-firm model discussed above using data from 19 Canadian cities, some 
of which exhibit cycles and some of which do not.
26
  He finds that cities with more small 
firms exhibit a greater tendency to have Edgeworth Cycles in retail petroleum pricing.  
Eckert further extends the literature in collaborative work with West (Eckert & West, 
2004a,b, 2005) and Atkinson (Atkinson, Eckert & West, 2009).  All these papers consider 
case studies in Canada; Eckert & West (2004a) examine Ottawa and Vancouver, Eckert 
& West (2004b, 2005) examine Vancouver and Atkinson Eckert & West (2009) examine 
how prices move across the market in Guelph, Ontario.  Eckert & West (2004a,b, 2005) 
find that firms are facilitating collusion in Vancouver, but fighting for market share in 
Ottawa, led by maverick independent chains.  In Eckert & West (2004b), the authors find 
that price increases tend to be simultaneous across the city, but that price decreases tend 
to respond to local factors.  A similar pattern is shown for Perth in Figure 5.9. 
 
                                                 
25
 Alvine & Patterson (1974) note cycle patterns in numerous US cities in the 1960s and 1970s, at a time 
when vertical controls, ,such as price supports, were widely used. 
26
 Eckert (2002) incorporates Edgeworth Cycles into a rockets and feathers model of crude price shock 
transmission into retail prices using a model similar to that of Borenstein et al (1997).  Noel (2009) extends 
this work. 
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Atkinson (2009) continues his study of Guelph, Ontario, looking at price cycles and 
testing whether their shape is most consistent with Edgeworth Cycle theory, or other 
models of dynamic pricing.  He finds greatest support for Edgeworth Cycles, and finds 
further that the Majors tend to lead prices upwards, whilst independent chains tend to 
lead them downwards; echoing the earlier work of Eckert (2003). 
 
Another author who has examined Edgeworth Cycles in Canada extensively is Noel 
(2007a, b).
27
  Noel (2007a, b) constructs a Markov-Switching regression and examines 
switching probabilities between the different states (relenting and undercutting where 
prices cycles and cost based and sticky pricing where they do not).  He uses these 
switching probabilities to derive information about cycle period, amplitude and the 
vertical and horizontal asymmetry of prices, comparing these measures with theoretical 
predictions about the shape of Edgeworth Cycles.  Noel (2007a) uses data collected from 
19 cities, whilst Noel (2007b) focuses in more detail on Toronto. 
 
Noel‟s (2007a, b) Markov Switching models allow for considerable flexibility in 
determining explanatory factors which drive both the change in price within a regime and 
the switch between regimes.  He explores differences between cities, periods of time 
(days of the week and months), station characteristics (particularly whether an outlet is 
controlled by the Majors or an independent chain), the market penetration of 
independents and the position in the cycle on a particular day.  The latter is useful for 
determining, for example, whether the probability of relenting increases as one 
approaches the minimum of the cycle, something he finds to be the case.   
                                                 
27
 Both Noel‟s work and that of Atkinson is based on their earlier PhD theses. 
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Noel (2007a, b) finds evidence that cycles are pro-competitive as the presence of cycles 
is strongly associated with the penetration of independents in a given market, and weakly 
associated with seller density and market size.  Noel (2007b) tests Edgeworth Cycle 
theory against other explanatory factors such as changes in demand, asymmetric 
discounts from rack price or collusion.  Like Atkinson (2009) he finds greatest support 
for Edgeworth Cycle theory. 
 
Despite the predominance of Canadian case studies, Edgeworth Cycles have also been 
examined in the US, Norway and Australia.  In the US, Lewis (2008) examines how retail 
petroleum prices changed in response to wholesale price shocks brought about by 
Hurricanes Katrina and Rita in 2005, focussing on 85 cities in the Mid-West, Mid-
Atlantic and Southern US.  He finds that wholesale cost shocks dissipate fastest in those 
cities which exhibit Edgeworth Cycles.  Lewis (2008) also explore what drives cycles, 
examining such factors as the market share of independent firms, station density, 
population, income, number of cars per household and land area, finding that only the 
market share of independents, population per outlet and the overall number of outlets are 
significant.  Lewis (2008) also develops a measure of the degree of the Edgeworth nature 
of price cycles; since an Edgeworth Cycle involves lots of small price changes and a few 
large one, Lewis (2008) reasons that the more negative the median change in price is, the 
greater the degree of the Edgeworth (or saw-toothed) nature of the cycle. 
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Doyle, Muehlegger & Samphantharak (2008) use Lewis‟s (2008) median change in price 
measure and data from 115 cities across the US to ascertain factors driving cycles, with a 
particular focus on convenience stores and the market penetrations of independents.  
They find that convenience stores associated with independents result in more 
pronounced Edgeworth Cycles than those associated with Majors, particularly when there 
are two or more such independents in the local market being studied.  They also find that 
greater independent penetration results in more pronounced Edgeworth Cycles, but only 
up to a point; the markets with the greatest degree of independent penetration exhibited 
fewer cycles, suggesting they are part of a tacit collusion which can break down.  They 
also find that cities with cycles are one to two cpg cheaper than those without them, 
confirming, at least in the US context, the hypothesis of the ACCC (1996, 2007) and IC 
(1994) that cycles are pro-competitive. 
 
Foros & Steen (2008) examine cycles in Norwegian data, but suggest that they are too 
regular to be Edgeworth Cycles; prices move slowly downwards through the week, but 
firms almost always relent on a Monday in response to head-office recommendations 
(most outlets are franchises) rather than as part of a mixed-strategy equilibrium.  
However, although Monday dominates, the price increases may still be part of a mixed 
strategy equilibrium, albeit one which allots a very high probability of a change in price 
to Mondays.  The authors do not explore this, and nor do they explore why the dominant 
price-increase day shifted from Thursday to Monday in recent years in Norway. 
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Finally, one author has examined price cycles in Australia; Wang (2005b, 2008) 
examines price cycles in Victoria, and those in Perth (Wang 2005a, 2006, 2007, 2009). 
 
The two papers on Victoria focus on the city of Ballarat, and specifically a case where 
local petroleum retailers were prosecuted by the ACCC for price fixing.  Wang presents 
evidence from court documents that shows not only prices, but the precise times on each 
day when the various parties to the cartel contacted each other to discuss future prices.  
Despite operating as a cartel, the prices of the participants still cycled.  Moreover, this 
cycle has the familiar saw-tooth pattern of an Edgeworth Cycle, with price increases all 
greater than three cpl, and price decreases around 0.2 cpl.  Wang suggests that this is 
because, even in this collusive environment, a price leader cannot be sure others will 
follow (indeed, some followers left price boards blank until they could see what others 
were doing) and hence collusion regularly broke down.   
 
In his five papers on the Perth market, Wang concentrates on three topics; the nature of 
price cycles, the nature of localised competition using a small sample of firms for which 
he has price and volume information, and the nature of the strategic game that each firm 
plays.  In his sample period of June 2001 to October 2003, Wang (2005a, 2006) finds 101 
price cycles, meaning that each lasts roughly a week.  Wang is especially interested in the 
role of branding, which he suggests overcomes the co-ordination problem which exists 
with many players.  He finds that price increases are highly correlated across stations 
sharing the same branding, with Shell, BP or Caltex leading price cycles upwards (mostly 
one or the other, but more rarely, two or three at the same time).  All brands usually 
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increase price by the third day after a price increase, and most cycles start on a Monday, 
Tuesday or Wednesday.   
 
To examine the strength of brand pricing discipline, Wang (2006) conducts a simple 
regression, decomposing price changes into a series of brand dummies. He finds that the 
R-squared results tend towards one on price increase days, and zero on price decrease 
days.  This suggests that brands lead prices up, but that something else leads them down.  
That something else appears to be local competition, which Wang (2009) explores using 
a small sample of eight outlets scattered across the metropolitan area for which he has 
price and sales data.  Examining cross-price elasticity, he finds that each outlet competes 
directly with only two or three rivals nearby, a fact which he confirms via anecdotal 
evidence from the outlets in his sample.  This points towards local competition being 
important during the downward phase of the cycle. 
 
In examining the relationship between cycles, Wang (2005a, 2006, 2007) finds some 
evidence that firms are playing mixed-strategy games in their decision to raise price, 
using an empirical model which seeks to predict the likelihood of a particular price-
leadership type emerging.  Interestingly, Wang (2007) finds that a firm that was the 
leader in the last cycle is unlikely to lead in this one.  Examining the reaction functions of 
each firm, Wang (2005a, 2006) finds that for the three leading brands, the state of the 
other leading brands in the last period is the only significant influence on their decision to 
raise price in the cycles where they are not price leaders. This supports the Markov 
hypothesis that he suggests drives the cycles.  He also find that the non-leading brands 
 70 
(Gull, Mobil, Peak, Liberty and Woolworths) respond in a similarly Markov fashion, 
when one allows for a third day in the rising phase.   
Spatial Competition 
In Chapter Four, I develop a model of spatial competition which admits Edgeworth 
Cycles as its equilibrium.  The model draws upon elements of the spatial competition 
literature, and this section provides a brief overview of the small part of the literature 
which underpins this model. 
 
Models of spatial competition posit that location can provide a degree of localised market 
power if rivals are located some distance away and transport (either through goods being 
delivered or customers travelling to the store) is costly.  The simplest model is a straight 
line of unit length, explored by Hotelling (1929) in his seminal paper.  The equilibrium 
Hotelling suggested was subsequently shown not to exist under the assumptions of his 
model (d‟Aspermont, Gabszwicz & Thisse, 1979; Osborne & Pitchik, 1987, definitively 
solve the Hotelling model), and a substantial literature has developed endeavouring to 
find the equilibria of this game.  Anderson and de Palma, in a series of papers (1988, 
1992a, and see also Anderson, de Palma & Thisse, 1992 and Anderson & Engers, 1994), 
have had particular success in finding equilibria by introducing heterogeneous goods via 
a logit model of demand, Anderson and Neven (1991) find it useful to move from 
Bertrand to Cournot competition, a move which itself has lead to its own literature (see, 
for example, Mayer, 2000, Yu & Lai, 2003, Arévalo Tomé & Chamorro-Rivas, 2007 and 
Gupta, Pal & Sarkar, 1997).  Anderson & Thisse (1989) provide an overview of the 
literature which developed during the 1980s, as do Eiselt & Laporte (1989), with the 
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latter also exploring the questions which remain unanswered in the literature at the time.  
Kilkenny & Thisse (1999) and Pires & Sarkar (2000) provide two later literature reviews. 
 
The main focus of the literature is on finding equilibria in the two-stage game of location 
then price.
28
  The basic tension in the models is between agglomeration, which allows 
firms to reach the whole market at lowest cost but intensifies price competition, and 
dispersion, which increases transport costs incurred by the firm in reaching some of the 
market but allows localised market power.  The type of equilibrium, and indeed the form 
of pricing which is optimal for the firm and society in general, is often a function of the 
particular assumptions which underpin each model.   
 
Positing a market as a straight line means that not all points in the market are equal.  
Vickery (1964) and Salop (1979) extend the model from a line to a circle, on which no 
location has an advantage over any other.  This has sparked a considerable literature as 
well, since it changes the nature of the game, and equilibria which result, because of this 
equality between points in the circle.  Yu & Lai (2003), Matsushima & Matsumura 
(2003), Pal & Sarkar (2006),
29
 Arakawa (2006) and Yu (2007) are all examples from this 
literature.  Gupta, Lai, Pal & Sarkar (2004) compare and contrast the use of linear and 
circular models. 
 
                                                 
28
 Anderson, de Palma & Hong (1992) examine a game where price and location are chosen 
simultaneously, and Anderson & DePalma, 1992, one where price is chosen first and location second. 
29
 They also study multi-plant firms in spatial markets, itself a growing literature.  Pal & Sarkar (2002) 
provide an overview of this literature and highlight how its conclusions differ from models where each firm 
is assumed to operate a single plant. 
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Another extension is to allow for competition to occur within the circle.  Without some 
restrictions, this simply becomes a case of perfect competition.  Many plausible 
restrictions have been examined.  Gupta et al (2004) posit an upstream monopolist 
seeking to spatially price discriminate amongst its customers.  Others suggest the 
distribution of consumers might not be uniform; Lederer & Thisse (1990) present a 
model in which customers are located at nodes on a network and firms compete on plant 
location, production technology and delivered pricing.  Dorta-Gonzales, Santo- Peñate & 
Súarez-Vega (2004,) extend this work by considering oligopolistic interaction between 
firms on such a network and a network framework is also used by Braid (1993, 1996), 
Gupta, Pal & Sarkar (1997) and Granot, Granot & Raviv (2010).
30
  Restrictions need not 
be this complex, however; MacLeod, Norman & Thisse (1988) present a model of 
equilibrium location and price choice in which the only abstractions from perfect 
competition are the presence of fixed costs and the ability to price discriminate on a 
locational basis. 
Much of the literature focuses on a two-stage game; firms choose first where to locate 
and then competition occurs between them.  In Chapter Four, the model I introduce is 
much simpler, considering location to be exogenous and thus focussing on what 
Anderson, de Palma & Thisse (1989) term the “short-run” (and which they show only has 
a pure-strategy equilibrium with price discrimination).  Moreover, most of the literature 
focuses on cases where the firm delivers the relevant goods to a consumer, whilst the 
model I consider has an idiosyncratic structure, whereby customers come to the firm, and 
can patronise one firm at zero cost but must incur a cost to patronise the other.  There are 
                                                 
30
 The latter paper also includes a good review of the literature where the order of entry into a spatial 
market is considered 
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thus only a few direct links between this literature and Chapter Four (see below).  
Elsewhere in the literature on retail petroleum markets,
31
 authors have incorporated 
exogenous location by using measures of distance to competitors (see for example, Netz 
& Taylor, 2002, Hastings, 2004, Hoskin et. al., 2008 or Cooper & Jones, 2007) or the 
density of competitors in a given region (see for example Clemenz & Gugler, 2006 and 
Van Meerbeck, 2003).   
 
The most important part of the spatial competition literature from the perspective of this 
thesis is that which derives from the work of Hoover (1937).  This work was extended by 
McBride (1983) and formally developed by Lederer & Hurter (1986).
32
  Here, I provide a 
brief overview of the model, as presented by Hoover (1937) as it is from this simple 
model that the work in Chapter Four derives.  The importance of Hoover‟s (1937) work is 
that he noticed that firms do no price based upon distance, but rather that, when firms 
have a degree of market power, they will charge higher prices to those customers located 
closer to them (and thus further from any rivals) than they will to customers located 
further from them, but closer to a rival.  He provides some empirical support for his 
model with a case study of Standard Oil. 
 
Analytically, Hoover (1937) suggests that elasticity falls as price falls.  When demand 
curves are straight lines, and the seller absorbs the freight costs, the demand and marginal 
                                                 
31
 There is only limited explicit crossover between the spatial economics literature outlined in this section 
and the retail petroleum literature outlined in the first part of this chapter.  Netz & Taylor (2002) is an 
exception; they set out to empirically test whether retail petroleum markets exhibit agglomerative or 
dispersive tendencies (finding more evidence for the latter) using a case study in Los Angeles and drawing 
direct inspiration from many of the papers listed here. 
32
 See also Thisse & Vives (1988) and the brief review of the literature in Anderson (1989). 
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revenue curves of the more distant buyer, as seen from the seller‟s perspective, are the 
same as those for the buyers who are nearer, except that they are shifted inwards.  This 
means that, when the seller equates his marginal cost with the marginal revenues of each 
buyer (seen from the seller‟s perspective), it charges a higher free-on-board price to the 
nearby buyer than it does to the more distant buyer.  This kind of discrimination is 
difficult for buyers to avoid. 
 
If there is more than one seller, then elasticity of demand changes according to location.  
Close by each seller, where it is relatively costly for rivals to supply customers, the 
elasticity of demand is relatively low.  However, on the fringes of the market, where rival 
supply is a possibility, elasticity of demand will be higher.  Thus, if there is but one 
seller, the price which the seller will charge for the good plus delivery to a specific point 
will lie between two points; the sum of marginal costs plus freight (the competitive 
solution), and an upper limit consisting of the reservation price for customers at that 
location.  If, however, there are two or more sellers, each in a fixed location and with 
overlapping markets, the upper limit changes.  It will now be the marginal delivered cost 
of the next lowest cost rival for each point in the market.  This gives rise to a pricing 







Figure 3.2: Delivered Prices in a Spatial Oligopoly with Overlapping Markets 
 




The upper limits indicate what the firms A, B and C would like to charge, if they had 
sufficient market power.  The lower limits represent the minimum price they are willing 
to charge, given their cost structure.  Actual prices are a function of the lower limits of 
rivals.
34
  Thus, the firms will have relatively little discretion over the prices they can 
charge, and customers closest to each of the firms will face the highest prices.   
 
McBride (1983) extends Hoover‟s (1937) model by developing a more complete 
specification of marginal revenue and marginal cost curves.  The result of his model is a 
range of customers.  Those closer to the firm will face monopoly prices based upon their 
marginal revenue curves.  Further away, when the customers are closer to a rival, both the 
                                                 
33
 Figure 3.2 is reproduced from Hoover (1937).  He does not include a vertical axis, the context of his 
discussion indicates that the vertical dimension is price.  The horizontal dimension is described by Hoover 
(1937) as being elasticity, but this is directly related to distance between firms. 
34
 If the market were a cartel, Hoover (1937) suggests that actual prices would follow the lower envelope of 
the upper limits. 
Upper limit       
Actual delivered prices 
Lower limit 
A C B 
 76 
firm and the rival would prefer to continue pricing according to marginal revenue, but 
can still profit so long as prices are above marginal cost.  The result is more competition, 
whose nature and intensity will be a product of the way in which the two firms to interact.  
McBride (1983) illustrates his model with a case study from the US concrete industry. 
 
Lederer & Hurter (1986) generalise Hoover‟s (1937) model, examining different 
consumer densities (along with relaxation of other assumptions in the original model), as 
well as exploring the consequences of the pricing game on the first stage of location 
choice (something McBride, 1983, also considers).  They find, in a more rigorous fashion 
than Hoover (1937), roughly the same result as in the original model; where demand 
elasiticity is low,the delivered price of the lowest cost firm serving all market demand at 
a particular point in the market will be the delivered costs of its next lowest rival. 
 
I make use of a model in Chapter Four which incorporates a degree of market power 
derived from fixed locations in space, as Hoover (1937) does, and I show that this variant 
gives rise to Edgeworth Cycle equilibria under a variety of circumstances.  To the 
knowledge of this author, this is the first time that a link has been made between spatial 
models of this type and Edgeworth Cycles. 
Network Analysis 
When economists speak of networks, it is most commonly in the context of network 
economies (see, for example, Katz & Shapiro, 1994) or the fact that utility from 
consuming a good or service can be enhanced by others consuming goods or services of 
the same type.  Internet browsers, computer operating systems, bank ATM networks and 
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DVD standards are all examples of this.  In this thesis, however, I take a more literal 
interpretation, and consider networks as patterns of interaction between players in a 
marketplace.  This more literal interpretation arises as a logical consequence of the 
analytical model described in Chapter Four.  In so doing, the structure of such networks 
is important.  Much of the literature on network structure has developed in the field of 
sociology and, whilst there has been some crossover into economics,
 35
 the author is 
unaware of any previous endeavours to study a product market via its network structure 
in the way it is done in Chapter Six. 
 
An important component of the social networks literature is whether the best form of a 
network is one with dense patterns of interconnection, or whether it should contain what 
Burt (1992) refers to as “structural holes”; parts of the network which are only joined by 
a single link between them.  Coleman (1988) advocates the first perspective, arguing that 
a greater number of ties results in more stability for the network and thus a greater 
potential for the creation of social norms amongst its members that further their collective 
goals.  Burt (1992) on the other hand, argues that individuals in the network are best 
served by being located at one of the ends of the bridge across the structural hole between 
two sub-networks, as this allows them to control information flow and thus reap 
competitive advantage. 
 
                                                 
35
 See for example Granovetter‟s (1973) seminal study of job networks, Burt‟s (1997b, 1999, 2004) many 
studies on networks inside firms and his (1992) study of macro networks in the US economy, Ter Wal & 
Boschma‟s (2009) review of network analysis in economic geography, or other work on intra-firm 
networks by Granovetter (2005), Zuckerman (2003), Rauch & Casella (2001) or Lie (1997). 
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Burt‟s (1992) book touched off a considerable debate in the literature,
36
 as authors sought 
to uncover evidence of dense networks or networks with structural holes contributing to 
the performance of those in the network or sought to explore the fundamental behavioural 
notions underpinning Burt‟s work.  In particular, Burt‟s (1992) notion discounts the 
possibility of nodes in the network reacting to a given node having a favourable structural 
position by forming additional linkages of their own (Ryall & Sorenson, 2007, Busken & 
Van de Rijt, 2008).  It seems unlikely nodes would behave so myopically.  Moreover, the 
question of who is in the network matters; Ingram & Roberts (2000) examining social 
networks amongst Sydney hoteliers suggest that networks containing producers with 
similar interests are less likely to find benefit from structural holes, a point which Burt 
himself (1997a) also concedes. 
 
On the empirical side of the debate, authors find evidence of cases where both dense 
networks and those characterised by structural holes are useful to their participants, and 
the general direction of findings seems to be that younger industries requiring flexibility 
can often be best-served by networks containing structural holes, whilst more dense 
networks better serve more mature industries requiring stability (see Gargiulo & Benassi, 
2000, Baum, Calabrese & Silverman, 2000 or Rowley, Brehen & Krackhardt, 2000 for 
examples) . 
 
                                                 
36
 There are some 6000 citations for Burt‟s (1992) book on Google Scholar.  Burt himself has conducted 
many studies (see, for example, Burt 1997b, 1999, 2004, Burt & Ronchi, 2007, Burt, Jannotta, & Mahoney, 
1998) and he shows a correlation between being favourably located near a structural hole in an intra-firm 
network and aspects of corporate success such as promotion, salary and prestige (see Burt, 2000, 2002 or 
2005 for reviews of this literature). 
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If information transfer is important, too many structural holes can be deleterious to the 
network but, equally, networks which are too dense make it difficult for network 
participants to keep track of all the information flows.  Thus, one often sees the “small 
world phenomenon” (see the seminal paper by Milgrom & Travers, 1969, or Watts & 
Strogatz, 1998 for a more recent approach in the physical sciences) of densely connected 
local networks, supported by sparse connections to distant points in the network.  
Reagans & Zuckerman (2001) explore the utility of this kind of network structure in 
research groups. 
 
There is thus no universal answer about which kind of network is better; both play a role 
dependent upon the nature of the industry/firm/social group within which the network sits 
and dependent upon the scale of analysis.  Burt (2000) himself also argues that the two 
concepts are not necessarily contradictory, but rather that each has value depending upon 
the context of what the network is to be used for.  Moreover, as Granovetter (2005) points 
out, there are limits on the number of links an agent can form and, indeed, where budget 
constraints exist, one might expect said agent to form those links which are most valuable 
to her, rather than trying to link with everyone.  The small worlds literature alluded to 
above is a consequence of these limitations and it appears to have relevance for this thesis 
given the shape of the retail petroleum market in Perth (see Figures 5.6 and 5.7).   
Network Centrality 
The density of the network as a whole is simply the proportion of ties which exist 
compared to the maximum possible with the number of nodes present.  This is useful, but 
it is arguably more useful to have a measure associated with each node in the network in 
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order to ascertain how network structure influences each participant in the network.  The 
most common measure is centrality; how close the given node is to the centre of the 
network.  Centrality has been associated with trust (Tsai & Ghoshal, 1998); those at the 
centre of a group will most strongly embody its shared vision and will thus be trusted 
most by others in the network.  Tsai (2000) and Ibarra (1993) suggest that centrality 
captures the structural dimension of social capital and that a central actor will have 
greater access to information, people or resources in a network than will a peripheral 
actor.  Ibarra (1993) cites a series of studies which relate centrality to occupational 
attainment, career mobility, power and external resource acquisition. 
 
There are many different measures of centrality, based upon relative position in the flow 
of information, numbers of connections and the importance of those connections 
(Freeman, 1979), and different measures are employed in different contexts.  However, 
there is an underlying mathematical relationship between all of them, and each can be 
thought of as the end result of a different kind of walk structure within the network.  This 
means that each is a measure of cohesiveness or proximity in a given network, and this is 
a function of network density.  Borgatti & Everett (2005) provide a detailed 
characterisation of many measures of centrality, and their mathematical 
interrelationships. 
 
In Chapter Four, I suggest reasons why, for the purposes of this thesis, Bonacich‟s (1972, 
1987) measure of centrality is perhaps the most useful.  It is based upon the elements of 
the eigenvector of the largest eigenvalue of the adjacency matrix associated with a given 
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network.  The adjacency matrix, a workhorse of the social networks literature, is a 
symmetric, zero-one matrix with a zero in the ij
th
 position if nodes i and j are not 
connected, and a one if they are.
37
   
 
To consider Bonacich‟s (1972,1987) measure in more detail, note first that, if an 
adjacency matrix is multiplied by itself, the result, rather than describing which nodes are 
connected to which, describes how many two-step connections exist between the ij
th
 
node.  If the adjacency matrix is multiplied by itself again, t describes how many three 



















         (3.4) 
 
Bonacich suggests that his measure, which endeavours to obtain the closest measure of 
the actual „bond‟ between two nodes by minimising the sum of the squared differences 
between the estimated and actual (but unknown) matrices representing bonds, is akin to 
principal components analysis in statistics, in that the use of a (suitably standardised) 
eigenvector as the centrality measure preserves as much as is possible, the maximum 
variance in the original.  Mathematically (following Bonacich, 1987), if R is the matrix of 
relationships, and e the measure of „centrality‟, the centrality of unit i is given by: 
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 Generally, they have zeroes down the main diagonal, though this is a convention, rather than a 
mathematical necessity, see Straffin (1980). 
38
 This relationship is true where the eigenvalues of the adjacency matrix are all less than one.  If they are 





         (3.5)
 
 
where λ is a constant, chosen such that the equations have a non-zero solution.  In matrix 
notation, this is expressed as: 
 
Ree           (3.6) 
 
where λ is the vector of eigenvalues and e its associated eigenvector.  Bonacich considers 
the largest eigenvalue and its associated eigenvector as these preserve the most variation 
from the original data in R but, as he notes, any eigenvector/eigenvalue pair can be used 
as a centrality measure.
39
   
 
Bonacich‟s measure can perhaps be understood better by examining a simple five node 







                                                 
39
 However, in a symmetric matrix, the largest eigenvector will contain all positive entries, whilst 
remaining eigenvectors will have a mix of positive and negative entries.  As discussed further below, this 
means that they pick up importance in subgroups, rather than importance overall.  Hadi & Ling (1998) note 
that, despite containing the largest amount of variation, the largest eigenvector might not be „closest‟ to the 
underlying data.  Indeed, as Borgatti & Everett (2005) point out, Bonacich‟s measure works best when a 
network has a single core. 
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Figure 3.3: Centrality Scores in a Five-Node Network 
 
A 0.615 0.664 0.577 
B 0.394 0.342 0.5 
C 0.394 0.155 0.289 
D 0.394 0.497 0.289 
E 0.394 0.497 0.5 
 
In Figure 3.3, we begin with a “bow-tie”, where A is connected to all other nodes, and B 
is connected to C and D to E.  We then remove one link, unravelling the left-hand side of 
the bow-tie such that C is connected to A only through B, and then unravel the right hand 
side such that D is connected to A only through E.  The centrality scores in each case are 
summarised under the relevant part of Figure 3.3.  Node A stays the most central in each 
case.  However, its relative advantage does not.  Removing the links between A and C, 
and then A and D has the effect of making C and D peripheral, as can be seen in the 
middle and right-most network, where C and then D obtain the lowest scores.  However, 
as links are removed, the advantages of the most central node vis-a-vis the next most 
central decreases; in the middle diagram, the fact that D and E are connected to each 
other means that they are more central than B, which is similarly connected to A, but is 
otherwise only connected to the peripheral node C, rather than another node only one link 
from the centre.  Once B and E become symmetric in the right-most diagram (a straight 
line, though it is not drawn as such to maintain continuity of shape), A must go through 
two links to reach the periphery of the network, so its centrality advantage over the next 
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most central nodes deceases.  Note that, if we added links to the bow-tie on the left of 
Figure 3.3, we would also equalise scores as more nodes would have the same structural 
relationship with the rest of the network as A has.  If C is joined to E and B to D, then all 
nodes obtain the same centrality score. 
 
Bonacich‟s (1972, 1987) measure is widely used in sociology, with more than 750 
citations for his two papers on Google Scholar.  An identical measure has also been used 
in geography, and indeed it was a geographer who first proposed the measure (Gould, 
1967) which was later independently discovered by Bonacich. 
Structural Holes 
Structural holes refer to “gaps” in a network; where two groups of nodes well-connected 
internally within each group have only a few connections between them.  Structural holes 
are particularly useful for the nodes which sit on either side of the bridge across the 
whole (the connection between groups), because these nodes can exploit any information 
flowing between groups to their own advantage.  The measures which are most 
commonly used to quantify structural holes are those developed by Burt (1992).  In 
Chapter Six, I make particular use of three of Burt‟s (1992) measures; constraint, 
efficiency and redundancy and in Chapter Four I provide a rationale for the use of these 
measures.  Here, I explain Burt‟s (1992) measures in some detail. 
 
Consider a network consisting of a number of nodes with a pattern of connection of 
differing strengths of interaction between pairs.  Beginning with a measure of the strength 
of the contact between two nodes zij, examine first all of the other nodes, q, connected to i 
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and also to j, who thus represent alternate ways for information from each to reach each 
other.  Define the relationship piqmiq, where p represents the proportion of i‟s network 
time and energy invested in maintaining the relationship with q, and m represents the 























     (3.7)
 
 
Here, the possibility for a directed graph is allowed by including the connection from i to 





         (3.8) 
 
This measures the portion of i‟s relationship with j which is redundant to its relations 
with other primary contacts (q).  The non-redundant portion of this relationship is simply 
one minus the above summation, and Burt suggests that the effective size of a node‟s 
network is simply the sum of the non-redundant portions of a node‟s contacts.  The 
effective size of the network ranges from one (which would indicate that the rest of the 
network is very well connected, and all of the information a given node obtains is 
redundant, in the sense that it could come from numerous contacts) up to N, the total 
number of contacts a node has in the network.  Thus, if one divides the measure of 
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effective network size by N, one has a measure of the efficiency of the network, from the 
perspective of the node being analysed.   
Burt then goes on to describe „constraint‟, which he suggests occurs in the absence of 
structural holes.  Constraint occurs when there is a great degree of indirect condition 
between one node and another, which means that, even if the first node severs its direct 
connections with the second, the amount of paths which will lead it back to the second 
mean that the second node can constrain its opportunities for entrepreneurial activity with 
other nodes to which a given node is connected.  In effect, a node has invested a great 
deal of time and effort, directly and indirectly, on ties with another node, and thus that 





        (3.9)
 
 
Where p is, as previously, the proportion of network time one node spends on relations 
with another.  When this expression is squared, the result measures the constraint on node 
i from a lack of primary holes around j.  Constraint is a measure of the lack of structural 
holes around those connected to a given node.  Its maximum is one, and at one, there is 
no-one in the network to whom i could turn to to support it in opposing demands from j.
40
   
 
Borgatti (1997) points out an important aspect in relation to Burt‟s measures above.  
When one has a simple zero-one adjacency matrix, one can only measure whether two 
                                                 
40
 Busken & Van de Rijt (2008) show that the maximum is actually 9/8, rather than one, but Burt (1992) 
suggests it is one, and no outlet in the empirical work of this thesis exceeds one. 
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parties are connected or not, rather than the strength of that connection.  In this situation, 
the measure of redundancy is simply the average degree (number of connections) of all of 
the nodes connected to the node for which the calculation is being made.  Efficiency is 
therefore the density of the network around the node under consideration, multiplied by 
n-1 (where n is the total number of nodes in the network).  The relationship between 
redundancy and efficiency is then one minus this density.  Thus, for a fairly small, fairly 
densely connected network, Burt‟s (1992) measure of efficiency, when applied to a zero-
one adjacency matrix, will be fairly close to being a simple linear transformation of 
network density.   
 
To obtain a flavour of Burt‟s measures of efficiency and constraint, which I use in 
Chapter Six, consider again Figure 3.3; this time with the constraint and efficiency 
scores, rather than the centrality scores, as shown in Figure 3.4. 
 
Figure 3.4: Efficiency and Constraint in a Five-Node Network 
 
 Efficiency Constraint Efficiency Constraint Efficiency Constraint 
A 0.75 0.563 0.778 0.611 1 0.5 
B 0.5 0.953 1 0.5 1 0.5 
C 0.5 0.953 1 1 1 1 
D 0.5 0.953 0.5 1 1 1 
E 0.5 0.953 0.5 1 1 0.5 
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The first thing to note is that, in general, the relative values are different from those for 
centrality; node A is neither the least constrained, nor the most efficient, despite being the 
most central in all three networks above.  Moreover, constraint and efficiency are not 
directly related; although there appears to be some form of inverse relationship in the 
bow-tie, this is a function of this particular shape, where four of the nodes have the same 
number of redundant contacts (B, C, D and E) and are equally constrained by the most 
central node.  However, this is not the case in the latter two networks.  Note especially 
the right-most straight line.  The efficiency scores are all the same because no node has a 
connection with another node that is shares with a third node (like A‟s connection to B in 
the bow-tie, which it shares with C).  The end-most nodes (C and D) are more 
constrained than those nodes closer to the centre because they have no ability to pass on 
or stop any information flow.  However, the most central node (A) is no longer better off 
than B or E, as it is in the centrality scores in Figure 3.3, because, whilst A could decide 
to stop information flowing from B to E and vice versa (wherever such information had 
originated), B can stop information flowing from A to C (and vice versa) and E can do 
the same for information flowing between A and D.  They are thus structurally equivalent 
in the sense of their constraint, even though A is more central than B or E in Figure 3.3, 
because A is connected to two relatively central nodes (B and E), whilst B and E are 
connected to only one (A). 
Finding Sub-Networks 
In many cases, it is not just the whole network which is of interest, but also the various 
smaller sub-networks contained within it.  This is particularly pertinent in the case of 
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Perth, as I explore further in Chapter Four.  It is therefore useful to explore how one 
might use network structure to uncover important sub-markets.   
 
In principal, communities, or sub-networks, are groupings whereby the number of 
internal connections is greater than the number of external connections (Freeman, 1993).  
However, applying this principal raises two issues; it can be very time consuming and the 
results are not necessarily unique.  The time issue can be addressed by incorporating 
some form of search structure, and Freeman (1993) proposes a genetic algorithm which 
does precisely this.  However, the non-unique nature of subgroups remains, and means 
that some degree of judgement must always be exercised. 
 
Girvan & Newman (2003a,b) characterise two approaches to finding sub-networks, 
agglomerative approaches and divisive approaches; summarising the literature on the first 
and devising a new method for following the second.
41
  In an agglomerative approach, 
one first devises a measure of similarity between each pair of nodes and then, beginning 
with an empty network, starts adding nodes in decreasing orders of their similarity.  Each 
step taken represents a different submarket characterisation.  Girvan & Newman‟s 
(2003a,b) divisive approach starts with a measure of „edge betweenness‟ (how many 
paths flow along a given edge connecting two nodes), and then removes edges in 
descending order of edge betweenness, recalculating the score after each removal.  
Again, each round of this process will give rise to a different set of subgroups.  Girvan & 
                                                 
41
 See Wilkinson & Huberman (2002), Radicchi, Castellano, Cecconi, Loreto, & Parisi (2004) and Gleiser 
& Danon (2003) for variations on these approaches.  
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Newman (2003a,b) also derive a test of their model, called modularity, which I describe 
in more detail and use in Chapter Five. 
 
Agglomerative and divisive approaches are precise, but they are complex, and still 
require the use of judgement to determine which step is the right one to stop at in order to 
characterise the appropriate submarket division.  There is a literature in geography, 
however, which uses a much simpler method that, whilst still requiring some judgement, 
delivers a unique result.  This literature stems from a seminal paper by Gould (1967) 
which also underpins much of the more modern literature on graph-splitting, including 
Girvan & Newman‟s (2003a,b) work above.  It is Gould‟s (1967) approach that I use in 
Chapter Five to determine appropriate sub-market splits.  In Chapter Four, I provide 
some reasons for doing so. 
 
Gould‟s (1967) approach is based upon the eigenvectors associated with the second to 
n
th
-largest eigenvalues of the adjacency matrix describing the network.  Since an 
adjacency matrix is symmetric, the first eigenvector will have all positive entries, and the 
second to n
th
 eigenvectors, in order that they can be orthogonal to the first, must have a 
mixture of positive and negative elements.  Gould suggests that collections of like-signed 
elements in each eigenvector might represent particular sub-structures associated with the 
element indexed with the relevant eigenvalue, or different ways in which one might 
divide up the network.  One can thus choose a collection of eigenvectors that allow one to 
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tell a consistent story about the optimal way in which the network should be divided.
42
  
He illustrates this approach by considering the road networks of Uganda and Syria, and 
uses it to pick out regional centres in each country, and the network of towns that 
surround them.   
 
Despite the seemingly ad-hoc nature of Gould‟s (1967) approach, it does provide useful 
results that can be examined in various ways (see Chapter Five).  It has been followed by 
other geographers, most particularly by his students, who use it widely in Africa (see 
Brookfield, 1973).  Cliff, Haggett & Ord (1973) use it to examine airline networks, whilst 
Boots (1985) shows how the approach gives consistent divisions for cellular networks of 
different sizes (that is, a landscape divided into cells), provided the number of cells is 
greater than 20.  O‟Huallachain (1985) uses a variant of Gould‟s methodology to reduce 
the dimensionality of input-output tables, and Hill (1998) uses it to group precincts into 
electorates.  Tinkler (1971, 1975) and Hay (1975) debate an extension by Tinkler (1971) 
that considers flows of information (which he terms „rumour‟ and „anti-rumour‟) whilst 
Straffin (1980) explores the mathematical underpinnings of Gould‟s (1967) work through 
the use of the Perron-Freobenius theorem. 
                                                 
42
 The number of eigenvectors to choose is arbitrary.  Boots (1985) points out that the signal-to-noise ratio 
decreases as eigenvalues get smaller and thus, in practical terms, only a few of the larger eigenvectors will 
provide useful information. 
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Chapter Four: Analytical Model 
Figure 5.9 (p. 178) shows how prices in Perth‟s retail petroleum market follow the saw-
toothed pattern of an Edgeworth Cycle.  The observation is not new, but in this chapter I 
develop a simple spatial duopoly model which admits Edgeworth Cycles as a Markov-
perfect equilibrium.   
 
The model is used in the empirical analysis for its predictions on relationships between 
price minima for two firms that compete.  This is the mechanism by which the decision is 
made to connect two retail petroleum outlets in the network that summarises market 
structure which I construct in Chapter Five.  It is the summary statistics associated with 
this network that form some of the variables in the regression models of price in Chapter 
Six.  I thus do not directly test the model developed in this chapter empirically. Rather I 
use it as a guide to the formation of a network, whose attributes are then used as part of 
an empirical model which seeks to explain pricing decisions. 
Model Outline 
Consider the situation of two firms, A and B, located on a straight road, and selling an 
homogenous product to homogenous consumers who enter the road (travelling in both 
directions) on either side of Firms A and B, but who plan to exit it at some point between 
them.
43
  Assume that the firms‟ locations are fixed and that no new entry is possible for 
                                                 
43
 Customers who pass both firms can access each without incurring additional transport costs, and hence 
patronise the firm with the lowest costs.  Customers who enter and leave within the interval between Firms 
A and B behave like those passing both if they enter and leave on different sides of the intersection between 
the cost of travel curves for each firm by patronising the lowest-cost firm, and those which enter and leave 
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the duration of the game.  Assume that each customer is perfectly informed about the 
price, and that the points at which they plan to leave the road form a continuous, uniform 
distribution between the two outlets.  Assume further that these homogenous customers 
have inelastic demand for a single unit of the product provided price is at or below the 
price a monopolist would charge, taken to be the market reservation price.  This stylised 
model seems apt in the context of a retail petroleum market where retail petroleum outlets 
are neither right next to each other, nor so far away that the pricing decisions of each is 
irrelevant to the other. 
 
Each customer will pass one of the retail petroleum outlets first, and thus is able to obtain 
petrol from that station without incurring any additional transport costs.  However, 
obtaining petrol from the other outlet would require them to deviate from their proposed 
travel plans, incurring a cost to do so.  Customers would only contemplate such a side-
trip if the outlet in question had fuel prices which were sufficiently low to warrant the 
additional travel costs.   
 
If the outlets have the same prices, each will capture the customers which pass them first.  
As one prices below the other, it captures a certain share of its rival‟s “natural” customers 
(ie – those which pass it first), beginning with those which had planned to leave the road 
closest to the (now) lower-priced station.  However, in reducing its price, the firm 
reduces the profits it can make from its “natural” customers, and thus it needs to balance 
these losses against the gains which accrue from increasing its market share. 
                                                                                                                                                 
on the same side of the intersection point behave like customers which pass only one outlet, with higher 
costs of travel. 
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The model is similar to that of Hoover (1937) in that spatial differentiation and a lack of 
entry gives rise to a degree of market power, which is greater for those customers located 
(here, leaving the highway) near the firm in question.  However, it differs in one 
important respect; rather than the firm delivering to customers, the customers come to the 
firm.  Thus, the firm in question has no notion of from whence each customer has come, 
and must thus set a single market price.  The resulting equilibrium of this game is 
outlined below, beginning with a graphical representation of the discussion above is 
shown in Figure 4.1. 
 
Figure 4.1: Pricing Game for Two Retail Petroleum Outlets 
 
To specify the model more formally, consider the case whereby the two firms play a 
sequential move game, with the Markov assumption imposed, as in Maskin & Tirole 








Cost of travel to A for 
customers who pass B first 
Cost of travel to B for 
customers who pass A first 
x 
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price of its rival in the previous period, the quantity of consumers passing each firm first 
(its “natural” customers) and the marginal cost each firm faces. 




















        (4.1) 
Where: 
pi = price charged by firm i. 
qi = number of overall customers that are the “natural” customers of firm i. 
δ = the proportion of the higher-priced firm‟s customers that are lost to the lower-priced 
firm. 
 
In the relatively simple situation shown in Figure 4.1 and described above, it is possible 
to solve for δ through some straightforward geometry.  Note that with a uniform 
distribution of leaving points for the highway, the probability that a given customer will 
leave at a given point is 1/d, where d is the distance between the two firms.  Thus, x/d in 
Figure 4.1 above represents δ; the proportion of customers who pass Firm B first, and 
who might be induced to travel on to Firm A by virtue of the difference between their 





          (4.2) 
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Where tanα = the per-unit cost of travel (cost/distance).  Thus, Equation 4.1 can be 




















































      (4.3) 
 
Note that in this instance, because of the uniform distribution of leaving points, the 
lower-priced firm will always capture some of the customers which pass the higher-
priced firm first, except when the firms are an infinite distance apart.  A more realistic 
distribution of leaving points, which saw all customers leave after a certain point, would 
be appropriate in a general sense, but for retail petroleum outlets located relatively close 
to each other, Equation 4.3 seems reasonable.  Note also that if the firms are adjacent to 
each other, they will capture all of their rival‟s market share through undercutting, and 
the model collapses to that of Maskin & Tirole (1988). 
 
The profit function for each firm when demand is described by Equation 4.3 will thus be: 
   
 



















































    (4.4) 
  
Where pi, qi  and tanα are defined as previously, and ci = marginal cost of firm i. 
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The dynamic price path traced out as each firm optimises in response to its rival can be 
rather complex.  To simplify, and ultimately explore the Markov-perfect equilibrium, I 
thus consider a simplified version of the model, which highlights its important dynamics. 
Simple Model 
In order to explore the equilibria of this model, I begin with its most simple 
characterisation; where marginal costs are assumed equal and set equal to zero, and each 




















































      (4.5) 
 
To begin the sketch of the Markov perfect equilibrium, consider first the case where Firm 
B arbitrarily sets its price at p
*
, greater than the minimum price that firm is willing to 
accept.  The optimal response for Firm A is found by taking the derivative of the profit 
function in Equation 4.5 and setting it to zero.  Since the firm can always increase its 
profit by undercutting (most obvious by reference to Equation 4.1) at any price above the 









































































      (4.6)
 
Firm B then responds to this optimal price in the same way,
44
 since the game is 
symmetric, and if we express this response in terms of the initial price chosen (p*), then 




1 pdpB           (4.7) 
 




1 pdpA           (4.8) 
 




1 pdp kk           (4.9) 
 
                                                 
44
 That is, substitute pA for p* and pB for pA. 
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At the limit, the equilibrium best response is: 
 
tandp            (4.10) 
 
Once one of the firms reaches this point, its opposite number has the same optimal best 
response in a single-shot game, and thus the two firms reach a static equilibrium.  
However, this is not a dynamic equilibrium; if one of the firms relents (increases its 
price), both can increase their prices, and hence profits, over the course of a new cycle.  
Relenting is, as Maskin & Tirole (1988) suggest, a public good; each would prefer that 
the other do so first.  Thus, at the minimum of each cycle, the two firms will play a mixed 
strategy „war of attrition‟ (provided each has a discount factor (δ) near one)
45
 in an 
endeavour to entice their rival to raise price first.   
 
The exact form of the mixed strategy equilibrium will depend upon the parameters of the 
game (how far apart the two firms are, the cost of travel and so on) which would dictate 
profits over a whole cycle.  However, one can explore how the game might unfold by 
using an example.  Consider the first four rounds of a game where the initial move is an 
increase in price to the maximum price possible, p (the monopoly or reservation price for 
the market, beyond which demand is zero).  There is good reason to expect that this will 
be the price to which the firm which relents moves to because each subsequent best-
response prices is a fraction of the relenting price.  Thus, profits are maximised in the 
                                                 
45
 Where δ = exp(-rT) with r being the relevant interest rate and T being the time between successive 
rounds of the game, as in Maskin & Tirole (1988).  A high discount factor will therefore mean that the 
future has a very similar value to the relevant player as does today. 
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case where that first price is itself maximised.  Also, note that the profits available to each 
firm in a given round of the game if neither relents will be as follows: 
 
 tanqdi           (4.11) 
 
This is important in calculating the net profits for each firm over the four rounds of the 
game.  In Table 4.1, note that the cells coloured grey indicate which outlet is making a 
pricing decision in each round of the game.  Firm B moves first. 
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Table 4.1: Four-Round Game Results 
 Best Response Price Profits 
 Firm A Firm B Firm A Firm B 
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Round 1  pd tan
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Round 2  pd tan
2
1 2   pd tan3
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Round 3  pd tan7
8
1 2   pd tan3
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Round 4  pd tan7
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Net Profits  
(sum of profits minus tan5qd
 
 – the profits each firm would obtain if both 



















Table 4.1 suggests that, depending upon the values of the relevant parameters, there will 
be cases where cycling gives higher profits than both firms remaining at the minimum 
price.  If the initial price p  in Table 4.1 is defined as being equal to δdtanα, with δ>1 
(that is, p is a multiple of the minimum price), both firms engaged in the five rounds of 
interaction shown in Table 4.1 emerge with positive profits for values of δ between 1.1 
and 1.9.  There thus seems to be scope for suggesting that, rather than the static 
equilibrium shown in Equation 4.10 being stable in a dynamic game, situations where the 
two firms instead play a mixed strategy equilibrium designed to facilitate relenting, but to 
prevent one firm from always relenting first, might not be uncommon.   
 
I now turn to the question of whether the price path shown in Equations 4.6 to 4.10 is an 
equilibrium.  As outlined in Chapter Three, one can construct a dynamic reaction 
function outlining each firm‟s optimal response to its rival thus: 
 
   jtiiti pRpR 1          (4.12) 
 
Following Maskin & Tirole (1988), a Markov perfect equilibrium in this context is a pair 
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Where (Vi) denotes the value function associated with the round in which firm i makes 
the pricing decision, and (Wi) denotes the value function associated with the period in 
which firm j makes the pricing decision.  The other variables are as denoted previously 
 
In this instance, the reaction functions comprise the optimal response results summarised 
in Equations 4.6 through 4.10.  Reorganising these into a table similar to Tables I and II 
in Maskin & Tirole (1988, p575 & 576), beginning with the maximum price of p and 
incorporating the incentive to mix strategies at the minimum price in order to induce a 















































I claim that this is a Markov perfect equilibrium, provided that the discount rate is close 
to one.  Formally, this would require that both elements in Equation 4.13 are satisfied by 
the strategies in Table 4.2 above.  This requires verification that deviating at a given step 
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does not result in a higher value for Vi or Wi.  Doing so, however, rapidly becomes 
complicated, even in this simple case, as is seen in Table 4.1. 
 
Arguably, however, one does not need to do so.  Take Round 1 in Table 4.2.  The 
optimum response to a price of  pd tan
2
1  is  pd tan3
4
1 .  If the firm facing 
 pd tan
2
1  undercuts with a different price (denoted p*), then the subsequent best 
response of its rival will be  *tan
2
1 pd  .  This is because, as shown in Equation 4.6, 
this is the best response to any arbitrarily chosen price.  Each subsequent round of best 
responses will, as in Equations 4.6 through 4.10, be a fraction of this price p*.  Since 
pp * , the overall value of the cycle will be reduced and Equation 4.13 will not be 
satisfied. 
 
Now consider the case where the firm in question responds to  pd tan
2
1  with a 
price increase, denoted p**, where   pppd  **tan
2
1  .  The optimal response 
could then be denoted  **tan
2
1 pd  .  Subsequent responses would then depend on 
this price p**, which again is less than p , and hence leads to a lower overall profit for 
the cycle as a whole.  Knowing this, the firm in question would in fact choose pp 
**
.  
Once it has done so, provided it can make some credible commitment that it will keep its 
price at this maximum, each firm will maximise its profits in a dynamic sense by staying 
at this maximum and splitting the market; in effect, acting as a cartel.   
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However, this cartel is highly unstable, because each firm can improve its position in a 
single round by undercutting to the optimal response to the cartel price.  Moreover, this 
incentive is effectively doubled; if it knows that the response of its rival to a price of 
 pd tan
2
1  will be the monopoly price p , then it will also know that deviating from 
the monopoly price will give it two periods of increased profits, rather than one.  Thus, 
the stronger the commitment of one party to the monopoly price, the greater the incentive 
for the other party to use the optimal response to the monopoly price. 
 
The above does not constitute a proof, in the strict sense, of the Markov perfect 
equilibrium.  Such a proof is problematic given the number of variables involved.
46
  
However, it does suggest that Edgeworth cycles are a very likely outcome in a simple 
model such as this, because the alternative, the cartel price, is unstable.   
General Model 
The simple model above restricted Equation 4.4 to a case where marginal costs are equal 
to zero and the number of customer passing each outlet first is the same.  I now explore 
the consequences of relaxing each of these assumptions.  The elements of each dynamic 
reaction function are more complex, but a similar pattern emerges as in the simple model.  
It seems likely that a Markov-perfect equilibrium still obtains in these more complex 
models, following the same chain of logic as outlined above.   
 
                                                 
46
 Maskin & Tirole (1988) undertake their proof with a simpler demand and profit function.  Noel (2008), 
using a more complex function faces a similar issue and instead examines computational solutions.   
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Consider first the case where marginal costs are different.
47
  This gives the following 
profit function: 
 
   
 



















































    (4.14) 
 
 Where each of the variables are defined as previously.  : 
 
If Firm B again moves first, setting a price of p
*
, at an arbitrary level above the minimum 
price, which is assumed to exist in equilibrium at this stage and shown to do so below, 
then the best response of Firm A, from Equation 4.13 above is: 
 
 mpdp  *tan
2
1          (4.15) 
 
Where, here m denotes the marginal cost of Firm A, and n (in Equations 4.16 to 4.23 




1 *          (4.16) 
 
In the next round, the best response to this price is then: 
                                                 
47
 When marginal costs are not equal to zero, but are equal to each other, the best responses are the same as 





1 *         (4.17) 
 
The pattern which emerges is similar to the simple case, but with the addition of marginal 






2tan    for Firm A, 





1tan    for Firm B. 
 
Again, this is an equilibrium in a static game, but in a dynamic game where discount 
factors are high, each firm will have the same incentive to adopt a mixed strategy 
approach at the minimum price to endeavour to induce the public good of a price 
increase.   
 
Consider finally the case where neither the marginal costs nor the numbers of customers 
are the same.  This gives the following expression for the profit of firm i: 
 
   
 



















































    (4.19) 
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This is the same expression as Equation 4.2 above.  Now let Firm A decide to set an 
arbitrary price of p
*
, and observe the chain of best responses.  If Firm A sets a price of p
*
, 






p        (4.20) 
 
The best response to this price, when Firm A responds in turn, will be: 
 




p      (4.21) 
 
In these two expressions, m and n refer to the marginal costs of Firms A and B 
respectively, whilst q and r refer to the “natural” customers of each firm.  The best 
response to the above price is: 
 




p      (4.22) 
Again, a similar pattern is emerging, and the equilibrium which is eventually reached can 
be characterised thus: 
 




1 22   for Firm A,  
and           (4.23) 




1 22    for Firm B. 
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This static equilibrium is very similar to the different marginal costs case above, but with 
the quantities of natural customers influencing results.  Again, a „public good‟ is 
associated with relenting, and the two firms will play mixed strategies at the minimum, 
relenting with some positive probability to induce a repeat of the cycle. 
Simultaneous Move Case 
In most jurisdictions, retail petroleum outlets are not restricted in when they make their 
pricing choice; they can react to prices charged by rivals whenever they determine it is 
necessary to do so.  In such circumstances, it seems apposite to consider the game as a 
sequential game, as modelled in the previous section.   
 
However, in the particular case examined in the empirical component of this thesis, the 
FuelWatch regulations require every retail petroleum outlet to provide a price to the 
regulator at the same time.  The fact of prices being reported simultaneously does not 
necessarily imply that a simultaneous game is being played; Lau (2001) suggests that an 
equilibrium where price hikes and cycles occur can be sustained provided strategic 
complementarity exists.  This is because changes in the relevant strategic variable (here, 
price) can produce an externality for the opposing player, which then leads the firms to 
commit to higher prices for more than one period, even when they move simultaneously.  
Maskin & Tirole‟s (1988) assumption of sequential moves make exogenous the strategic 
commitment to keep prices high for two periods and thus begin a cycle.  However, Lau 
(2001) shows that one does not need to make this assumption, as strategic 
complementarity means that commitment can arise endogenously.  That said, because the 
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FuelWatch regulations require simultaneous choice of price, rather than assuming a 
sequential game eventuates regardless of this regulatory restriction, I explore the 
outcomes of a simultaneous game, within the same framework as the sequential game of 
the previous section.   
 
To simplify the analysis, I work with the simple model (Equation 4.5) where marginal 
costs are assumed equal and equal to zero, and each firm has the same number of 




















































      (4.5) 
 
If one makes no further assumptions, and one assumes that firms play the game in a 
myopic fashion, then the firms move instantaneously through Equations 4.6 to 4.10.  
However, this is not what one observes empirically; firms in Perth generally follow an 
Edgeworth cycle in their pricing.  Thus, to explore why this might happen, I make an 
additional assumption; that there is some exogenous limit to the size of their choices of 
price decrease each time they play the simultaneous game.  That is, in terms of choice of 
price, if the current lowest price amongst the two players is pt, I assume that each has 








Here m is the monopoly or maximum price, and k is the (exogenously imposed) 
maximum size of any undercut.  Thus, each firm can choose to undercut the current price 
by up to some discrete amount k,
48
 to play the same price again, or to return to the 
monopoly price.
49
   
 
I do not claim any proofs in the discussion below, but instead explore the structure of the 
game in the context of the exogenous restrictions.  The result, I suggest, allows the 
formation of some interesting conjectures as to how Edgeworth cycles might emerge if 
firms play a simultaneous pricing game.  In the discussion, I set m=5, and explore the 
consequences of k=1, 2 and 3. 
Game with k=1 
In this instance, since the minimum value of k is one, each firm has only one undercutting 
choice; to undercut by a cent.  Consider the case where the current price is 5cpl.
50
  There 
                                                 
48
 Maskin & Tirole (1988) make the same assumption that prices are discrete numbers, rather than being 
part of a continuum, and this same assumption is carried forward in the rest of the literature.  This is 
partially because the model changes with continuous prices, but also because prices are not generally 
continuous.  In the Perth retail petroleum market, for example, the minimum change in price legally 
allowed is 0.1 cpl. 
49
 In the games outlined below, it can be relatively easily verified that the maximum price dominates any 
other price above that charged by a rival. 
50
 Throughout this section, I make reference to “the current price”.  By this, I mean the current minimum of 
the two prices being charged by the firms at present.  The expression is intended as shorthand to avoid 
making the text overly difficult to read. 
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are two choices which each firm can make; they can stay at five cpl, or reduce to four cpl.  
There are thus four possible situations.  These are shown in Table 4.4. 
 
Table 4.3: Price and Profit Outcomes for pt=5, k=1 
 A B C D 
Pi,t+1=5, 
pj,t+1=5 
Pi,t+1=5, pj,t+1=4 Pi,t+1=4, pj,t+1=5 Pi,t+1=4, 
pj,t+1=4 



















Here tan α is the cost of travel, as in the previous section and d is the distance between 
the two retail petroleum outlets.  Note first the nomenclature, as this will carry forward to 
all examples below, some of which have too many outcomes to place in a table such as 
this.  In each case, we start with pi,t+1=5, pj,t+1=5.  This is labelled “A”.  Next, pj,t+1 is 
reduced by one, and this is labelled “B”.  If k were greater than one, as it is in the next 
two games below, then we would have moved through the other choices of pj,t+1, 
labelling them “C” “D” and so on, before moving to the set of outcomes associated with 
pi,t+1=4, and so on downwards. 
 
Note also the outcomes.  Where pi,t+1=pj,t+1, The profit is simply the price.  If pi,t+1>pj,t+1, 















      (4.24) 
 
















       (4.25) 
 
This is consistent through all of the games analysed below.  I now compare which of the 
above situations is preferred by Firm i, and under what circumstances.  Firstly, A is 














   (4.26) 
 
If travel costs are relatively small and the outlets relatively close together (the smaller the 
travel costs, the further apart they can be for 4.27 to hold), B will be preferred to A.  Now 












   (4.27) 
 
If the relationship between travel cost and distance is such that 4.26 holds, then D will be 
preferred to C.  Moreover, since A is preferred to D, one can also say that A is preferred 
to C, and B is preferred to C and D. 
 
Before going further, it is worth exploring the relationship between distance and travel 
costs.  As travel costs decrease, outlets can be further apart and the above preference 
relationships will still hold.  The key relationship is between A and B above; between 
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undercutting and pricing at the monopoly price.  The lower are travel costs, the wider will 
be the circle of competitors for a given retail petroleum outlet, because customers will be 
willing to travel further in order to buy at a lower price.
51
  This makes intuitive sense, and 
indeed accords with the findings of Marvel (1976), who finds more intense competition 
on commuter routes, where travel costs are smaller per unit of distance (in a given 
direction) than within surrounding local areas, where customers might need to navigate 
unfamiliar streets to find a competitor.  I return to this relationship between undercutting 
and the monopoly price at the conclusion to this section, as it has important implications 
for the presence of cycles. 
 
In order to find the Nash Equilibrium of the game described above, I first put all the 
preferred outcomes into a table, Table 4.4.  In Table 4.4, the preference when Situation A 
is compared to Situation B (say) is shown in the AB
th
 cell in the table.  Where the 
situations are equal, the cell is coloured black.  For this very simple game, Table 4.4 is 
perhaps overly complicated, but the approach is very useful when there are more 
situations being compared, so I introduce it here. 
 
Table 4.4: Matrix of Preferred Outcomes, pt=5, k=1 
 A B C D 
A  B A A 
B B  B B 
C A B  D 
D A B D  
 
                                                 
51
 However, beyond a certain distance, undercutting will no longer be profitable, and the firms will act as 
monopolists, which also seems intuitively sensible. 
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In Table 4.4, in Row and Column B, all of the entries are “B”, which indicates that B is 
preferred to each other situation in this game.  Thus, we may designate it as the preferred 
option.
52
  If Row B and Column B are removed from the matrix in Table 4.4, then all of 
the entries in Row A and Column A of this three by three matrix are “A”, meaning that 
Situation A is preferred to everything except Situation B.  If Row A and Column A are 
now removed, then Situation D is seen to be preferred over the remaining Situation C.  




This is the same outcome that I came to above, and I repeat it here to show the chain of 
logic in Table 4.4 because, in subsequent games, there are too many pair-wise 
comparisons to show them all; Table 4.4 represents a way of summarising the work 
required to obtain a set of ordered preferences, which is then used to calculate the Nash 
Equilibrium of the game.  It is to this Nash Equilibrium that I now turn, in Table 4.5. 
 
Table 4.5: Nash Equilibrium of Game Where pt=5 and k=1. 
 Station j 
Pj,t+1=5 Pj,t+1=4 
Station i 
Pi,t+1=5 A,A B,C 
Pi,t+1=4 C,B D,D 
 
As is clear from the presentation of the situations in Table 4.4 above, there is symmetry 
in the game.  Thus, Situation B for Station i is the same as Situation C for Station j.  
                                                 
52
 As noted above, provided travel costs are sufficiently small. 
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Consider first if Station i believes that Station j will choose pj,t+1=5.  If Station i believes 
this will be Station j‟s choice, it can respond with pi,t+1=5, and find itself in Situation A, 
or it can respond with pi,t+1=4, and find itself in Situation B.  Since it prefers Situation B 
to Situation A (provided travel costs are not large), it will choose pi,t+1=4.  If Station j 
believes that Station i will choose pi,t+1=4, it can respond with pj,t+1=5, to find itself in 
Situation C, or it can respond with pj,t+1=4, and find itself in Situation D.  Since it prefers 
Situation D to Situation D, it will respond with pj,t+1=4.  If both firms have chosen a price 
of four, none can deviate unilaterally to improve their payoffs, and we thus have a pure-
strategy Nash equilibrium.   
 
Thus, if the game starts at the monopoly price of five, and each firm is able to reduce its 
price by one cpl, then after one round, the game will result in a Nash Equilibrium 
whereby the price equals four. 
 
Now consider the next round.  Here, each firm has three choices; it can choose a price of 
five (the monopoly price), a price of four (the current market price) or a price of three 
(reducing the price by k).  This gives rise to a slightly more complex situation for prices 







Table 4.6: Price and Profit Outcomes for pt=4, k=1 







Pi,t+1=4, pj,t+1=5 Pi,t+1=4, 
pj,t+1=4 





























































Note that the nomenclature of situations matches the pattern in Table 4.3 above, but 
extends out to nine, rather than four cases.  There are too many pair-wise combinations to 
show all working, so the matrix of preferred outcomes is shown in Table 4.7. 
 
Table 4.7: Matrix of Preferred Outcomes, pt=4, k=1 
 A B C D E F G H I 
A  A A D A A G H A 
B A  B D E F G H I 
C A B  D E F G H I 
D D D D  D D G D D 
E A E E D  E G H E 
F A F F D E  G H I 
G G G G G G G  G G 
H H H H D H H G  H 
I A I I D E I G H  
 
This gives rise to the following order of preference: 
G>D>H>A>E>I>F>B>C 
 
I now turn to the Nash Equilibrium of this game, in Table 4.8. 
Table 4.8: Nash Equilibrium of Game Where pt=4 and k=1. 
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 Station j 
Pj,t+1=5 Pj,t+1=4 Pj,t+1=4 
Station i 
Pi,t+1=5 A,A B,D C,G 
Pi,t+1=4 D,B E,E F,H 
Pi,t+1=3 G,C H,F I,I 
 
Following the same process as for Table 4.5 reveals just one pure strategy equilibrium, at 
I,I, or where pi,t+1=pj,t+1=3.  Thus, the second round of this game will result in the price 
moving down by one more cent. 
 
I now turn to the next round, where pi,t=pj,t=3.  Here, each firm has three choices; it can 
choose a price of five (the monopoly price), a price of three (the current market price) or 
a price of two (reducing the price by k).  This gives rise to a situation for prices and 
profits, which is shown in Table 4.9. 
 
Table 4.9: Price and Profit Outcomes for pt=3, k=1 
 A B C D E 
Pi,t+1=5, pj,t+1=5 Pi,t+1=5, 
pj,t+1=3 
Pi,t+1=5, pj,t+1=2 Pi,t+1=3, pj,t+1=5 Pi,t+1=3, 
pj,t+1=3 





















q  3q 
 
 F G H I  
Pi,t+1=3, pj,t+1=2 Pi,t+1=2, 
pj,t+1=5 






















q  2q 
 
Note that the nomenclature of situations matches the pattern in Table 4.6 above, but the 
prices and profits are different.  The matrix of preferred outcomes, shown in Table 4.10. 
Table 4.10: Matrix of Preferred Outcomes, pt=3, k=1 
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 A B C D E F G H I 
A  A A D A A G H A 
B A  B D E F G H I 
C A B  D E F G H I 
D D D D  D D G D D 
E A E E D  E G H E 
F A F F D E  G H I 
G G G G G G G  G G 
H H H H D H H G  H 
I A I I D E I G H  
 
Note that Tables 4.7 and 4.10 are identical.  This means that the order of preference, and 
the pure strategy Nash equilibrium is the same (when expressed in letters).  Thus, the 
game moves to a price of two. 
 
I now turn to the next round, where pi,t=pj,t=2.  Here, each firm has three choices; it can 
choose a price of five (the monopoly price), a price of two (the current market price) or a 
price of one (reducing the price by k).  This gives rise to a situation for prices and profits, 
which is shown in Table 4.11. 
 
Table 4.11: Price and Profit Outcomes for pt=2, k=1 
 A B C D E 
Pi,t+1=5, pj,t+1=5 Pi,t+1=5, pj,t+1=2 Pi,t+1=5, pj,t+1=1 Pi,t+1=2, pj,t+1=5 Pi,t+1=2, 
pj,t+1=2 






















q  2q 
 
 F G H I  





















q  q 
 
The matrix of preferred outcomes is shown in Table 4.12. 
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Table 4.12: Matrix of Preferred Outcomes, pt=2, k=1 
 A B C D E F G H I 
A  A A D A A G H A 
B A  B D E F G H I 
C A B  D E F G H I 
D D D D  D D D D D 
E A E E D  E G H E 
F A F F D E  G H I 
G G G G D G G  G G 
H H H H D H H G  H 
I A I I D E I G H  
 
Note that this matrix is different to Table 4.10; it is more profitable to charge a price of 
two when the opponent charges five than it is to charge a price of one.  Thus, in a more 
general sense, there will eventually be a price level where the deepest undercut is no 
longer most preferred.  This does not change the pure strategy Nash equilibrium in this 
case, but it also points towards the dominance of the undercutting strategy weakening as 
prices move closer to marginal costs.  This should perhaps be expected, as with less profit 
available from undercutting, one would expect the incentive to undercut to weaken.  The 




I now turn to the Nash Equilibrium of this game, in Table 4.13. 
 
 
Table 4.13: Nash Equilibrium of Game Where pt=2 and k=1. 
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 Station j 
Pj,t+1=5 Pj,t+1=2 Pj,t+1=1 
Station i 
Pi,t+1=5 A,A B,D C,G 
Pi,t+1=2 D,B E,E F,H 
Pi,t+1=1 G,C H,F I,I 
 
Although the deepest undercut is no longer preferred, following the same process as for 
Table 4.5 reveals just one pure strategy equilibrium, at I,I, or where pi,t+1=pj,t+1=1  Thus, 
this round of this game will result in the price moving down by one more cent, to just one 
cent above marginal costs. 
 
I now turn to the next round, where pi,t=pj,t=1.  Here, each firm has three choices; it can 
choose a price of five (the monopoly price), a price of one (the current market price) or a 
price of zero, or marginal cost (reducing the price by k).  This gives rise to a situation for 
prices and profits, which is shown in Table 4.14. 
 
Table 4.14: Price and Profit Outcomes for pt=1, k=1 
 A B C D E 
Pi,t+1=5, pj,t+1=5 Pi,t+1=5, 
pj,t+1=1 
Pi,t+1=5, pj,t+1=0 Pi,t+1=1, pj,t+1=5 Pi,t+1=1, 
pj,t+1=1 




















q  q 
 
 F G H I  
Pi,t+1=1, pj,t+1=0 Pi,t+1=0, 
pj,t+1=5 







q  0 0 0 
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The matrix of preferred outcomes is shown in Table 4.16.  Three outcomes have a profit 
of zero (G, H and I) and if Firm i has the higher price, it cannot have negative profits, 




Table 4.15: Matrix of Preferred Outcomes, pt=1, k=1 
 A B C D E F G H I 
A  A A D A A A A A 
B A   D E     
C A   D E     
D D D D  D D D D D 
E A E E D  E E E E 
F A   D      
G A   D E     
H A   D E     
I A   D E     
 
The effect of some of the outcomes giving rise to a profit of zero changes the order of 
preference quite markedly.  It is now: 
 
D>A>E>G=H=I=F=B=C 
I now turn to the Nash Equilibrium of this game, in Table 4.16. 
 
Table 4.16: Nash Equilibrium of Game Where pt=1and k=1. 
 Station j 
Pj,t+1=5 Pj,t+1=1 Pj,t+1=0 
Station i 
Pi,t+1=5 A,A B,D C,G 
Pi,t+1=1 D,B E,E F,H 
Pi,t+1=0 G,C H,F I,I 
 
                                                 
53
 The firm in question could choose not to open, and earn a profit of zero, rather than negative profits.   
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There is still one pure-strategy Nash Equilibrium, but it is no longer at the lowest price.  
Thus, firms will not move down to marginal cost, but will retain some profits due to their 
spatial market power. 
 
Before moving on to the case where k=2, it is worthwhile considering the equilibrium 
above.  In each of the Nash equilibria in Tables 4.5, 4.8, 4.13 and 4.16, the equilibrium 
has relied on undercutting being preferred to the maximum price.  This requires, 
successively, on tanα being less than 4/d, 3/d, 2/d and 1/d.  The distances between the 
two firms do not change from game to game, and nor do the customers.  Hence, there will 
be cases where tanα<4/d, but tanα>1/d (or 2/d or 3/d).  Where relenting to the maximum 
price is preferred to undercutting, rather than a single equilibrium, one has two pure 
strategy Nash equilibria.  Consider the situation outlined in Table 4.14, but assume that 




Now, Table 4.16 changes, and we have Table 4.17, thus: 
Table 4.17: Nash Equilibria of Game Where pt=1and k=1, but tanα>1/d. 
 Station j 
Pj,t+1=5 Pj,t+1=1 Pj,t+1=0 
Station i 
Pi,t+1=5 A,A B,D C,G 
Pi,t+1=1 D,B E,E F,H 
Pi,t+1=0 G,C H,F I,I 
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There are now two pure-strategy Nash equilibria in this game; one where the price equals 
one, and one where it equals five.  A similar situation obtains in cases where tanα<4/d, 
but greater than 2/d or 3/d.   
 
For illustrative purposes, I turn, therefore, to the mixed strategy equilibrium for the game 
shown in Table 4.17 (an analogous approach could be used for the cases where tanα<4/d, 
but greater than 2/d or 3/d).  From Table 4.17, I take just the top left corner containing the 
two pure strategy equilibria, and I give the outcomes A and B their numerical values of 
one and zero.  Further, I let: 
 
γ = the probability expected by Station j that Station i will choose pi,t+1=5 
δ = the probability expected by Station i that Station j will choose pj,t+1=5 
 
Table 4.18: Mixed Strategy Nash Equilibrium of Game in Table 4.17. 
 Station j 
Pj,t+1=5 Pj,t+1=1 δ-mix 
Station i 
Pi,t+1=5 5q,5q B,D 5qδ +(1- δ)B  
Pi,t+1=1 D,B q, q Dqδ +(1- δ) 
γ -mix 5qγ+(1- γ)B Dqγ+(1- γ)  
 
To find the mixing probabilities, I set 5qγ+(1- γ)B= Dqγ+(1- γ) and 5qδ +(1- δ)B = Dqδ 






          (4.28) 
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Thus, provided 4dtanα>4 (which is true if tanα>1/d), one has a situation whereby the 
larger the distance between two firms or the larger the travel costs, the smaller the 
likelihood of raising price.  This seems counter-intuitive, but is a result of the action of 
the principal of opponent indifference that underlies the calculation of the mixing 
probability in 4.28 above in this myopic, single-shot, simultaneous game.  One way to 
think about this is to consider that, the further apart two firms are, the greater the 
temptation of one‟s rival to change the monopoly price, and hence the more frequently a 
firm must undercut in order to keep its rival from charging this price.  In a more realistic 
setting, whereby firms considered profits over a longer time-frame, and Maskin & 
Tirole‟s (1988) “public good” comes into play, other forces may increase the likelihood 
of raising price, although each firm would still prefer the other to raise price first. 
 
The important fact about the discussion around Table 4.17 and 4.18 is not the mixing 
probability itself, but the fact that a mixed strategy exists in the first instance.  It is not 
necessary to assume some forward-looking multi-period framework, or to assume some 
form of strategic commitment to keeping prices fixed for two periods, or to assume a 
sequential game, in order to obtain an Edgeworth Cycle.  Rather, one will emerge in a 
series of one-shot, myopic simultaneous-move games where the maximum price decrease 
is set exogenously, for a range of transport costs and distances.  Moreover, as the 
discussion below suggests, the Edgeworth shape of the cycle is a product of the size of 
the exogenously-set maximum price decreases, but the cycle itself is not.  To explore this 
further, I now turn to cases where k=2 and 3. 
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Game with k=2 
In this instance, each firm has two undercutting choices, rather than one; they can choose 
to undercut by a cent, or by two cents. 
 
Consider first the case where pt=5.  This gives rise to the following situations for prices 
and profits: 
 
Table 4.19: Price and Profit Outcomes for pt=5, k=2 
 A B C D E 
Pi,t+1=5, pj,t+1=5 Pi,t+1=5, 
pj,t+1=4 
Pi,t+1=5, pj,t+1=3 Pi,t+1=4, pj,t+1=5 Pi,t+1=4, 
pj,t+1=4 





















q  4q 
 
 F G H I  
Pi,t+1=4, pj,t+1=3 Pi,t+1=3, 
pj,t+1=5 






















q  3q 
 
Note that this is identical to Table 4.6 above, the case when pt=4, k=1, it will thus have 
exactly the same outcome, and will result in a pure strategy equilibrium where 
pi,t+1=pj,t+1=3.  In essence, the pattern is the same as was the case for higher prices in the 
game above with k=1; the pure strategy equilibrium is pt-k. 
 
The next logical step is p=3; the pure strategy equilibrium from the previous round of the 
game.  However, for completeness, I show the results when p=4.  A similar pattern 
emerges, which suggests that the relevant pure strategy equilibrium is not an artefact of 
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the choice of starting point.  In subsequent cases, for k=2 and k=3, I take the same 
approach. 
 
Consider, then case where pt=4.  This gives rise to the following situations for prices and 
profits: 
 
Table 4.20: Price and Profit Outcomes for pt=4, k=2 
 A B C D 
Pi,t+1=5, pj,t+1=5 Pi,t+1=5, 
pj,t+1=4 
Pi,t+1=5, pj,t+1=3 Pi,t+1=5 pj,t+1=2 






















     
 E F G H 
Pi,t+1=4, pj,t+1=5 Pi,t+1=4, 
pj,t+1=4 























     
 I J K L 
Pi,t+1=3, pj,t+1=5 Pi,t+1=3, 
pj,t+1=4 























     
 M N O P 
Pi,t+1=2, pj,t+1=5 Pi,t+1=2, 
pj,t+1=4 






















q  2q 
 





Table 4.21: Matrix of Preferred Outcomes, pt=4, k=2 
 A B C D E F G H I J K L M N O P 
A  A A A E A A A I J A A M N O P 
B A  B B E F B B I J K B M N O P 
C A B  C E F G C I J K L M N O P 
D A B C  E F G H I J K L M N O P 
E E E E E  E E E I E E E E E E E 
F A F F F E  F F I J F F M N O P 
G A B G G E F  G I J K G M N O P 
H A B C H E F G  I J K L M N O P 
I I I I I I I I I  I I I I I I I 
J J J J J E J J J I  J J M N J J 
K A K K K E F K K I J  K M N O K 
L A B L L E F G L I J K  M N O P 
M M M M M E M M M I M M M  M M M 
N N N N N E N N N I N N N M  N N 
O O O O O E O O O I J O O M N  O 
P P P P P E P P P I J K P M N O  
 




Note that a similar pattern emerges as for the games where k=1; all outcomes with lower 
prices dominate over those with the same price, which in turn dominate over all the 
outcomes where the firm has the higher price.  Here, however, the best outcome is not the 
lowest price; it is better to charge a price of three when a rival charges a price of five that 
it is to charge a price of two.  Thus, the additional gains from taking market share are 
outweighed by the losses from charging lower prices to “captive” (that is, closer) 
customers at a higher starting price than was the case when k=1.  I now turn to the Nash 
Equilibrium of this game, shown in Table 4.22. 
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Table 4.22: Equilibrium of Game Where pt=4and k=2. 
 Station j 
Pj,t+1=5 Pj,t+1=4 Pj,t+1=3 Pj,t+1=2 
Station i 
Pi,t+1=5 A,A B,E C,I D,M 
Pi,t+1=4 E,B F,F G,J H,N 
Pi,t+1=3 I,C J,G K,K L,O 
Pi,t+1=2 M,D N,H O,L P,P 
 
Here, again, a single pure-strategy Nash Equilibrium exists, and results in both firms 
charging a price of two, or pt-k, as previously. 
 
Consider, then case where pt=3.  This gives rise to the following situation: 
 
Table 4.23: Price and Profit Outcomes for pt=3, k=2 
 A B C D 
Pi,t+1=5, pj,t+1=5 Pi,t+1=5, 
pj,t+1=3 
Pi,t+1=5, pj,t+1=2 Pi,t+1=5 pj,t+1=1 






















     
 E F G H 
Pi,t+1=3, pj,t+1=5 Pi,t+1=3, 
pj,t+1=3 























     
 I J K L 
Pi,t+1=2, pj,t+1=5 Pi,t+1=2, 
pj,t+1=3 























     
 M N O P 
Pi,t+1=1, pj,t+1=5 Pi,t+1=1, 
pj,t+1=3 



















q  q 
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The matrix of preferred outcomes is shown in Table 4.24.   
 
Table 4.24: Matrix of Preferred Outcomes, pt=3, k=2 
 A B C D E F G H I J K L M N O P 
A  A A A E A A A I J A A M N O P 
B A  B B E F G B I J K L M N O P 
C A B  C E F G H I J K L M N O P 
D A B C  E F G H I J K L M N O P 
E E E E E  E E E E E E E E E E E 
F A F F F E  F F I J F F M N O F 
G A G G G E F  G I J K G M N O P 
H A B H H E F G  I J K L M N O P 
I I I I I E I I I  I I I I I I I 
J J J J J E J J J I  J J M J J J 
K A K K K E F K K I J  K M N O K 
L A L L L E F G L I J K  M N O P 
M M M M M E M M M I M M M  M M M 
N N N N N E N N N I J N N M  N N 
O O O O O E O O O I J O O M N  O 
P A P P P E F P P I J K P M N O  
 




Note that a similar pattern emerges as for the previous game in terms of the best outcome; 
again it is when the price is two, rather than three below the monopoly outcome (which in 
turn is better than being four cpl below the monopoly outcome).  Here, however, because 
the starting price has changed, the numbering also changes.  I now turn to the Nash 




Table 4.25: Equilibrium of Game Where pt=3and k=2. 
 Station j 
Pj,t+1=5 Pj,t+1=3 Pj,t+1=2 Pj,t+1=1 
Station i 
Pi,t+1=5 A,A B,E C,I D,M 
Pi,t+1=3 E,B F,F G,J H,N 
Pi,t+1=2 I,C J,G K,K L,O 
Pi,t+1=1 M,D N,H O,L P,P 
 
Here, again, a single pure-strategy Nash Equilibrium exists, and results in both firms 
charging a price of one, or pt-k, as previously. 
 
Consider, then case where pt=2.  This gives rise to the following situation: 
 
Table 4.26: Price and Profit Outcomes for pt=2, k=2 
 A B C D 
Pi,t+1=5, pj,t+1=5 Pi,t+1=5, 
pj,t+1=2 
Pi,t+1=5, pj,t+1=1 Pi,t+1=5 pj,t+1=0 






















     
 E F G H 
Pi,t+1=2, pj,t+1=5 Pi,t+1=2, 
pj,t+1=2 























     
 I J K L 
Pi,t+1=1, pj,t+1=5 Pi,t+1=1, 
pj,t+1=2 




















     
 M N O P 
Pi,t+1=0, pj,t+1=5 Pi,t+1=0, 
pj,t+1=2 
Pi,t+1=0, pj,t+1=1 Pi,t+1=0, pj,t+1=0 
Profiti,t+1 0 0 0 0 
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The matrix of preferred outcomes is shown in Table 4.27, profits cannot be negative, 
which has the effect of bounding situations B, C, D, G, H and L at zero, meaning many 
more cells are shaded than in Table 4.24. 
 
Table 4.27: Matrix of Preferred Outcomes, pt=2, k=2 
 A B C D E F G H I J K L M N O P 
A  A A A E A A A I J A A A A A A 
B A    E F   I J K      
C A    E F   I J K      
D A    E F   I J K      
E E E E E  E E E E E E E E E E E 
F A F F F E  F F I J F F F F F F 
G A    E F  G I J K      
H A    E F G  I J K      
I I I I I E I I I  I I I I I I I 
J J J J J E J J J I  J J J J J J 
K A K K K E F K K I J  K K K K K 
L A    E F   I J K  M N O P 
M A    E F   I J K M     
N A    E F   I J K N     
O A    E F   I J K O     
P A    E F   I J K P     
 




As with the situation where k=1 and p=1 (Table 4.15), all but the undercutting and 
matching moves are dominated.  I now turn to the Nash Equilibrium of this game, shown 




Table 4.28: Equilibrium of Game Where pt=2and k=2. 
 Station j 
Pj,t+1=5 Pj,t+1=2 Pj,t+1=1 Pj,t+1=0 
Station i 
Pi,t+1=5 A,A B,E C,I D,M 
Pi,t+1=2 E,B F,F G,J H,N 
Pi,t+1=1 I,C J,G K,K L,O 
Pi,t+1=0 M,D N,H O,L P,P 
 
Once again, as in the case where p=1, k=1, the equilibrium is one cpl, and this is a pure 
strategy equilibrium.  However, the same phenomenon as discussed between Tables 4.17 
and 4.18 applies here; the undercutting pure strategy Nash Equilibrium in each game 
above with k=2 depends upon tanα being less than 4/d, 3/d, 2/d and 1/d.  Thus, one can 
make precisely the same conjecture as is made above; that tanα might be less that 4/d, but 
greater than one of 3/d/ 2/d or 1/d.  If this occurs, there is once again two pure strategy 
Nash equilibria in the game concerned (one an undercut and one a return to the price of 
five cpl).  The game then has an equilibrium in mixed strategies, and a cycle once again 
ensues.  The key difference, in this instance, is that the steps are larger, because the 
exogenous restriction allows them to be.  Thus when k=2, the cycles have less of an 
Edgeworth shape than when k=1.  I now turn to the case where k=3, to ascertain whether 
a similar pattern emerges. 
Game with k=3 
At pt=5, the same thing occurs as when we had k=2; that is, since the monopoly price is 
also the current price, there are one fewer choices than is the case where pt<m, and hence 
the result is the same as was the case when k was one step smaller and pt one cpl less.  
Thus, here, the case for pt=5 and k=3 (price choices available 5,4,3,2) is the same as for 
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pt=4 and k=2.  The net result will be, as above a pure strategy Nash Equilibrium where 
pi,t+1=pj,t+1=2. 
 
I now turn to the case where pt=4.  The price and profit outcomes for this game are 
shown in Table 4.29. 
 
Table 4.29: Price and Profit Outcomes for pt=4, k=3 
 A B C D E 
Pi,t+1=5, pj,t+1=5 Pi,t+1=5, pj,t+1=4 Pi,t+1=5, pj,t+1=3 Pi,t+1=5 pj,t+1=2 Pi,t+1=5 pj,t+1=1 
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The matrix of preferred outcomes is too large to show, but the order of preferences from 





Note that the pattern is similar to the cases where k<3; all of the times when a firm has a 
lower price dominate over the times when prices are equal, which in turn dominate cases 
where a firm has the higher price.  Again, the lowest price is not the optimal, for the same 
reasons as outlined previously.  I now turn to the Nash Equilibrium, which is shown in 
Table 4.30. 
 
Table 4.30: Equilibrium of Game Where pt=4and k=3. 
 Station j 
Pj,t+1=5 Pj,t+1=4 Pj,t+1=3 Pj,t+1=2 Pj,t+1=1 
Station 
i 
Pi,t+1=5 A,A B,F C,K D,P E,U 
Pi,t+1=4 F,B G,G H,L I,Q J,V 
Pi,t+1=3 K,C L,H M,M N,R O,W 
Pi,t+1=2 P,D Q,I R,N S,S T,X 
Pi,t+1=1 U,E V,J W,O X,T Y,Y 
 
As was the case previously, there is one pure strategy equilibrium; at pt- k. 
I now turn to the case where pt=4.  The price and profit outcomes for this game are 









Table 4.31: Price and Profit Outcomes for pt=3, k=3 
 A B C D E 
Pi,t+1=5, pj,t+1=5 Pi,t+1=5, pj,t+1=3 Pi,t+1=5, pj,t+1=2 Pi,t+1=5 pj,t+1=1 Pi,t+1=5 pj,t+1=0 
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 K L M N O 






























      
 P Q R S T 


























      
 U V W X Y 
Pi,t+1=0, pj,t+1=5 Pi,t+1=0, pj,t+1=3 Pi,t+1=0, pj,t+1=2 Pi,t+1=0, pj,t+1=1 Pi,t+1=0, pj,t+1=0 
Profiti,t+1 0 0 0 0 0 
 
The matrix of preferred outcomes is again too large to show, but the order of preferences 
from this matrix (following the same approach as in previous cases and noting that one 








Table 4.32: Equilibrium of Game Where pt=3and k=3. 
 Station j 
Pj,t+1=5 Pj,t+1=3 Pj,t+1=2 Pj,t+1=1 Pj,t+1=0 
Station 
i 
Pi,t+1=5 A,A B,F C,K D,P E,U 
Pi,t+1=3 F,B G,G H,L I,Q J,V 
Pi,t+1=2 K,C L,H M,M N,R O,W 
Pi,t+1=1 P,D Q,I R,N S,S T,X 
Pi,t+1=0 U,E V,J W,O X,T Y,Y 
 
Once again, there is a single pure strategy Nash Equilibrium at a price of one cpl.  
However, the same set of requirements as for k=2 and k=1 in terms of undercutting being 
preferred to returning to a price of five cpl obtain here.  That is, it requires tanα to be less 
(in turn) than 4/d, 3/d, 2/d and 1/d.  Once again, it is feasible that there may be cases 
where the first of these inequalities is true, but that one or more of the rest are not.  In this 
situation, there are again two pure strategy equilibria (the relevant undercut and a return 
to a price of five cpl), and the mixed strategy game that follows gives rise to a cycle.  
Here, the cycle has less of an Edgeworth shape than in the cases where k=1 and k=2, but 
it remains a cycle.  It therefore does not seem unreasonable to conjecture that, where this 
myopic, simultaneous-move game is played repeatedly, situations where cycles occur 
will emerge.  It remains to explore what might cause such cycles to have an Edgeworth 
shape; in other words, whether there are forces which impose an exogenous k on the 
game.  I turn to this question below. 
Which choice of k? 
There is nothing in the structure of the games outlined above which points to a particular 
value of k being chosen; it is exogenously imposed in each case.  The smaller is k, the 
more likely that, in cases where the costs of travel and distances between outlets favour 
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cycles, the cycles will have an Edgeworth shape.  Empirically, in Perth (as in many other 
cities) Edgeworth Cycles do emerge.  Thus, if the myopic, simultaneous-move game 
described above is representative of how pricing decisions are made in the Perth retail 
petroleum market, then it is worthwhile asking what, if anything, might be imposing a 
small k on firms exogenously. 
 
There is nothing in the regulatory system governing the market which imposes small 
price cuts.  If anything, FuelWatch rewards larger price reductions by publicising the 
lowest-priced sites in the city.  It may be the case, however, that petroleum retailers are 
themselves making credible commitments to each other that any price reductions they 
make will be small, in order to draw out the cycle. 
 
There does seem to be some empirical evidence that firms seek to make such 
commitment.  The ACCC (2007) suggests based on the evidence it received from Majors, 
independents and supermarkets which retail petroleum that  most seek to match local 
competition in pricing, with Majors charging the “going market price” (ibid, p136) and 
supermarkets seeking to match the lowest price in a local market (ibid, p137).  It also 
cites evidence from an independent operator that most independents try not to reduce 
prices too low, or wait too long before raising them, for fear of retaliation through very 
low prices (ibid, p137).  Further, in the discussion on price cycles (ibid, p 170-80) Caltex 
suggests that it and the other majors engage in price matching (ibid p171), which 
Woolworths confirms in its submission (ibid p172).  If firms are making these statements 
in public documents, and if they are common knowledge amongst retailers, then this may 
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indicate a desire to make credible commitments not to reduce price by more than a small 
amount.  Wang‟s (2005b, 2008) accounts of the cartel prosecution in Ballarat point to 
similar findings, with individual retailers repeatedly signalling their intent to only just 
undercut rivals and large undercuts precipitating a price war. 
 
The evidence above is circumstantial at best, but it does not seem outside the realms of 
possibility that, to the extent that the myopic, simultaneous-move game outlined here 
applies, individual retailers do seek a reputation of not being a price gouger, in order to 
make cycles last longer, and thus increase their own profits.  That is, even where strategic 
complementarity does not engender a sequential game, as Lau (2001) suggests, the firms 
may be able to make enough of a credible commitment around their undercutting strategy 
to draw out the cycle to the advantage of all firms. 
 
Although speculative, the model in this section might also explain how price wars emerge 
more generally in retail petroleum markets.  If there is some exogenous shock to the 
system, the tacit knowledge about the appropriate k might be lost, and thus one might 
expect to see price gouging, until the firms learn the “right” value of k again.  This might 
explain some of the “false-starts” that Noel (2007a,b) observes in his data.
54
  Moreover, it 
might explain why Wang (2009) sees price cycles taking some time to emerge in Perth 
after the introduction of the FuelWatch regime despite existing immediately prior to its 
introduction; firms are learning for the first time how to play a simultaneous rather than a 
sequential game in price choices. 
                                                 
54
 These also occur from time-to-time in the dataset used in this thesis; 56 times in around 98,000 price 
points; not enough for robust statistical analysis. 
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It is thus not guaranteed that a certain value of k will emerge.  Nor is it guaranteed that 
the k chosen will be small enough to produce an Edgeworth Cycle.  However, given the 
incentives of each of the players, it also would not seem to be particularly surprising if 
something akin to an Edgeworth Cycle did emerge.  Since the pattern of pricing in the 
Perth market does seem to follow the Edgeworth pattern (see Figure 5.9 on p. 178), and 
prices are chosen simultaneously, the model presented in this section may represent a 
credible explanation as to why this has occurred. 
Connecting Pairs and Constructing the Network 
The link between the theoretical models in this chapter and the empirical work in Chapter 
Six flows, as mentioned, through the way in which the network summarising the structure 
of competition is constructed.  I thus turn to a discussion about how the bilateral model 
outlined above is used to construct the network, and then to calculate the summary 
statistics used to summarise position in that network, for the purposes of the empirical 
analysis of Chapter Six. 
 
Using the bilateral model to build the network requires a simplifying assumption; where a 
retail petroleum outlet interacts with many outlets at the same time, it treats each 
interaction as independent.  Once this assumption is made, the duopoly model outlined 
above provides a simple means of determining whether two outlets are connected, and 
this provides a way in which to construct the network. 
 
If Outlets A and B are indeed influencing each other‟s pricing decisions, then this should 
be apparent in the relationship between their minimum prices.  Recall that, if the two 
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firms have equal marginal costs, they will have the same price minimum, and it will be 
equal to: 
 
tandp            (4.10) 
 






2tan    for Firm A, 





1tan    for Firm B. 
 
Finally, when marginal costs are not equal to each other, and the number of customers 
which pass each outlet first are also not equal to each other, one has: 
 




1 22   for Firm A,  
and           (4.23) 




1 22    for Firm B. 
 
In each case the dtanα is common to both firms and thus, to find relative differences in 
minimum prices, it is unnecessary.  Thus, to the extent that the duopoly model and 
simplifying assumption of independent interaction is correct, to find patterns of 
 142 
connection, one needs at most, empirical observations on actual price minima, marginal 
costs and traffic flows. 
Summarising the Structure of the Network 
Once the network is constructed by categorising all of the patterns of bilateral interaction, 
one needs to develop summary statistics for network structure if one is to follow the 
approach outlined above of regressing these against price to determine whether price is 
influenced by structure in the appropriate fashion.  To obtain these summary statistics, I 
turn to the social networks literature summarised in Chapter Three.  Two issues exist; 
whether density or structural holes are important, and whether local sub-markets should 
be considered in addition to the overall market. 
 
The density vs. structural holes debate is summarised briefly in Chapter Three, and 
hinges around the nature of the industry being studied; if it is mature and stable, some 
authors suggest that denser networks are more appropriate and if it is young and dynamic, 
some authors suggest that a flexible network full of structural holes is more appropriate.  
Retail petroleum is a relatively mature market, but a given marketplace is in a constant 
state of flux as players enter and leave (particularly independents).  Thus, it is not clear 
that one can characterise interaction as being similar to that amongst a small number of 
large firms which have each produced similar products for many years.  Indeed, as Wang 
(2005b, 2008) suggests in his examination of the cartel in Ballarat (see Chapter Three), 
collusion is more likely to stick when the proprietors of individual sites have known each 
other for many years, or even decades.  Thus, there may be scope for considering the 
network as being relatively young. 
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However, there is also the issue raised by Ingram & Roberts (2000) of whether networks 
of producers benefit from having structural holes, as producers tend to have similar 
interests.  Whilst all petroleum retailers have an interest in higher prices, the nature of the 
competition they engage in, highlighted in the model above, suggests that their interests 
are not particularly well-aligned.  Thus, they may not prefer dense networks, even though 
they are all producers. 
 
Finally, as Figures 5.6 and 5.7 suggest, the pattern of interconnection between retail 
petroleum outlets in Perth is locally dense, but globally sparse, containing many gaps.  
Thus, it seems most appropriate to be agnostic in the density vs. structural holes debate, 
and incorporate structural measures from both camps.  For structural holes, the suite of 
measures is rather limited, and I choose Burt‟s measures of efficiency and constraint (see 
Chapter Three), as well as considering redundancy of contacts between each outlet and 
the five most central outlets in its network. 
 
For the network density side of the debate, the measure most often used is the direct, 
node-based consequence of density; centrality (see Borgatti & Everett, 2005).
55
  There 
are a large number of centrality measure to choose from, although each has clear 
mathematical links (ibid.).  The choice is generally made based upon the types of 
networks one is examining, or the types of questions one wishes to explore. 
 
                                                 
55
 Note that, in a zero-one matrix, Burt‟s (1992) measure of efficiency is strongly related to network density 
(Borgatti, 1997).  Chapter Three provides further details of this relationship, which means that much of the 
information about density is likely to enter the regression through efficiency. 
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For retail petroleum markets, the nodes in the network are retail petroleum outlets, each 
of which is an economic agent and, as such, is likely to view link formation as a cost-
benefit exercise.  Link formation is likely to be costly (even though price information is 
free, proprietors still needs to ascertain other aspects, such as traffic flows), and thus one 
might expect each outlet to form links with those stations which are likely to provide it 
with the most information about pricing in the network; outlets which are themselves 
important.  These outlets are then likely to respond in kind, as link formation is bilateral.  
Bonacich‟s (1972, 1987) measure summarises centrality based upon the centrality of the 
nodes to which one is directly connected, and thus seems to best reflect the kind of cost-
benefit trade-offs and choices each station seems rationally likely to make.  It is for this 
reason that I use it here. 
 
Finally, as noted previously, in a market as geographically spread-out as Perth, it seems 
wise to consider sub-markets.  Not only are the distances across the market so great that it 
seems highly unlikely that firms operating on opposite sides of it actually consider each 
other as competitors, but market demand and supply-side restrictions (like zoning laws, 
for examples) tend to aggregate retail petroleum outlets along major roads or at major 
shopping centres in the suburbs.  Figures 5.6 and 5.7 show this small-world phenomenon 
at work in Perth‟s retail petroleum markets. 
 
Conceptually, one could divide the market according to some exogenous geographical or 
socio-political grouping.  For example Perth is split by a Freeway and a river, which 
could be used to divide it in four, or I could use even more detailed suburban divisions.  
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However, such arbitrariness has its costs; two outlets on the edge of arbitrarily defined 
suburban markets might logically be expected to interact more with each other if they are 
closer to each other than to their peers in the same defined market.  It seems more 
appropriate to let the network structure itself determine where divisions should be made. 
 
For this, I use Gould‟s (1967) approach.  Its main attraction is its simplicity, and the 
relative uniqueness of results compared to more complex agglomerative or divisive 
methods (see Chapter Three).  Moreover, as will be seen in Chapter Five, it is not clear 
that the choice of methodology is particularly crucial as many of the more complex 
graph-cutting techniques are based upon the work of Gould (1967) and thus give roughly 
similar results.  Finally, it is also possible to undertake some ad-hoc investigations of the 
results and ascertain whether the sub-markets formed are reasonable, as I outline in 
Chapter Five. 
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Chapter Five: Data Characteristics and Network 
Construction 
In Chapter Six, I undertake a series of regression analyses aimed at exploring the 
influence of network structure on pricing.  The basic forms of the regressions are similar 
to previous literature in their included variables (see Chapter Three), but I add a number 
of new variables summarising network structure.  In this chapter, I explore the 
characteristics of the data which form the inputs into the regression models used in 
Chapter Six. 
 
Table 5.1 provides a summary of the data used, including the abbreviations for each 
variable used in the regression analysis in Chapter Six.  It thus forms a reference point for 
that chapter.  I have grouped the data into a number of families, for ease of presentation.  
The data on price, marginal cost and station characteristics come from FuelWatch,
56
 
whilst the data on demand characteristics are from the Australian Bureau of Statistics 
(ABS, 2006) Census.  The remaining data are constructed for the thesis, and hence the 
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 This is a proprietary dataset obtained from FuelWatch, containing a census of all prices for the time 
period being studied and selected characteristics of each station collected by FuelWatch as part of its own 
data collection exercise. 
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Table 5.1: Description of the Data 


















s Global Burt Efficiency NCHAR1 
Marginal cost (tgp) MC Global Burt Constraint NCHAR2 






Ampol BR1 Global NEvec Centrality NCHAR4 
BP BR2 Local Burt Efficiency NCHAR5 
Caltex BR3 Local Burt Constraint NCHAR6 
Caltex-Woolworths BR4 Local Evec centrality NCHAR7 











Liberty BR7 Curtin SUBM2 
Mobil BR8 Midland SUBM3 
Peak BR9 North East SUBM4 
Shell BR10 Fwy North SUBM5 





Branded Independent TP1 Western Suburbs SUBM7 
Company Controlled TP2 Melville SUBM8 
















Independent TP4 Tuesday DWD2 
Larger Independent TP5 Wednesday DWD3 
Price Supported TP6 Thursday DWD4 





e Conditional Service SV1 Saturday DWD6 
Full Service SV2 Sunday DWD7 


























BP Connect CS1 February MD2 
Caltex Starmart CS2 March MD3 
Caltex Starshop CS3 April MD4 
Mobil Quix CS4 May MD5 

















Median family Income DCHAR1 July MD7 
Average Household size DCHAR2 August MD8 
Number aboriginal DCHAR3 September MD9 
Number persons DCHAR4 October MD10 
Number born overseas DCHAR5 November MD11 
Number of families with dependent children DCHAR6 December MD12 







































Number of families DCHAR8 Min OCO2 
Av Number vehicles per hh DCHAR9 Median OCO3 
Dwelling density (houses per sq km) DCHAR10 Lower Quartile OCO4 
Number of rented dwellings DCHAR11 Upper Quartile OCO5 
Number of state housing dwellings DCHAR12 Below Average OCO6 
Number of dwellings DCHAR13 Above Average OCO7 
Number with post-school qualification DCHAR14 Leader OCO8 
Number employed DCHAR15 Follower OCO9 










































On a main Rd DCHAR17 Min OCS2 
Number of competitors within 5km DCHAR18 Median OCS3 





a Variation at 7 days SPM1 Upper Quartile OCS5 
Variation at all harmonics of 7 days SPM2 Below Average OCS6 



























 Burt Redundancy of most central EGOR1 Leader OCS8 
Burt Redundancy of 2nd most central EGOR2 Follower OCS9 
Burt Redundancy of 3rd most central EGOR3    
Burt Redundancy of 4th most central EGOR4    
Burt Redundancy of 5th most central EGOR5    
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Station Characteristics: Brand, Type, Service and Convenience Stores. 
The regression analysis in Chapter Six uses 208 of the 357 retail petroleum outlets which 
operated during the period under analysis; the 1
st
 of January 2003 to the 14
th
 of March 
2004.  There were a number of reasons for not using the full set: 
 77 outlets were located on the fringes of the city, more than five kilometres from 
the main network, and were thus not considered to be connected to it. 
 46 outlets either closed or opened during the period under analysis, and a small 
number of Caltex-Woolworths outlets operating from shopping centre car-parks 
did not open on Sundays.  Both had incomplete datasets.
 57
 
 21 outlets had fewer than ten cycles during the period (against more than 50 for 
the remainder).  FuelWatch requires all sellers of petroleum to provide daily 
prices, and this includes marinas, taxi depots, mechanical repair shops and others 
for whom the sale of petroleum is a secondary business.  These outlets do not 
exhibit cycles and are excluded because the sale of retail petroleum is not a 
primary business.  
 
Figures 5.1 and 5.2 provide an overview of the outlets characterised by brand and by 





                                                 
57
 Caltex-Woolworths outlets are under-represented in the sample; 20 were open for part of the period, 11 
were open for the whole period (except on Sundays), but only four are in the sample.  The result is that the 
regression models do not reflect the behaviour of supermarkets particularly well. 
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Source: FuelWatch Data 
 















Source: FuelWatch Data 
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Caltex has the largest market share, followed by BP and Shell.  Independent chains (Gull, 
Liberty and Peak) make up roughly a quarter of the sample, making them collectively 
more important than either Shell or Mobil and slightly smaller than BP.   
 
Company controlled outlets comprise roughly half of those in Figure 5.2.  However, 
FuelWatch defines both those outlets owned directly by the Majors and those owned by 
their multi-site franchisees as being company controlled.  In WA as a whole, Shell owns 
eight sites, BP owns five and Mobil none.
58
  Thus, most of the outlets listed as company 
controlled in Figure 5.2 are owned by one of the multi-site franchisees of these brands. 
 
Shepard (1991) explores the influence of retail petroleum outlets offering different types 
of service on pricing, finding that those offering both self service and full service do so in 
order to better sort their customers and practice price discrimination.  In Perth, however, 
the role of service in price discrimination would appear to be less important, as only five 
percent of outlets in the sample offer full service, with a further 20 percent offering 
conditional service.
59
  Most of these are independents or branded independents. 
 
Each of the Majors has one convenience store brand, and Caltex has two.  These are: 
Shell Select, BP Connect, Caltex Starshop, Caltex Starmart and Mobil Quix.  Whilst 
Mobil, Shell and BP (or their multi-site franchisees) own all of their convenience stores, 
                                                 
58
 These data come from a personal communication from the Department of Industry, Tourism and 
Resources, which collects such data on a state-wide, but not a city basis.  Note that Caltex has no multi-site 
franchisees, and thus owns 15 outlets in Perth.  Since Mobil has 13 sites listed by FuelWatch as company 
controlled and all of these are under a single multi-site franchisee, this leaves 71 sites, more than 50 of 
which would be operated by the multi-site franchisees of BP or Shell.  
59
 That is, pumping services are offered at some times, but not at others. 
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Caltex convenience stores are as likely to be operated by price-supported, single-site 
franchisees as they are to be operated by Caltex itself.  Convenience stores offer other 
potential profit streams, which mean that fuel itself might be a loss-leader.
60
  Figure 5.3 
shows how many outlets have convenience stores by brand.   
 








BP Caltex Mobil Shell
Convenience Store Other
 
Source: FuelWatch Data 
Although this thesis focuses on competition through a network structure, one can also 
characterise local competition through examining the number of competitors within a 
certain radius (here 5km) or the distance to the nearest competitor.  Figures 5.4 and 5.5 
below provide details on both measures.  Whilst Perth itself is a fairly low-density city, 
the retail petroleum market is quite concentrated, as retail petroleum outlets tend to 
congregate at major shopping centres or along major roads.  This is partly in response to 
demand and partly due to local town-planning restrictions. 
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 Although Adams (1997) suggests otherwise; see Chapter Three for details. 
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Source: Author calculations based on Universal Business Directories (2002) 
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The choice of demand characteristics is based on the findings of the elasticity literature 
summarised in Chapter Three, and the availability of data from the ABS (2006).  ABS 
data at the postcode level is matched to the postcode of each retail petroleum outlet.  This 
implicitly assumes that all demand is local, ignoring the commuter traffic that Marvel 
(1976) finds to be of importance for demand in the US.  The assumption is made because 
there are no data available on demand for each retail petroleum outlet.  However, its 
consequences might not be too egregious; most of Perth‟s commuter traffic flows down 
its freeways, which have no retail petroleum outlets on them.   
 
Table 5.2 summarises the demand data, showing city-wide averages and the upper and 
lower bounds of 95 percent confidence intervals around these averages. Table 5.7 
provides more detail at the sub-market level. 
 
Table 5.2: Demand-Side Characteristics 
  Lower Bound Average Upper Bound 
Median family Income 1321.5133 1362.7889 1404.0645 
Average Household size 2.4503018 2.4922705 2.5342392 
Number aboriginal 312.46014 362.88406 413.30798 
Number persons 19931.575 21479.348 23027.121 
Number born overseas 7627.2796 8243.0386 8858.7977 
Number of families with dependent children 2360.4874 2569.7826 2779.0778 
Number of families with Single Mother 817.59251 896.27536 974.95822 
Number of families 5295.9837 5731.7971 6167.6105 
Av Number vehicles per household 1.4479305 1.4681488 1.4883671 
Dwelling density (houses per sq km) 431.34798 468.12804 504.90811 
Number of rented dwellings 1830.5952 1969.9517 2109.3081 
Number of state housing dwellings 265.2835 308.80676 352.33003 
Number of dwellings 7355.8529 7889.7585 8423.664 
number with post-school qualification 6566.6349 7041.1932 7515.7516 
Number employed 9735.9579 10502.449 11268.941 
Number using public transport for work travel 861.12314 915.24638 969.36962 
Source: ABS (2006) 
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Occurrences Families 
The two occurrence families are groups of dummy variables which indicate whether the 
price of a given outlet displays a certain characteristic on a given day.  One pertains to the 
whole market, and the other to the sub-market within which the relevant outlet sits.  
Tables 5.3 and 5.4 summarise the frequencies of the cumulative total of each of these 
occurrences in the 441 days of the sample period. 
 
Table 5.3: Occurrences in the Whole Market 
Source: FuelWatch data 
 
The major point of Tables 5.3 and 5.4 is the concentration of frequencies in the lower 
bands; there are no consistent price leaders at the local or global level, and few outlets 
that are consistently above or below the average.  This lack of consistent behaviour 
should not be particularly surprising as the nature of the mixed strategy equilibrium in 
Chapter Four precludes such consistency. 
Frequency 
Bands 




























0 19 4 0 0 0 0 0 43 0 
25 85 147 12 19 44 0 3 86 0 
50 85 48 27 28 59 0 8 77 0 
75 17 7 47 42 38 0 4 2 0 
100 2 2 36 25 20 5 6 0 0 
125 0 1 29 27 26 2 10 1 1 
150 0 0 36 25 10 12 19 0 2 
175 0 0 20 13 0 10 17 0 13 
200 1 0 2 7 1 14 32 0 124 
225 0 0 0 7 6 44 41 0 69 
250 0 0 0 10 2 34 34 0 0 
275 0 0 0 1 2 27 13 0 0 
300 0 0 0 3 1 22 8 0 0 
325 0 0 0 1 0 12 9 0 0 
350 0 0 0 1 0 6 2 0 0 
375 0 0 0 0 0 9 3 0 0 
400 0 0 0 0 0 5 0 0 0 
425 0 0 0 0 0 7 0 0 0 
450 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
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0 16 2 0 0 0 0 0 43 0 
25 50 112 9 22 34 0 0 76 2 
50 75 52 21 49 46 0 7 85 9 
75 34 17 34 37 44 3 5 4 14 
100 16 12 45 34 34 4 5 1 70 
125 4 5 26 18 21 2 3 0 53 
150 8 4 36 22 12 19 15 0 47 
175 3 2 21 10 5 15 15 0 14 
200 0 3 11 2 0 32 38 0 0 
225 1 0 6 6 4 29 32 0 0 
250 2 0 0 6 3 38 26 0 0 
275 0 0 0 0 5 28 29 0 0 
300 0 0 0 2 1 12 20 0 0 
325 0 0 0 1 0 7 6 0 0 
350 0 0 0 0 0 5 5 0 0 
375 0 0 0 0 0 4 2 0 0 
400 0 0 0 0 0 6 1 0 0 
425 0 0 0 0 0 5 0 0 0 
450 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Source: FuelWatch data 
Network Structure: Network Characteristics, Sub-markets and 
Redundancy 
In order to develop summary statistics on network structure and identify sub-networks, I 
need first to identify the network.  The process is of building the network based upon the 
relationship between price-cycle minima is outlined in Chapter Four, and here I explain 
how this is done empirically in the case study.  I also examine the network results in 
some detail, particularly the sub-networks.  This is not a formal test, either of network 
structure or of the model in Chapter Four, but is rather a more modest examination of 
reasonableness, which seeks to ascertain whether the prices of outlets grouped in a given 
submarket are more similar than the prices of outlets grouped in some other logical way, 
such as by the same brand.  If the network approach is even remotely valid, one would 
expect outlets in the same sub-market to have reasonably cohesive pricing with their 
neighbours, and thus the examination in this section performs the role of assessing 
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reasonableness, before the network summary data is used as an input into the regression 
models of Chapter Six. 
 
Recall from Chapter Four that the spatial duopoly model presented therein makes a 
number of predictions pertaining to the relationship between the minimum prices charged 
by pairs of outlets which are interacting with each other on price.  This, as mentioned, is 
the link between the theoretical model of Chapter Four and the empirical models of 
Chapter Six, and this section explains how that link was made in practice.  In the simplest 
case of equal marginal costs, minimum prices will be equal.  In the study period in Perth, 
the correlation between daily tgps at the different wholesalers is more than 99 percent in 
every case (see Table 5.12 below) and thus I assume that marginal costs are equal for 
each pair of outlets examined.  To test for equality in cycle minima, I take the average of 
the cycle minima for each station over the whole sample period and then, for each pair 
analysed, I conduct a test of the difference between these means.  Where I find no 
statistical difference between the means, I declare that pair to be connected.
61
  The cycle 
minima are determined by searching for the lowest price in the three days prior to each 
price increase of greater than five percent.
62
  There are 208 stations overall in the sample, 
and, rather than testing every pair, I restrict attention only to outlets that are within five 
kilometres of one another.  There is only a limited range of prices across the whole 
market on a given day, and thus distant outlets might show related pricing purely by 
chance.  Focussing only on nearby outlets obviates this issue. 
                                                 
61
 An obvious extension to the model is to consider the proportion of times two stations share the same 
minima as an indication of the strength of their connection. 
62
 I also looked for minima four days from the price hike, and tested a number of smaller and larger price 
hikes.  This made little difference to the results. 
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The results are summarised in Figure 5.6 (overleaf).  The blue area represents the Swan 
River, which divides the city North from South, and the grey line represents the main 
north-south freeway, which divides East from West.  Placement of each station is 
approximate, but roughly correlates to the physical shape of the Perth market.
63
  The 
different coloured dots represent different brands.  Brands tend to be spread throughout 
the Perth market, rather than focussing on any particular area. 
                                                 
63
 The software used to construct the networks and calculate their structural characteristics (Borgatti, 
Everett, & Freeman, 2002) has only limited capabilities in terms of spatial mapping. 
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I now turn to the process of dividing the network into sub-networks.  I follow Gould‟s 
(1967) methodology of examining patterns of positive and negative entries in the 
eigenvectors associated with the second to n
th
-largest eigenvalues of the adjacency matrix 
which summarises the network.  Here, I stop at the sixth largest eigenvalue, as smaller 
eigenvectors contain too much noise for any useful signals to be extracted. 
 
This method of defining sub-markets by visual inspection is vulnerable to the numbering 
system used.  To endeavour to ensure that outlets which are close to each other 
geographically (and hence more likely to be connected) are also close to each other on 
the number line, I start by taking two stations which are connected and close to each 
other, numbering them one and two and then establishing the geographical midpoint 
between them.  The third outlet is the nearest to the midpoint, and subsequent outlets are 
numbered by the same process.  In most cases, this results in outlets located close to each 
other geographically also being near each other on the number line.  However, the 
process is not perfect, and thus a degree of judgement must be exercised. 
 
Table 5.5 (overleaf) provides an overview of the results, with the positive and negative 
elements of the eigenvectors coloured green and red to aid visual inspection.  The 
numbers in bold across the top of Table 5.5 are the eigenvectors.  All are relatively close 
together, which Gould (1967), examining terrain, suggests means the terrain is rather 
smooth.  In terms of prices, this suggests that no region dominates another.  
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Table 5.5: Eigenvector Results 
























Number   Evec2  
 
Evec3   Evec4  
 
Evec5   Evec6  














0.0598749 0.0000002        94  -0.0000402 0.0517979 0.0308661 
-
0.1200665 0.0000006 














0.0693686 0.0000003        95  -0.0000395 0.0803048 0.0278101 
-
0.1219587 -0.0000001 












0.0344564 0.0000001        96  -0.0000374 0.1147139 0.0228217 
-
0.1180553 -0.0000010 












0.0613403 0.0000002        97  -0.0000080 0.0060654 0.0063730 
-
0.0274023 0.0000003 












0.0463788 0.0000002        98  -0.0000370 0.0412854 0.0316770 
-
0.1354419 0.0000014 












0.0227847 0.0000001        99  -0.0000429 0.0409163 0.0348935 
-
0.1542006 0.0000019 
       10  
-






0.0173073 0.0000001      100  -0.0000402 0.0394359 0.0322365 
-
0.1470455 0.0000018 
       11  
-






0.0115368 0.0000000      102  -0.0000549 0.0151690 0.0255726 
-
0.1005959 0.0000014 
       12  
-











       14  
-











       15  
-






0.0052675 0.0000000      105  0.0000083 0.1915644 
-
0.0228038 0.0017908 -0.0000042 
       16  
-








0.0051885 0.0000000      106  0.0000111 0.1662037 
-
0.0215686 0.0071249 -0.0000039 
       17  
-








0.0000017      107  0.0000187 0.2152171 
-
0.0328347 0.0278431 -0.0000050 
       18  
-








0.0000017      108  0.0000524 0.2870851 
-
0.0570536 0.0863556 -0.0000062 
       19  
-








0.0000013      109  0.0000592 0.3334857 
-
0.0679676 0.1070083 -0.0000067 
       20  
-








0.0000024      110  0.0000303 0.2336763 
-
0.0504910 0.0861307 -0.0000039 
       21  
-








0.0000024      111  0.0000305 0.2248086 
-
0.0506090 0.0907709 -0.0000031 
       22  
-








0.0000016      112  0.0000130 0.1087090 
-
0.0244532 0.0437997 -0.0000016 




















































































0.0000008      117  -0.0000014 0.0227186 0.0004215 
-
0.0225101 -0.0000001 














0.0000010      118  -0.0000026 0.0071880 0.0036663 
-
0.0436199 0.0000011 














0.0000012      119  -0.0000015 0.0049884 0.0022598 
-
0.0310348 0.0000008 














0.0000020      120  0.0000000 0.0000018 
-
0.0000007 0.0000034 0.3176010 














0.0000021      121  0.0000000 0.0000018 
-
0.0000007 0.0000034 0.3176010 
















0.0000022      122  0.0000000 0.0000016 
-
0.0000007 0.0000031 0.2838592 












0.0523567 0.0030607 0.0611246 
-
0.0000001      125  0.0000000 0.0000018 
-
0.0000007 0.0000034 0.3176010 
















0.0000009      126  0.0000000 0.0000020 
-
0.0000008 0.0000038 0.3408803 












0.0469237 0.0032821 0.0533898 0.0000000      127  0.0000000 0.0000020 
-
0.0000008 0.0000038 0.3408803 










0.0384787 0.0016212 0.0485897 
-
0.0000001      128  0.0000000 0.0000034 
-
0.0000012 0.0000048 0.3484758 














0.0000002      130  0.0000000 0.0000020 
-
0.0000008 0.0000038 0.3408803 






0.2409327 -0.0717877 0.0000002         87  0.0001096 
-
0.0241351 0.0141251 0.0002582 0.0000004      131  0.0000000 0.0000027 
-
0.0000009 0.0000034 0.2138640 












0.0261002 0.0000003      132  0.0000000 0.0000019 
-
0.0000008 0.0000035 0.3099819 












0.0296695 0.0000006      133  0.0000000 0.0000139 
-
0.0000040 0.0000097 0.0697791 






0.2927130 -0.1000745 0.0000003         91  
-
0.0000339 0.0152597 0.0265255 
-
0.0687877 0.0000005      135  0.0000000 0.0000132 
-
0.0000037 0.0000088 0.0010911 












0.0664569 0.0000011      136  0.0000000 0.0001230 
-
0.0000335 0.0000756 0.0089328 

























Number   Evec2  
 
Evec3   Evec4  
 
Evec5   Evec6  
     137  0.0000001 0.0010910 
-




0.0000503 0.0000000      234  0.0000011 0.0001269 
-
0.0000444 0.0001586 -0.0000001 
     140  0.0000001 0.0010790 
-




0.0001551 0.0000000      235  0.0000001 0.0000181 
-
0.0000067 0.0000259 0.0000000 
     141  0.0000007 0.0089523 
-




0.0002273 0.0000001      237  0.0000001 0.0000237 
-
0.0000089 0.0000348 0.0000000 
     142  0.0000078 0.0783503 
-




0.0002545 0.0000001      238  0.0000002 0.0000278 
-
0.0000105 0.0000414 0.0000000 
     143  0.0000078 0.0792188 
-




0.0002592 0.0000001      239  0.0000002 0.0000278 
-
0.0000105 0.0000414 0.0000000 
     144  0.0000078 0.0783503 
-




0.0003744 0.0000001      240  0.0000002 0.0000266 
-
0.0000101 0.0000395 0.0000000 
     145  0.0000102 0.1001604 
-




0.0003744 0.0000001      241  0.0000002 0.0000277 
-
0.0000105 0.0000413 0.0000000 








0.0002689 0.0000001      242  0.0000001 0.0000142 
-
0.0000056 0.0000229 0.0000000 
     147  0.0000281 0.2198447 
-




0.0002680 0.0000001      243  0.0000000 0.0000045 
-
0.0000018 0.0000074 0.0000000 








0.0003139 0.0000001      244  0.0000001 0.0000115 
-
0.0000045 0.0000185 0.0000000 








0.0002865 0.0000001      245  0.0000088 0.0007723 
-
0.0002600 0.0008858 -0.0000003 








0.0001811 0.0000001      246  0.0000088 0.0007723 
-
0.0002600 0.0008858 -0.0000003 








0.0001926 0.0000001      247  0.0000001 0.0009735 
-
0.0002537 0.0005433 0.0000403 








0.0002635 0.0000001      248  0.0000000 0.0001090 
-
0.0000295 0.0000662 0.0001623 








0.0002352 0.0000001      249  0.0000000 0.0000265 
-
0.0000075 0.0000176 0.0011302 








0.0001109 0.0000001      250  0.0000000 0.0000146 
-
0.0000041 0.0000097 0.0001579 








0.0000952 0.0000000       








0.0000909 0.0000000       








0.0000390 0.0000000       








0.0000416 0.0000000       








0.0000390 0.0000000       








0.0000012       








0.0000016       








0.0001042 0.0000000       




0.0000082       215  0.0006568 
-
0.0032911 0.0020310 0.0000356 0.0000001       




0.0000076       216  0.0008796 
-
0.0033626 0.0020795 0.0000354 0.0000001       




0.0000055       217  0.0028193 
-
0.0010565 0.0006876 0.0000021 0.0000000       




0.0000079       218  0.0008708 
-
0.0010211 0.0006646 0.0000085 0.0000000       




0.0000038       219  0.0028193 
-
0.0010565 0.0006876 0.0000021 0.0000000       








0.0000016 0.0000000       
     174  0.0975671 
-




0.0000620 0.0000000       
     175  0.0975671 
-






0.0000037       
     176  0.0975671 
-
0.0000878 0.0000203 -0.0000671 0.0000000       225  0.0000001 0.0009618 
-
0.0002504 0.0005356 0.0000205       
     178  0.1091174 
-




0.0000020       
     179  0.2679232 
-




0.0000054       








0.0000032       








0.0000010       








0.0000005       
     183  0.2679232 
-




0.0000004       
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The third eigenvector appears to be dividing outlets north of the Swan River into those 
near the Freeway, and those further to the north-east.  It also appears to be pulling out 
those in the city centre, whilst the sixth eigenvector distinguishes between those outlets 
near the centre of the city and those in Midland.  The third and fourth eigenvectors appear 
to be separating stations near Fremantle from those around Melville, and those in turn 
from the stations in the Victoria Park-Bentley area further to the east (a split which the 
sixth eigenvector makes clearer). 
 
The process is somewhat judgemental, but it seems reasonable to divide the market, 
based on Table 5.5 above into the eight markets shown in Table 5.6. 
 
Table 5.6: Sub-markets 
Sub-market Station Numbers 
Fremantle 174-212, 214 
Curtin 133-153, 170, 171, 225, 247-50 
Midland 120-132 
North East 1-29, 118,119 
Freeway North 30-90 
City Central 91-117, 223 
Western Suburbs 215-221 
Melville 154-169, 213, 227-246 
 
Translating this onto Figure 5.6, we obtain Figure 5.7 (overleaf). 
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Examining the Reasonableness of the Sub-networks 
Having constructed the network and divided it into sub-networks, I now conduct a series 
of somewhat ad-hoc investigations to ascertain whether the sub-market division is 
reasonable.  I examine only the sub-networks as establishing a useful counterfactual for 
the network as a whole is difficult.  For the sub-networks, I employ three approaches: 
 A modularity approach based on the work of Girvan & Newman (2003a,b) which 
is a direct structural approach. 
 An examination of demand-side characteristics in each sub-market, to ascertain 
whether these are different. 
 An examination of supply-side characteristics; specifically an examination of 
whether pricing within each sub-market is more cohesive than in other types of 
groupings. 
 
None of these approaches are statistically definitive tests, but each sheds some light on 
the question of whether the sub-market divisions are reasonable, and thus perform the 
role of being a first pass assessment of whether one would expect useful results from the 
network structure variables in the regressions in Chapter Six. 
 
I do not replicate Girvan & Newman‟s (2003a,b) approach in its entirety, as this would 
require calculating edge centrality, and recalculating it every time an edge was removed.  
However, examining the edges which need to be removed in order to divide the network 
into the sub-markets shown in Figure 5.7, these comprise half of the edges with the 
highest edge centrality (calculated according to Girvan & Newman‟s, 2003a,b, 
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methodology).  This suggests that they would be amongst the first removed and that, if 
one were to follow Girvan & Newman (2003a,b) rather than Gould (1967), the results 
would not be particularly different. 
 
I also calculate Girvan & Newman‟s (2003a,b) modularity score for the network as 
divided into the sub-markets shown in Figure 5.7.  The calculation involves comparing 
the number of within sub-group connections with the number of within sub-group 
connections that would result in a random network with the same number of sub-groups 
and same number of connections overall.  The measure is proportional, ranging from zero 
to one, with scores of over one-half indicating a performance better than random.  The 
division in Figure 5.7 scores a little more than two-thirds, indicating that it is a reasonable 




I now turn to the demand-side analysis, comparing the demand characteristics of each 
sub-market in Table 5.7.  The characteristic values shown are a weighted average of the 
characteristics for each postcode within the relevant sub-market, with the weights coming 
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Table 5.7: Sub-markets – Demand Side Analysis 
  
Curtin City Central Fremantle Freeway North 
Av St. Dev Av St. Dev Av St. Dev Av St. Dev 
Median family Income 1173.825 174.071 1491.142 297.241 1398.959 228.816 1475.479 254.531 
Average Household size 2.446 0.228 2.115 0.135 2.406 0.263 2.555 0.369 
Number aboriginal 431.042 309.451 161.154 121.526 322.531 365.401 188.377 180.761 
Number persons 18537.875 7737.795 11292.615 3582.010 22190.719 15742.706 24002.868 11785.194 
Number born overseas 7105.875 2976.731 4708.231 1201.322 8184.438 5809.194 9455.736 5272.188 
Number of families with dependent 
children 1980.792 973.447 1059.346 448.082 2589.750 1846.560 3038.189 1636.161 
Number of families with Single 
Mother 811.667 385.912 401.577 174.917 1019.031 869.612 834.943 505.621 
Number of families 4836.042 2123.360 2676.846 925.802 5988.688 4354.068 6531.113 3364.280 
Av Number vehicles per hh 1.446 0.148 1.296 0.122 1.447 0.116 1.521 0.170 
Dwelling density (houses per sq 
km) 290.423 229.852 763.026 236.916 526.897 213.544 494.664 249.280 
Number of rented dwellings 1951.833 1043.760 1764.500 614.910 2188.531 1553.067 1914.717 945.549 
Number of state housing dwellings 320.250 240.612 269.423 304.099 446.188 422.651 210.094 256.237 
Number of dwellings 6951.583 2801.148 4634.654 1463.972 8574.875 5970.479 8620.075 3856.931 
number with post-school 
qualification 5912.000 2686.207 4341.500 1616.796 7591.844 4484.205 8434.660 3815.702 
Number employed 8799.917 3883.595 5703.231 1895.337 10598.625 7397.693 12448.906 6114.711 
Number using public transport for 
work travel 779.125 403.232 910.077 320.565 874.531 462.901 1024.623 450.696 
  
Melville Midland North East Western Suburbs 
Av St. Dev Av St. Dev Av St. Dev Av St. Dev 
Median family Income 1231.824 198.290 1127.090 0.145 1130.770 141.711 2186.843 253.179 
Average Household size 2.730 0.198 2.600 0.000 2.578 0.232 2.457 0.113 
Number aboriginal 466.061 267.359 1437.000 0.000 477.870 308.467 51.571 15.946 
Number persons 24003.061 10280.143 35000.000 0.000 22462.609 6899.537 13792.857 3770.151 
Number born overseas 9320.758 4289.151 10449.000 0.000 9374.478 3633.875 5089.143 1787.387 
Number of families with dependent 
children 3104.576 1612.959 4150.000 0.000 2676.174 805.718 1607.286 462.465 
Number of families with Single 
Mother 1029.697 341.957 1818.000 0.000 1131.087 466.204 316.714 62.270 
Number of families 6568.485 2797.167 9284.000 0.000 6018.391 1914.354 3266.143 899.533 
Av Number vehicles per hh 1.556 0.100 1.475 0.000 1.465 0.104 1.471 0.070 
Dwelling density (houses per sq 
km) 298.241 213.028 94.805 0.000 594.089 140.125 457.279 150.652 
Number of rented dwellings 1590.121 558.516 3264.000 0.000 2190.913 1044.158 1464.000 343.482 
Number of state housing dwellings 193.424 132.683 655.000 0.000 466.217 445.773 113.714 102.970 
Number of dwellings 8258.939 3048.020 12667.000 0.000 8280.391 2519.594 4984.143 1301.390 
number with post-school 
qualification 7258.212 3602.530 9311.000 0.000 6288.783 1816.824 6041.714 1764.179 
Number employed 11719.636 5417.499 16096.000 0.000 10284.304 2984.206 6316.000 1700.449 
Number using public transport for 
work travel 902.000 446.333 1087.000 0.000 823.174 201.722 852.857 256.007 
Source: ABS (2006) 
There are some clear differences between each of the sub-markets.  The Western Suburbs 
market, for example, is richer than the remainder, as well as being better educated and 
more likely to contain people who people own their own homes.  It has comparatively 
little public housing, or Aboriginal inhabitants.  At the other extreme, the North-East has 
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much lower incomes, lower employment and higher levels of public housing and 
Aboriginal inhabitants.  The Freeway North and Melville markets seem most indicative 
of white, middle-class suburbia on their respective side of the Swan River, with middling 
incomes, many families with dependent children and a greater likelihood that an 
inhabitant was born in Australia.  The City Central market has denser housing than the 
rest (followed by Fremantle, another important city centre within Perth), along with 
higher numbers of renters and fewer families with dependent children.  It also has the 
highest number of people using public transport for travel to work, indicative of good 
public transport links within the area. 
 
The demand-side analysis provides some support for the sub-market divisions, but the 
results are statistically weak; a one-tailed ANOVA analysis of the sub-groups for each of 
the characteristics above suggests that only the numbers of people using public transport 
for travel to work is different across the sub-groups. 
 
I thus turn finally to the supply-side analysis, comparing the cohesion of prices within 
each sub-market with two counterfactuals; grouping by like brands and a set of random 
groupings where members of the group share neither the same brand nor the same sub-
market.
65
  The simplest way to compare these three different sets of groups is to conduct 
a one-tailed ANOVA test, and the results of such a test are shown in Table 5.8. 
 
 
                                                 
65
 The random groups are quite small; with eight sub-markets, each can have but eight elements.  Moreover, 
because there are only four distinct brands in the Western Suburbs sub-market, the smallest of the eight, 
one can construct only four groups that have members that have neither the same sub-market nor the same 
branding 
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Table 5.8: Similarity of Prices – ANOVA Analysis 
Branding Sub-Market Random 
  F-Test P-Value   F-Test P-Value  F-Test P-Value 
BP 9.1801 0 Fremantle 12.186      0 One 10.885      0 
Caltex 1.7816 0.0003 Curtin 12.640      0 Two 6.6960      0 
Caltex-
Woolworths 5.3605 0.0011 Midland 11.935 0 
Three 12.145      0 
Gull 8.8459 0 North East 13.398 0 Four 22.141      0 
Independent 1.802 0.1654 Fwy North 7.1813 0 
 
Liberty 10.981 0 City Central 13.696 0 
Mobil 1.0275 0.4198 Western Suburbs 0.79921 0.5704 
Peak 5.9313 0 Melville 8.3543      0 
Shell 2.3706 0  
 
Unfortunately, the results of the ANOVA test are inconclusive; all groupings are valid, 
although the sub-market and random groupings perform a little better than brands.  The 
problem is that ANOVA tests rely upon averages, and on average there are few 
differences between outlets.  Indeed, an ANOVA test on the whole sample gives a test 
statistic of 11.347 (and a P-value of zero), which suggests that all of the outlets come 
from the same group. 
 
To examine cohesiveness of pricing in a more robust manner, I thus turn to an approach 
based on that suggested by Brillinger (1975) and used by Bartels (1977) to explore 
regional unemployment in Holland.  The approach relies upon examining the eigenvalues 
of the cross-coherency matrix for each group in Table 5.8.  The coherency between any 
two outlets shows the degree of linear relationship between the magnitudes of their power 
spectra at the relevant frequency band of the spectrogram (or alternatively, the degree to 
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which each element in the pair has the same amount of its total variance explained by 




As Brillinger (1975) points out, the eigenvectors of the cross-spectral matrix (using the 
cross-coherency matrix normalises the results) gives the closest result of any mapping 
from the smaller space described by the frequency data to the larger space described by 
the original data.  It is thus the best way to reduce the dimensionality of a problem 
involving a comparison of a large number of pairs of outlets (as one has with coherency 
scores) to one where comparisons are between groups of outlets.  The spectral density 
matrix of this mapping mechanism has the eigenvalues of the cross-coherency matrix 
down the main diagonal and zeroes on the off-diagonal elements.
67
  Thus, the key to the 
analysis is to examine the relevant eigenvalues; the closer these are to zero, the better is 
the mapping and thus the more cohesive is the relevant subgroup. 
 
In order to undertake the analysis of the cross-coherency matrix eigenvalues, I follow a 
number of steps: 
 Firstly, I undertake an auto-spectral analysis, using 42 frequency bands (see 
discussion on prices below) and ascertain the cycles with the most power and hence 
the most important lags for each of the 208 stations. 
 Secondly, I regress these lags (which differ for each outlet, but usually contain the 
seventh and tenth lags) against price for each outlet, and collect the residual vector.  
                                                 
66
 The auto-spectra are examined under pricing below, where I create spectrograms with 42 frequency 
bands.  Chatfield (2006), Brillinger (1975) or Granger & Hatanaka (1964) provide further details on 
coherency, phase and gain, the three elements of cross-spectral analysis, and the formulae used to calculate 
coherency in this analysis are taken from Granger & Hatanaka (1964, Chapters Five and Six). 
67
 Under certain assumptions that seem reasonable to assume hold here, see Brillinger, 1975, pp. 344-5. 
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Coherency analysis is undertaken using this residual vector to avoid auto-correlation 
from introducing bias to results (Chatfield, 2006). 
 Thirdly, having found the coherency between each pair in each of the nine brand 
groups, seven sub-market groups and four random groups, I arrange these into 
symmetric matrices (with ones down the main diagonal, indicating perfect coherency 
between each outlet and itself).  Each of the 20 groups has 42 such matrices; one for 
each frequency band. 
 Fourthly, I reduce the amount of data to be analysed.  There are 42 frequency bands 
for each of the 20 groups, but the first 12 comprise more than 80 percent of the 
variance in the average outlet, so I consider only these.  Moreover, each coherency 
matrix has n eigenvalues, where n is the number of outlets in that group.  I take only 
sufficient of the eigenvalues to explain 90 percent of the variation in each of the 
coherency matrices. 
 Finally, I take a weighted average for each of the eigenvalues (weights being the 
proportion of the 90 percent of variance each comprises) to give me a single score for 
each group at each frequency band. 
 
The results of this rather complex procedure are shown in Figure 5.8.  There is a wide 
dispersion of scores, with the branding grouping exhibiting much more diversity than the 
sub-markets grouping.  There are also not many differences between the various 
groupings for longer-term cycles but, over the shorter cycles of roughly a week, there is 
much greater variation.  Importantly, the branding groupings appear to be above the sub-
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market groupings in most cases at these frequencies, suggesting, albeit weakly, that sub-
markets describe these cycles better than brands. 
 






































Random Subroup1 Random Subgroup 2 Random Subgroup 3 Random Subgroup 4
FreewayNorth Fremantle Curtin CityCentral
Melville Northeast Midland WesternSuburbs
Caltex Shell BP Gull
Peak Mobil Liberty Caltex-Woolworths
 
Source: Author calculation based on FuelWatch price data 
As a straight average across all frequency bands, the four randomised groups scored 
0.684, whilst the sub-market groupings scored 0.636 and the branding groupings scored 
0.687.  If this is weighted by the power of the relative frequency band in explaining total 
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variance for the average outlet across the whole sample, then the averages are 0.717, 
0.685 and 0.724 respectively.  There are differing numbers of outlets in each of the 
groupings, and if the (unweighted) average frequency scores for each grouping are 
themselves weighted by the number of elements in that grouping, then the weighted 
average scores for sub-markets and branding groups are 0.628 and 0.690 respectively.  
The greater distance between the two scores is due to the fact that Liberty, which has 
very cohesive pricing amongst its stations, has only a small number of outlets, whilst 
Caltex, with much less cohesive pricing, has more outlets. 
 
It is difficult to assess the statistical significance of the differences between each of the 
average values above, or between each of the coherency curves shown in Figure 5.8, 
unless one makes some rather heroic assumptions concerning the distribution of each 
after being subjected to the various procedures outlined above.  However, it does not 
seem completely unreasonable to suggest that, based upon the procedure above, the sub-
market grouping of outlets does perform better, albeit marginally so, in explaining the 
degree to which prices are cohesive within a group than does the branding grouping 
which, in general, does no better than a random collection of stations.  That is not to say, 
however, that all brands are equal; BP and (more particularly) Liberty, have pricing 
which is as good as or better than the best of the sub-market groupings.  Nor is it to say 
that each sub-market is equal; the Western Suburbs and (to a lesser extent) the Freeway 
North sub-markets do not have particularly cohesive pricing compared to the other sub-
markets. 
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Summary of Network Data 
Having constructed the network, divided it into sub-markets and investigated the 
reasonableness of this division, I then calculate the Bonacich (1972, 1987) centrality and 
Burt (1992) efficiency and constraint of each outlet relative to the network as a whole and 
within each sub-market using the Ucinet software developed by Borgatti, Everett & 
Freeman (2002).
68
  The data thus generated are summarised briefly below. 
 
The distribution of scores for each of the network characteristics is presented in Table 
5.9.  Note that I have normalised the centrality scores such that they range from zero to 
one, like the constraint and efficiency scores.  This then means that the normalised 
eigenvector centrality and eigenvector centrality scores are the same. 
 





















0.1 0 206 168 0 204 64 
0.2 7 0 12 15 0 18 
0.3 15 0 2 22 0 16 
0.4 52 0 6 54 0 18 
0.5 55 0 1 58 0 20 
0.6 44 0 3 36 0 18 
0.7 23 0 7 13 0 24 
0.8 7 0 5 3 0 21 
0.9 0 0 1 0 0 4 
1 5 2 3 7 4 5 
 
The Global and Local Burt Efficiency scores follow, very roughly, a normal distribution, 
with most retail petroleum outlets, suggesting that most outlets have roughly the average 
amount of redundant contacts in the network.  A smaller number of outlets either have 
mostly redundant contacts, suggesting they sit on the periphery of the network, or have 
                                                 
68
 I also calculate the redundancy of the connections of each outlet to each of the five most central in each 
sub-market.   
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very few redundant contacts, suggesting they sit at the most strategic points in between 
sub-networks.  These outlets can be identified more clearly in Figure 5.7 above. 
 
The centrality results appear to be following, very roughly, a power curve relationship.  
That is, a few outlets are very central, whilst most are not.  This is a common result in 
studies of networks (see for example Barabassi, 2002).  Moreover, the result appears to 
be, very roughly, scale-free.  The sub-networks also seem to evince a power-curve 
relationship, albeit one with a fatter tail, reflective of the smaller numbers of outlets in 
each sub-market. 
 
The results for constraint are difficult to interpret in Table 5.9 above, except to say that 
there are a very small number of highly constrained outlets with no freedom to move, 
whilst most outlets enjoy considerable freedom in this regard.  The problem is the rather 
coarse grain of the frequency bins in Table 5.9 above.  Table 5.10, below, examines the 
frequency scores for these two measures, taking out the outlets scoring one in each case, 
with more fine grained frequency bins. 
 














0.005 35 49  0.055 0 0 
0.01 62 47  0.06 0 0 
0.015 47 36  0.065 0 0 
0.02 30 28  0.07 0 0 
0.025 8 16  0.075 0 0 
0.03 6 7  0.08 1 1 
0.035 5 6  0.085 0 0 
0.04 2 4  0.09 0 0 
0.045 6 6  0.095 0 0 
0.05 4 4  0.1 0 0 
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The results now are more akin to power curves.  That is, most outlets are not constrained 
much, with smaller numbers of them facing increasing amounts of constraint.  
Interestingly, four outlets are unconstrained (constraint equals zero) at the global level, 
and a further two at the local level.  These, and the most constrained outlets, all sit at the 
Eastern extremity of the Perth market.  It is not clear why these peripheral outlets 
represent both the most and least constrained, as it is not a general relationship, but it 
appears to be related to the distance from all stations in this sub-market to the centre of 
the overall market in the CBD. 
 
Delving further into the network structure scores and examining, for example, whether 
the majors are more likely to have central outlets, reveals little of value.  There are no 
statistically significant differences in any of the above network scores between Major and 
non-Major outlets.  There are also few differences when comparisons are done between 
brands, or between outlet types (branded independent, franchisee etc), and where such 
differences do arise, there does not appear to be any kind of consistent pattern, except 
that the single Wesco outlet in the sample is consistently different from other outlets.   
 
I now turn to the redundancy information and, more specifically, to some detail on 
whether there is a consistent link between redundancy and centrality.  This is summarised 
in the EGOR values in Table 5.1, which summarise the Burt Redundancy of the five most 
central retail petroleum outlets in each sub-market vis-à-vis each retail petroleum outlet.  
Note that, in each case, the scores have been normalised, with the highest redundancy 
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scores receiving a value of one.  This allows one to compare across the five EGOR 
values, which have differing maximum scores. 
 
Table 5.11: Burt Redundancy of Five Most Central Outlets 
 Frequency 
Band EGOR1 EGOR2 EGOR3 EGOR4 EGOR5 
0 120 125 132 134 141 
0.1 0 0 0 0 0 
0.2 0 0 2 0 0 
0.3 1 1 0 0 1 
0.4 0 6 2 2 0 
0.5 8 3 6 6 7 
0.6 5 9 10 9 9 
0.7 8 12 6 14 12 
0.8 14 12 14 11 12 
0.9 27 22 16 14 17 
1 25 18 20 18 9 
 
In the vast majority of cases, the redundancy is zero; the outlet in question does not share 
any redundant contacts with the most central outlets in each sub-group.  However, where 
there is redundancy, the distribution is skewed towards a high proportion of redundancy.  
This is perhaps a corollary of the distribution of centrality scores.  Some outlets have very 
high scores, but most have quite low scores.  Where the low scoring outlets are more than 
a few steps away from the centre of the give sub-network, they have few common links 
with the centre.  However, where an outlet is slightly closer to the centre, it has many 
common contacts and, indeed, almost all of its contacts are also shared with the centre. 
Pricing Characteristics: Price and Spectra 
In this section I explore prices, marginal costs and margins (prices minus marginal costs, 
or tgps).  The most salient characteristic of prices and margins is that they cycle.  Thus, I 
take some time examining these cycles, using spectral analysis to draw out useful 




Marginal costs are the simplest of the three data series, and I examine them first.  They 
are proxied by the tgp for each wholesaler.
69
  Although this might not be precisely the 
price each retailer pays for fuel and might not represent precisely the costs that are 
marginal to a retailer, it is the best publically-available data associated with marginal 
costs for retail petroleum outlets, and is thus used widely in the literature.  TGPs do not 
cycle, but rather follow Singapore benchmarks with a certain lag (see ACCC, 2007, for a 
detailed analysis of this relationship).  Moreover, they are surprisingly uniform in Perth; 
almost every brand, on almost every day has exactly the same tgp.  This is shown in 
Table 5.12. 
 
Table 5.12: Terminal Gate Price Correlation Coefficients 
 BP Caltex Gull Mobil Shell 
BP 1.0000 0.9986 0.9963 0.9958 0.9994 
Caltex  1.0000 0.9966 0.9961 0.9989 
Gull   1.0000 0.992976564 0.9961 
Mobil    1.0000 0.9956 
Shell     1.0000 
 
Prices, and by extension, margins, are more variable and more interesting.  Figure 5.9 
provides an overview of prices charged at all Shell outlets for a three-month period 
within the timeframe being analysed.  The yellow lines represent the price path of each 
retail petroleum outlet and the thicker brown line the Shell tgp.  The patterns of both are 
typical of other brands, and of other subsets of the time period being analysed. 
                                                 
69
 Under the FuelWatch regulations, wholesalers are required to use the same components when calculating 
their TGP (the spot price of petrol in Singapore, freight, insurance and loss, excise, GST, quality premiums 
and other costs such as terminal operating margin and temperature compensation), but they are not required 
to ascribe the same value to each.  In practice, they often do, but this is not because the regulatory system 
requires it thus. 
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There are three points to note about these prices.  Firstly, they cycle.  Secondly, the 
cycles have the characteristic, saw-toothed shape of an Edgeworth Cycle.  The ACCC 
(2007) suggests that cycles in Perth last for roughly a week, and one obtains a similar 
result following Noel‟s (2007a) approach of calculating cycle length based upon 
switching probabilities.   
 
To examine price cycles in more detail, I use spectral analysis.  I follow the approach 
outlined in Granger & Hatanaka (1964) and construct a spectrogram for prices and 
margins,
70
 dividing the spectra into 42 different frequency bands.
71
  Spectral analysis 
                                                 
70
 In most cases, particularly in the physical sciences where spectral analysis is widely used, this approach 
has been superseded by the use of fast Fourier transformation or, more recently, by maximum entropy 
approaches (see Press, Teukolsky, Vetterling and Flannery, 2007 for a textbook treatment).  These 
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becomes complicated with non-stationary data, so prior to constructing the spectrograms, 
I conduct a Phillips-Perron unit root test on the data in their natural order (from t0 to t441) 
and in their reversed order (t441 to t0) to improve robustness.  Aside from one outlet for 
which the null hypothesis is accepted in some versions of the test, all outlets reject the 
null in all formulations of the test and in both orderings of the data.  It seems unlikely that 
the data are non-stationary, and therefore it is reasonable to use spectral analysis. 
 
The resulting spectrograms are shown in Figures 5.10 (prices) and 5.11 (margins).  In 
each, the red lines indicate Caltex or Ampol-branded stations, green indicates BP, orange 
indicates Shell, light blue indicates Mobil, and dark blue indicates all of the non-Major 


















                                                                                                                                                 
approaches give more precise results, but require specialist software, whilst the approach of Granger and 
Hatanaka (1964) can be relatively easily implemented using a spreadsheet.  Moreover, experimentation 
with more sophisticated techniques for some retail petroleum outlets produced spectrograms very similar to 
those in Figures 5.10 and 5.11. 
71
 Chatfield (2006) suggests the use of, M=2√N is common in the literature, where M is the number of 
frequency bands and N the number of observations.  Here, N=441, thus M=42. 
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The most obvious aspect of Figures 5.10 and 5.11 is the dual peak at seven and ten 
days.
72
  This is most pronounced for BP and Shell.  Moreover, it is not the case that some 
outlets follow cycles of seven days and some follow cycles of ten days; most in fact 
exhibit peaks at both frequency bands.  
 
The dual peak should not be surprising.  Indeed, it is more logical than a single peak.  If a 
retail petroleum outlet consistently followed a seven day cycle, this would become 
immediately obvious to all of its rivals, each of whom could then underbid it on the 
eighth day and capture market share.  The same is true of groups of outlets following a 
seven-day cycle.  Indeed, if retail petroleum outlets were colluding successfully, it seems 
unlikely they would collude around a cycle, when colluding at its peaks would be more 
profitable.  A far more logical explanation for the patterns observed is that each outlet 
uses cycles of different lengths, randomising (mostly) between seven and ten-day cycles 
so that rivals will not know when it will raise its price.
73
   
 
The simultaneous game developed in Chapter Four also suggests that cycle lengths will 
not be constant, due to the mixed strategies played at prices equal to and one cent above 
marginal costs.  Wang‟s (2009) also suggest that cycle lengths will differ from cycle to 
                                                 
72
 Peaks at 21, 14 and 3.5 days are echoes of the seven-day cycle, a common occurrence in spectrograms.  
The longest period encapsulates all cycles longer than 84 days, and is thus picking up longer-term cycles 
such as changes in crude prices and seasonal variation. 
73
 Obviously, if an outlet randomised only between seven and ten-day cycles, then, if it did not raise its 
price on the seventh day, it would be clear to rivals that it would do so on the tenth.  Thus, cycles of other 
lengths enter the mix as well (shown by their power in the spectrograms), but seven and ten-day cycles 
dominate.  Note that it is not the case that firms utilised seven day cycles for several months, before 
switching to longer cycles, but rather that cycles of different lengths are mixed together.  Wang‟s (2009) 
results point to a similar conclusion. 
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cycle because the owners of brands play a mixed strategy equilibrium in terms of which 
relents in which round; there is no consistent price leader in terms of relenting. 
 
The use of cycles of different lengths is also evident when one examines the distribution 
of days upon which prices are raised, shown in Figure 5.12.  If the cycle was exactly one 
week, one day would dominate.  If it was exactly ten days, then over time all days would 
be represented equally.  Figure 5.12 shows neither pattern, suggesting that the choice of 
the day upon which to raise price is more complex.  The use of cycles of differing lengths 
might be expected to contribute to just such a pattern. 
 
















Source: FuelWatch data, author calculations 
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I now examine the shape of the cycles, to ascertain the extent to which this matches the 
predictions of Edgeworth theory; that is, the extent to which they are saw-toothed.
74
  
There are two ways in which one might do this.  The first is to compare the number of 
days each station increases price with the number of days it decreases price.  Absent of 
some trend in the data, if the cycle has a regular, sinusoidal shape, one would expect 
these two to be equal.  The less equal they are, the more saw-toothed are the cycles.  
Figure 5.13 shows the number of price increase days (non-increasing days are just 441 
minus this figure) for each of the 208 stations, as a histogram.  Most retail petroleum 
outlets have between 60 and 75 price increase days out of the 441 days in the sample 
period, indicative of a sharply saw-toothed price pattern. 
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Source: FuelWatch data, author calculations 
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 Alternatively, the inequality could be caused by an underlying trend in prices.  However, no such trend 
emerges in this data over the whole period. 
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Another way in which one might explore the same phenomenon, (Lewis, 2008) is to look 
at the median change in price.  Where there are many small price decreases and a few 
large price increases, this will be less than zero, and the distance below zero is roughly 
comparable with the degree to which the cycle is saw-toothed.  In Chapter Six, I use this 
statistic to summarise the Edgeworth nature of price cycles exploring, as Lewis (2008) 
does, the factors which contribute towards it.  Figure 5.14 shows the distribution of 
median changes in price amongst the 208 retail petroleum outlets in the sample.  Most 
stations have a value close to minus one; indicative of the saw-toothed Edgeworth cycle 
pattern. 
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Chapter Six: Regression Analysis of Prices in a Network 
This chapter explores the extent to which network structure influences pricing, using the 
network structure summary statistics developed in Chapter Five.  Note that it does not 
test the theory of Chapter Four directly.  Instead, the link is indirect; the theoretical model 
in Chapter Four provides predictions about price minima if two firms are competing, 
which I then use to define a rule of bilateral connection, which then forms a network and 
the place of each firm in this network structure is summarised using measures from 
sociology that then form the inputs into the regression models presented in this chapter.  
The links between Chapter Four and this chapter are thus indirect. 
 
I examine the influence of network structure on pricing in two ways.  Firstly, I examine 
the influence of network structure on daily pricing decisions, undertaking two panel 
regressions, with daily prices and margins (price minus tgp) on the left-hand side and a 
number of different outlet and market variables, drawn largely from the literature (see 
Chapter Three), on the right-hand side along with several network structure variables.   
 
Secondly, I examine the influence of network structure on the way in which each outlet 
prices, describing the shape of its price path.  To do this, I undertake two separate 
regressions.  The first is an extension of Lewis (2008), adding network structure to a list 
of explanatory variables similar to his paper and regressing these against the median 
change in price.  The second regression aims to capture the differing cycle length 
findings of Chapter Five, by regressing the same set of variables against the spectral 
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power of seven and ten-day cycles, to see whether there are any significant differences in 
the proportion of these cycles in the strategy choice of a given retail petroleum outlet. 
 
As noted in Chapter Five, my sample is 208 retail petroleum outlets in Perth, and all 
prices charged by these outlets in the period from January 1
st
 2003 to March 14
th
 2004.  
The former marks the beginning of good daily data on tgps, and the latter marks the last 
day prior to the conversion of 40 Shell outlets into Coles Express outlets, as part of the 
joint venture between these two players.  
Panel Analyses: Price and Margins 




































   (6.2) 
 
Each of the variables is defined in Table 5.1, with the exception of M, which is the gross 
retail margin; the daily retail price minus the daily tgp from the same-branded 
wholesaler.
75
  Note that the variables in Equations 6.1 and 6.2 represent families of 
                                                 
75
 All independents are assumed to use Gull as a wholesaler.  The assumption is not an important one, given 
the high degree of similarity between tgps amongst the different brands on each day. 
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variables from Table YY.  Thus DEMANDij refers to the j
th
 amongst 19 demand-
characteristic variables, applied to the i
th
 retail petroleum outlet. 
 
In regressing explanatory factors against prices and margins, one must be cognizant of 
the fact that the driving forces during the downwards phase of the cycle might differ from 
the upward phase.  Atkinson, Eckert & West (2009), Atkinson (2009) and Eckert (2002) 
address this issue by treating the upward and downward phases in separate regressions, 
whilst Eckert & West (2004b) do so by allowing the coefficients to vary over the four 
phases of the cycle they identify in their work.  Noel‟s (2007a,b, 2008, 2009) approach is 
more sophisticated; he uses a Markov-Switching regression.  This is necessary for Noel 
because he has only a sample of prices and cannot thus observe turning points.  Here, I 
have a census of prices, and thus I can use a simpler approach; Hansen‟s (1996, 1999, 
2000) Threshold Regression Model. 
 
Threshold regression assumes that the model behaves differently when a certain critical 
value is above or below its threshold level.  This is not particularly new, but the novelty 
of the approach lies in allowing the data itself to determine where the particular threshold 
should lie, rather than imposing the threshold exogenously.  Here, it is useful because, 
although it is clear that the upward phase of the price cycle is characterised by large price 
increases, it is not clear that price decreases will be the sole component of the downward 
price cycle which may also include price matching or even small price increases due to 
cost shocks or mistakes.  Noel (2007b) alludes to a similar concern.  Thus, I use the data 
to determine where the threshold should be.   
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 refers to the entire right hand side of Equations 6.1 and 6.2 above.  The 
threshold variable q can be any variable the modeller chooses, including the change in the 
left-hand side variable, which I use here.  One can reduce the two equations shown in 
Equation 6.3 into a single equation by allowing It(γ) to be an indicator variable which 
takes a value of one when the second argument above is true and zero otherwise, and by 
setting θ3= θ2  - θ1, to obtain: 
 
   231 ,0 itttttt iidewitheIxxy        (6.4) 
 
In order to find the correct threshold, Hansen (1999) suggests performing a grid-search 
over a number of potential thresholds and choosing the threshold that gives the regression 
containing it the smallest sum of squared errors.  The resultant estimates of all of the 
coefficients will be unbiased and consistent.  However, one cannot make that claim about 
the coefficient of the threshold itself without first understanding more about its 
distribution, which an OLS regression of the above form will not reveal.  In the 
discussion below, I outline Hansen‟s (1999) procedure for testing the threshold variable.     
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Prior to explaining the estimation results of the regression models, I describe briefly the 
process by which I use Hansen‟s (1999) method of finding the appropriate threshold, and 
the testing of that threshold. 
Finding the Threshold 
In this section, I describe the procedure by which I divide the price series into upward 
and downward phases of the price cycle using Hansen‟s (1999) approach, with the daily 
change in retail petroleum prices as the relevant threshold variable.  Figure 6.1 shows the 
frequency of different daily price changes.  Most are negative, and indeed most are 
relatively small and negative.  Small positive price changes are rare, with most of the 
positive price changes being greater than 5 cpl.  
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Since I am differentiating between a rising and a falling phase of a price cycle, it makes 
sense to set the lower bound of the grid search at zero.
76
  I set the upper bound at ten cpl, 
                                                 
76
 There are 56 zero or negative price changes sandwiched between two or more positive price changes in 
the dataset of roughly 98,000 prices.  I manually assign these to the upward phase after finding the 
threshold via Hansen‟s approach, which does not adversely affect results. 
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and divide the interval into an uneven grid, with windows of 0.2 cpl from zero to five cpl 
and 0.5 cpl.
77
  This gives 33 different thresholds to test. 
 
A representative set of results for the 33 thresholds is provided in Figure 6.2.  It is for the 
regression model with retail price on the left-hand side, but the margins model has almost 
exactly the same shape, and the same minimum point.
78
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Prior to undertaking a formal test of the validity of this threshold, it is worthwhile 
examining reasonableness.  In general, the Majors tend to increase price aggressively, 
                                                 
77
 Legally, prices can change by an increment of 0.1 cpl. 
78
 For both the price and margins regressions, I explore the consequences of omitting and adding the 
various right-hand-side variables in Equations 6.1 and 6.2.  In terms of finding the appropriate threshold, 
omission of variables does not seem to have much effect.  Almost all of the combinations of right-hand-
side variables in Equations 6.1 and 6.2 have a shape like that of Figure 6.2, and the minimum point of 3.6 
cpl is also exhibited by almost all of them. 
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often by upwards of ten percent.  In many instances, the independents are more wary, 
staggering price increases over two or sometimes three days.  There is thus a risk that the 
threshold is dividing the sample not by change in price, but by type or branding.   
 
Figure 6.3 shows the number of price changes above the threshold as a proportion of total 
price changes for each different brand, and each different ownership/management type.  
There are some differences, between the majors and independent brands, but there do not 
appear to be many systematic differences between types of ownership, so it does not 
appear that the threshold approach is simply sorting outlets by type.   
 


















































































































































































I now present the results of the formal test of whether the threshold of 3.6 cpl is 
appropriate or not.  To test whether the restriction should be imposed (that is, H0: θ1= θ2), 













          (6.5) 
 
Where S refers to the sum of squared errors, with the zero subscript indicating the null 
(θ1= θ2) and the one subscript indicating the sum of squared errors under the relevant 
threshold.  Since the null hypothesis does not contain the threshold, the test statistic has a 
non-standard distribution and thus has no critical values.  However, Hanson (1999) 
outlines a bootstrapping procedure which allows one to ascertain the p-values associated 
with this test statistic, and thus whether to accept or reject the null.  Following Hansen‟s 
(1999) procedure leads to a value for F1 of 543801.4 for prices and 447339.1 for margins, 
with p-values of 0.0000 for both.  This suggests that a threshold exists. 
 
Next, I ascertain whether the threshold of 3.6 cpl determined above is correct or not (that 
is  ˆ:0 H ).  This, Hansen (1999) suggests is best achieved by examining the 
confidence interval around the threshold using the likelihood ratio test statistic: 
 














 are defined as previously, γ refers to each of the thresholds possible and ̂  refers 
to the threshold chosen of 3.6 cpl.  This is compared to critical values defined by: 
 
      11log2c         (6.7) 
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Where α is the confidence level.  Figure 6.4 expresses this graphically.  LR refers to the 
likelihood ratio test statistic result and the grey lines represent the confidence interval 
critical values for various values of α.  Purely for presentational purposes, both the LR 
test statistics and the confidence intervals have been expressed in logs, except where 
 ˆ , which remains at zero.  As is clear, the confidence interval around the threshold 
estimate is very tight, suggesting the threshold estimated is the correct one. 
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Model Estimation Results 
I now turn to the empirical estimation of Equations 6.1 and 6.2 in the threshold regression 
form of Equation 6.4.  In so doing, I explore a number of different forms for each 
equation.  This gives rise to eight basic models, shown in Table 6.1 where the shading 
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indicates which variables are included in which model.
79
  Table 6.1 also provides an 
indication of the information criteria scores for each model, a rough indication of fit.  
Note that, for the margins model, MC is not included, and it contains the first and seventh 
lags of the margin, not the retail price. 
 


















NCHAR                 
SUBM                 
MC                 
RPRICE {1 7}/ M{1 7}*                 
BR                 
TP                 
CS                 
DCHAR                 
DWD                 
MD                 
OCO{1}*                 
OCS{1}*                 
EGOR                 
Retail Price Information Criteria Results 
AIC 3.39055 3.27186 3.20489 3.12184 3.05466 3.06379 3.06459 3.05338 
SBC 3.39367 3.27916 3.21615 3.13674 3.07291 3.08016 3.08096 3.07225 
Hannan-Quinn 3.3915 3.27408 3.20833 3.12638 3.06022 3.06878 3.06958 3.05914 
Margins Information Criteria Results 
AIC 3.55688 3.44541 3.37106 3.28869 3.23614 3.24251 3.24328 3.23422 
SBC 3.56021 3.45292 3.38253 3.3038 3.25417 3.25908 3.25986 3.2533 
Hannan-Quinn 3.5579 3.4477 3.37456 3.29329 3.24163 3.24756 3.24834 3.24004 
*The first and seventh lags of the retail price and margins and the first lags of OCO and OCS 
To test model appropriateness, I undertake a series of likelihood ratio tests, shown in 
Table 6.2.  Model Eight, the most general model, is also the most appropriate. 
 
 
                                                 
79
 All models shown in Table 6.1 have Shell as the omitted brand dummy, Shell Select as the omitted 
convenience store dummy, company-controlled as the omitted type dummy, Melville as the omitted 
submarket dummy, Thursday as the omitted day-of-the-week dummy and April as the omitted monthly 
dummy.  In general, selection of dummies to omit does not overly influence results. 
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Table 6.2: Likelihood Ratio Test Results – Prices and Margins Regressions 
Likelihood Ratio Test Results - Prices Regression 
  Model 8 Model 5 Model 7 Model 6 Model 4 Model 3 Model 2 Model 1 
Model 8                 
Model 5 230.8439               
Model 6 1069.395 838.5506             
Model 7 1014.551 783.7067             
Model 4 6320.321 6089.477             
Model 3 13850.56 13619.72     7530.243       
Model 2 19868.21 19637.37     13547.89 6017.647     
Model 1 30673.28 30442.43     24352.96 16822.71 10805.07   
Likelihood Ratio Test Results - Margins Regression 
  Model 8 Model 5 Model 7 Model 6 Model 4 Model 3 Model 2 Model 1 
Model 8                 
Model 5 192.4708               
Model 6 865.7056 673.2348             
Model 7 795.5076 603.0368             
Model 4 4992.3467 4799.8759             
Model 3 12498.595 12306.125     7506.2488       
Model 2 19286.218 19093.748     14293.872 6787.6229     
Model 1 29428.579 29236.108     24436.233 16929.984 10142.361   
 
Hansen‟s (1996, 1999,  2000) threshold regression can be estimated in two forms (see 
Equations 6.3 and 6.4 above).  I choose the second, single equation form (Equation 6.4), 
which is common in the literature.
80
  It means that each equation contains θ3 rather than 
θ2.  The coefficients and variances for θ2 are recovered manually.  The results for the 
prices and margins Model Eight regressions are presented in Tables 6.3 and 6.4 overleaf. 
                                                 
80
 See, for example, Foster (2006), Savvides & Stengos (2000), Tsionas & Christopoulos (2003), Huang & 
Yang (2006), Boetel, Hoffmann & Liu (2007), Papageorgiou (2002), Girma (2005), Chen & Lee (2005) 
and the empirical examples in Hansen‟s (1996, 1999, 2000) three papers. 
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Table 6.3: Regression Model Eight – Price as Dependent Variable 
Variable Coeff t-stat Variable Coeff t-stat Variable Coeff t-stat Variable Coeff t-stat Variable Coeff t-stat Variable Coeff t-stat 
Constant -1.5896 -8.6924 TP1 0.6905 30.5696 DWD1 0.2159 14.6318 TCNST -1.5896 -8.6924 TTP1 -1.3282 -10.6592 TDWD1 0.50285 7.56612 
NCHAR1 -0.0869 -1.5632 TP3 0.1866 4.6754 DWD2 0.2115 15.1043 TNCHAR1 -0.3316 -1.2431 TTP3 -0.0069 -0.0357 TDWD2 0.12260 1.79225 
NCHAR2 -0.8164 -11.5144 TP4 0.0000 0.0000 DWD3 0.0728 5.6051 TNCHAR2 0.5094 1.4256 TTP4 0.0000 0.0000 TDWD3 0.05595 0.83083 
NCHAR4 -0.0019 -1.8069 TP5 0.1876 4.5444 DWD5 -0.2291 -16.8392 TNCHAR4 -0.0008 -0.1529 TTP5 -1.0453 -5.1015 TDWD5 -1.08490 -11.76190 
NCHAR5 0.2498 4.8519 TP6 -0.1111 -6.6494 DWD6 -0.1081 -8.4268 TNCHAR5 0.3497 1.4250 TTP6 -0.0951 -1.2003 TDWD6 -0.60024 -4.37781 
NCHAR6 0.6470 9.4409 TP7 0.0000 0.0000 DWD7 0.3497 27.5065 TNCHAR6 1.0753 3.1595 TTP7 0.0000 0.0000 TDWD7 1.44851 21.79995 
NCHAR8 -0.0033 -4.7218 CS1 0.0131 0.7378 MD1 0.3153 15.4528 TNCHAR8 0.0088 2.5420 TCS1 0.0849 0.8934 TMD1 -1.53188 -16.91409 
SUBM1 0.0225 1.0228 CS2 -0.0329 -1.7293 MD2 0.1762 8.4743 TSUBM1 0.2965 2.6703 TCS2 -0.1042 -1.1648 TMD2 -1.34988 -12.27875 
SUBM2 -0.0579 -2.5406 CS3 -0.1246 -6.7247 MD3 0.1847 8.0598 TSUBM2 -0.2523 -2.1778 TCS3 0.0594 0.6977 TMD3 -1.49619 -13.38230 
SUBM3 -0.0198 -0.4368 CS4 -0.0664 -1.7718 MD5 0.0006 0.0256 TSUBM3 -1.1561 -5.1706 TCS4 0.1793 0.8505 TMD5 -0.72168 -6.52607 
SUBM4 0.0479 2.5567 DCHAR1 -0.0003 -6.3876 MD6 -0.0654 -2.6789 TSUBM4 -0.0077 -0.0823 TDCHAR1 0.0008 3.2025 TMD6 -0.53068 -4.42738 
SUBM5 0.0823 3.6480 DCHAR2 -0.5543 -7.9318 MD7 0.1782 7.9007 TSUBM5 0.1922 1.6042 TDCHAR2 0.2730 0.7830 TMD7 -0.15699 -1.47928 
SUBM6 -0.0135 -0.5540 DCHAR3 -0.0007 -9.8812 MD8 0.1431 6.3027 TSUBM6 -0.0407 -0.3240 TDCHAR3 0.0005 1.4106 TMD8 -1.38848 -10.51760 
SUBM7 -0.2772 -5.8900 DCHAR4 0.0002 10.4960 MD9 0.0587 2.7256 TSUBM7 -0.0381 -0.1729 TDCHAR4 0.0000 -0.4947 TMD9 -0.92455 -8.02988 
EGOR1 0.1837 9.8298 DCHAR5 -0.0001 -13.7428 MD10 0.4212 19.2140 TEGOR1 0.0801 0.8733 TDCHAR5 0.0001 2.9023 TMD10 -0.36558 -3.26920 
EGOR2 0.2137 11.4990 DCHAR6 -0.0002 -4.7878 MD11 0.1215 5.7419 TEGOR2 0.0294 0.3303 TDCHAR6 -0.0006 -2.3239 TMD11 -0.79761 -7.36826 
EGOR3 -0.0678 -3.9575 DCHAR7 -0.0001 -3.3662 MD12 0.0819 3.8469 TEGOR3 0.1032 1.2051 TDCHAR7 -0.0011 -4.6351 TMD12 -1.22443 -11.56668 
EGOR4 0.0224 1.2282 DCHAR8 0.0005 9.8781 OCO1{1} 0.1927 4.9564 TEGOR4 0.0559 0.6079 TDCHAR8 -0.0006 -2.5593 TOCO1{1} 0.04683 0.70782 
EGOR5 0.1228 6.3345 DCHAR9 0.7829 5.4204 OCO2{1} 0.1011 4.8485 TEGOR5 0.1116 1.1611 TDCHAR9 4.8555 6.8145 TOCO2{1} -0.05780 -0.32147 
MC 0.1334 59.2855 DCHAR10 0.0000 -0.6723 OCO3{1} -0.0154 -1.5580 TMC 0.5881 21.5121 TDCHAR10 -0.0007 -4.1591 TOCO3{1} 0.26736 6.63683 
RPRICE{1} 0.8352 532.5761 DCHAR11 0.0003 9.7727 OCO4{1} 0.0598 4.6188 TLRP1 0.3184 10.7253 TDCHAR11 0.0004 2.1507 TOCO4{1} -0.31623 -4.15985 
RPRICE{7} 0.0470 48.2224 DCHAR12 0.0002 4.5647 OCO5{1} -0.3555 -20.7774 TLRP7 0.1097 19.7641 TDCHAR12 0.0009 4.9198 TOCO5{1} 0.22151 4.30429 
BR1 -0.0263 -1.0911 DCHAR13 -0.0005 -12.2808 OCO6{1} 0.0331 2.7531 TBR1 -0.0340 -0.3002 TDCHAR13 0.0003 1.5718 TOCO6{1} -0.96992 -6.78831 
BR2 -0.0231 -1.4855 DCHAR14 0.0000 -1.3373 OCO8{1} -0.9869 -7.5862 TBR2 -0.8532 -10.7388 TDCHAR14 -0.0005 -6.4897 TOCO8{1} 1.42211 9.68568 
BR3 -0.0389 -1.8131 DCHAR15 -0.0002 -11.0519 OCS1{1} 0.0109 0.4700 TBR3 -0.1009 -1.0127 TDCHAR15 0.0005 5.6386 TOCS1{1} -0.02258 -0.43030 
BR4 0.2568 7.8449 DCHAR16 0.0005 9.6149 OCS2{1} 0.1069 6.2534 TBR4 -2.2397 -14.2300 TDCHAR16 0.0000 0.1657 TOCS2{1} 0.01660 0.17286 
BR5 -0.1201 -2.8185 DCHAR17 -0.0792 -6.0090 OCS3{1} -0.0162 -1.7042 TBR5 -1.4772 -7.0084 TDCHAR17 0.0804 1.1438 TOCS3{1} 0.37541 9.96171 
BR6 0.7234 18.2268 DCHAR18 -0.0241 -9.6336 OCS4{1} 0.1218 8.7587 TBR6 -2.8131 -15.8592 TDCHAR18 0.0868 6.7438 TOCS4{1} 0.04608 0.64946 
BR7 0.0272 0.7347 DCHAR19 0.0344 6.0271 OCS5{1} -0.1835 -10.7607 TBR7 -0.8025 -4.0479 TDCHAR19 0.0414 1.4190 TOCS5{1} 0.03113 0.71320 
BR8 0.0010 0.0282 
  
OCS6{1} 0.1579 13.9256 TBR8 -1.7508 -8.7614 
  
TOCS6{1} 0.02427 0.19261 
BR9 0.0566 1.3940 OCS8{1} 0.1543 1.3644 TBR9 -2.4414 -12.2409 TOCS8{1} 0.46609 3.56045 
BR11 0.8611 12.0047   TBR11 -2.3256 -6.7568   
  
Centred R^2 0.9625 
  
R-Bar^2 0.9625 
Log Likelihood -137584.8 
Breusch-Pagan Test Statistic 11791.06 
Durbin-Watson Test Statistic 1.9077 
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Table 6.4: Regression Model Eight – Margins as Dependent Variable 
Variable Coeff t-stat Variable Coeff t-stat Variable Coeff t-stat Variable Coeff t-stat Variable Coeff t-stat Variable Coeff t-stat 
Constant 0.0085 0.0640 TP1 0.6776 27.7914 DWD1 0.2434 15.0828 TCNST 0.0085 0.0640 TTP1 -1.3210 -10.2836 TDWD1 0.4196 6.0642 
NCHAR1 -0.0886 -1.4143 TP3 0.1802 4.3311 DWD2 0.2361 15.1974 TNCHAR1 -0.3300 -1.1707 TTP3 0.0229 0.1146 TDWD2 -0.0074 -0.1044 
NCHAR2 -0.8130 -10.1459 TP4 0.0000 0.0000 DWD3 0.0686 4.8006 TNCHAR2 0.4887 1.2851 TTP4 0.0000 0.0000 TDWD3 -0.0549 -0.7642 
NCHAR4 -0.0020 -1.6927 TP5 0.1749 3.7748 DWD5 -0.1764 -10.8672 TNCHAR4 -0.0011 -0.2016 TTP5 -1.0593 -4.9011 TDWD5 -1.0357 -10.2295 
NCHAR5 0.2477 4.3418 TP6 -0.1089 -5.7688 DWD6 -0.1047 -7.6752 TNCHAR5 0.3615 1.3911 TTP6 -0.1063 -1.2741 TDWD6 -0.7397 -5.2657 
NCHAR6 0.6392 8.3278 TP7 0.0000 0.0000 DWD7 0.3648 26.5025 TNCHAR6 1.1422 3.2170 TTP7 0.0000 0.0000 TDWD7 1.2258 17.9602 
NCHAR8 -0.0033 -4.2468 CS1 0.0108 0.5688 MD1 0.0603 2.8279 TNCHAR8 0.0088 2.4374 TCS1 0.0802 0.8280 TMD1 -1.7992 -19.7590 
SUBM1 0.0232 0.9357 CS2 -0.0335 -1.5555 MD2 -0.0471 -2.2232 TSUBM1 0.3193 2.7826 TCS2 -0.0901 -0.9647 TMD2 -1.5746 -14.5109 
SUBM2 -0.0535 -2.1113 CS3 -0.1223 -5.9328 MD3 0.1552 6.8974 TSUBM2 -0.2406 -2.0390 TCS3 0.0493 0.5504 TMD3 -1.5461 -14.6038 
SUBM3 -0.0200 -0.3950 CS4 -0.0713 -1.5606 MD5 -0.2085 -8.9425 TSUBM3 -1.1902 -5.0694 TCS4 0.1871 0.8000 TMD5 -1.0874 -9.7647 
SUBM4 0.0480 2.2601 DCHAR1 -0.0003 -5.6953 MD6 -0.4026 -16.3066 TSUBM4 0.0209 0.2127 TDCHAR1 0.0008 3.1436 TMD6 -0.8628 -7.0917 
SUBM5 0.0921 3.6754 DCHAR2 -0.5509 -7.0899 MD7 -0.2248 -9.4797 TSUBM5 0.2272 1.8326 TDCHAR2 0.2732 0.7499 TMD7 -0.2947 -2.7998 
SUBM6 -0.0133 -0.4916 DCHAR3 -0.0007 -8.6924 MD8 -0.1375 -5.5979 TSUBM6 -0.0293 -0.2234 TDCHAR3 0.0004 1.0863 TMD8 -1.3932 -10.4461 
SUBM7 -0.2584 -4.9157 DCHAR4 0.0002 9.3957 MD9 0.1222 5.2489 TSUBM7 -0.0228 -0.0994 TDCHAR4 0.0000 -0.3485 TMD9 -1.3965 -11.8416 
MARG{1} 0.8294 458.0596 DCHAR5 -0.0001 -12.2437 MD10 0.0674 3.0273 TEGOR1 0.7416 8.3320 TDCHAR5 0.0001 2.5677 TMD10 -0.6104 -5.4525 
MARG{7} 0.0513 45.3011 DCHAR6 -0.0002 -4.2406 MD11 -0.1005 -4.5869 TEGOR2 -0.1121 -1.3029 TDCHAR6 -0.0006 -2.3180 TMD11 -1.0292 -9.4245 
EGOR1 0.1851 8.9245 DCHAR7 -0.0001 -2.8064 MD12 -0.2810 -12.5758 TEGOR3 0.3538 4.1579 TDCHAR7 -0.0011 -4.7050 TMD12 -1.0087 -9.3923 
EGOR2 0.2105 10.1262 DCHAR8 0.0005 8.8546 OCO1{1} 0.1935 4.7632 TEGOR4 0.2571 2.7941 TDCHAR8 -0.0007 -2.5091 TOCO1{1} -0.0061 -0.0868 
EGOR3 -0.0645 -3.3890 DCHAR9 0.7465 4.6424 OCO2{1} 0.1075 4.8548 TEGOR5 -0.0466 -0.4907 TDCHAR9 5.0922 7.1571 TOCO2{1} -0.0057 -0.0272 
EGOR4 0.0231 1.1518 DCHAR10 0.0000 -0.3074 OCO3{1} -0.0165 -1.4678 TMARG1 -0.5162 -14.9566 TDCHAR10 -0.0007 -4.4776 TOCO3{1} 0.2336 5.1185 
EGOR5 0.1200 5.5390 DCHAR11 0.0003 8.5527 OCO4{1} 0.0545 3.7464 TMARG7 0.1342 6.0346 TDCHAR11 0.0004 2.4677 TOCO4{1} -0.3058 -3.7531 
BR1 -0.0110 -0.4035 DCHAR12 0.0002 3.9449 OCO5{1} -0.3187 -17.6819 TBR1 -0.0933 -0.7810 TDCHAR12 0.0009 5.0690 TOCO5{1} 0.1763 3.2014 
BR2 -0.0031 -0.1879 DCHAR13 -0.0005 -10.9815 OCO6{1} 0.0731 5.3681 TBR2 -0.8998 -10.9645 TDCHAR13 0.0003 1.4431 TOCO6{1} -1.1665 -7.9332 
BR3 -0.0197 -0.8178 DCHAR14 0.0000 -1.0389 OCO8{1} -1.1159 -8.4266 TBR3 -0.1937 -1.8449 TDCHAR14 -0.0005 -6.8259 TOCO8{1} 1.4245 9.3798 
BR4 0.2637 7.2450 DCHAR15 -0.0002 -10.0685 OCS1{1} -0.0219 -0.8965 TBR4 -2.3626 -14.1985 TDCHAR15 0.0005 5.5963 TOCS1{1} 0.0666 1.1557 
BR5 -0.0979 -2.0515 DCHAR16 0.0005 8.6293 OCS2{1} 0.1043 5.6354 TBR5 -1.5863 -7.1149 TDCHAR16 0.0001 0.2626 TOCS2{1} -0.1375 -1.2255 
BR6 0.7418 16.0577 DCHAR17 -0.0811 -5.3019 OCS3{1} -0.0197 -1.8249 TBR6 -2.8996 -15.3320 TDCHAR17 0.0815 1.0994 TOCS3{1} 0.3640 8.5715 
BR7 0.0439 1.0668 DCHAR18 -0.0244 -8.7835 OCS4{1} 0.0933 6.0239 TBR7 -0.8666 -4.1571 TDCHAR18 0.0889 6.7680 TOCS4{1} 0.0578 0.7402 
BR8 0.0334 0.7697 DCHAR19 0.0342 5.3728 OCS5{1} -0.2018 -11.1367 TBR8 -1.9152 -8.6154 TDCHAR19 0.0454 1.4984 TOCS5{1} 0.0684 1.4499 
BR9 0.0864 1.9004 
  
OCS6{1} 0.1256 9.8648 TBR9 -2.5921 -12.2370 
  
TOCS6{1} 0.2571 1.9075 
BR11 0.8774 10.8120 OCS8{1} 0.3024 2.5192 TBR11 -2.4017 -6.5422 TOCS8{1} 0.3566 2.5394 
  
Centred R^2 0.89668 
  
R-Bar^2 0.896479 
Log Likelihood -145796.9 
Breusch-Pagan Test Statistic 10242.99 
Durbin-Watson Test Statistic 1.936846 
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Both models provide a good fit to the data, with high R-squared values. Neither exhibits 
evidence of serial correlation, as the Durbin-Watson tests statistics show.  However, the 
Breusch-Pagan tests statistics indicate heteroscedasticity, which I address by using robust 
standard errors.
81
  Since each regression is large (although many variables are dummies), 
there is potential scope for multicollinearity or misspecification in the regression models.  
I address this by testing many different formulations of the models, with different 
independent variables excluded (see Table 6.1 and the sensitivity analysis discussion 
below).  The results, particularly those pertaining to network characteristics, are generally 
robust to these changes. 
 
The set of variables measuring network structure provide reasonably consistent results 
across the two models, with centrality at both the global and local levels being negative 
(albeit only at the ten percent level for global centrality) during the downward phase of 
the price cycle and local centrality being positive during the upswing.  Efficiency and 
constraint are positive at the local level, and constraint is negative at the global level, 
during the downswing, whilst neither is significant (except for constraint in the margins 
regression) during the upswing.  This contrast between negative constraint at the global 
level and positive constraint at the local level, as well as positive efficiency and 
constraint at the local level is taken up in detail in the discussion of results below.  The 
statistically significant EGOR results have generally positive coefficients during the 
downswing and the upswing.  The lack of significance of the network structure variables 
                                                 
81
 All of the results in Tables 6.3 and 6.4 are for the robust standard errors versions of each regression 
model, excepting of course the Breusch-Pagan test statistic results. 
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during the upswing is not surprising if brand headquarters drive prices upwards, as Wang 
(2006) suggests.  
 
The omitted submarket dummy is SUBM8, the Melville market.  The positive 
coefficients on SUBM4 and SUBM5 (the Northeast and Freeway North markets 
respectively) submarkets indicate that they price higher than the omitted submarket, 
whilst the negative coefficients on SUMB2 and SUBM7 (Curtin and the Western 
Suburbs, respectively) indicate contra pricing patters.  The results are interesting, because 
they suggest that submarkets which are geographically close to one another do not price 
in a similar fashion. 
 
Marginal costs, lagged prices and lagged margins are all roughly in line with 
expectations.  All suggest that higher levels of marginal cost today, or prices or margins 
at the relevant lags imply higher levels today for prices or margins, with the exception of 
one-day lagged margins during the upswing.  Note also that the coefficients on one-day 
lagged prices and margins are roughly 0.8 during the downswing, which highlights the 
small declines during that phase, and that both have much stronger effects than either 
marginal cost or seven-day lags.  The same is true, vis-à-vis one-week lags during the 
upswing, but not marginal costs, which become much more important during the 
upswing, suggesting that the impetus to hike price increases as one nears marginal cost.  
Noel (2007a,b) has similar findings. 
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The results on the various station characteristics are reflective of the omitted dummy 
variables.  In the sensitivity analysis section (see below) I explore the consequences of 
omitting different dummies.  The omitted branding dummy is Shell, and the results 
during the downswing indicate that Caltex-Woolworths (BR4), independents (BR6) Peak 
(BR9) and Wesco (BR11) have higher prices than Shell, whilst Gull (BR5) has lower 
prices and the other majors have pricing unrelated to Shell‟s.  During the upswing, the 
situation is quite different, with all brands having negative coefficients.  This indicates 
that, when Shell initiates a price increase, it tends to do so alone.  Wang (2007) has 
similar findings, indicating that most price increases are lead by a single brand.   
 
For station type, branded independents (TP1), distributor-controlled (TP3) and the larger 
independents (TP5) tend have higher prices than company-controlled outlets (the omitted 
variable), whilst price supported outlets (TP6) tend to price lower than the company-
controlled outlets.  All of these carry the Caltex brand, which appears to indicate that 
Caltex uses these outlets to lead prices downwards.  The negative coefficients on branded 
independents and larger independents during the upward phase of the price cycle indicate 
that these types of outlets are never price leaders.  Finally, there are no significant 
coefficients in the convenience store outlets, suggesting none price in a consistently 
different manner to the omitted dummy (Shell Select). 
 
The demand characteristics provide some results which are consistent, and some which 
are inconsistent with expected priors.  Most of the actual coefficients are very small, even 
though they are mostly significant, and thus it is unlikely that any demand effects are 
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particularly important.  The exception is the number of vehicles per household, which has 
a small positive coefficient during the downward phase of the cycle, but a very large 
coefficient during the upward phase.  This may be because markets with many cars 
represent the most profitable markets.  The results for the number of people, families and 
houses have a similar direction, suggesting that markets with more customers in them 
face higher prices.  Other socio-economic indications, such as the number of families 
with dependent children or headed by a single mother, have the expected negative sign, 
but the number of rented dwellings, state housing commission houses, the unemployment 
rate and the availability of public transport all have signs opposite to those expected.  
This is perhaps indicative of poorer areas being less well-served by retail petroleum 
outlets, and thus facing less competitive pressure.   
 
Being on a main road, being near a competitor or having many competitors near the retail 
petroleum outlet all lead to lower prices during the downward phase of the price cycle, 
which reflects their pro-competition effects. However, the number of competitors within 
five kilometres has a positive, significant coefficient during the upward phase, indicating 
that outlets packed more densely together raise price together, potentially a network-
density effect.   
 
The day of the week dummies indicate that prices tend to be higher earlier in the week.  
There is less evidence of seasonal factors, although the evidence from the downward 
phase of the price cycle tends to suggest that prices are lower in winter than in summer. 
 
 202 
Finally, examining the occurrences families, most of these results match expectations.  In 
each case, the variable is the single-period lag of the dummy in question, and thus seeks 
to explore whether the status of the given station yesterday, known when today‟s prices 
are determined, influences the price choice.  In the most part, behaviour is mean-
reverting, at least in the downward phase; those at the minimum price last period increase 
their price, as do those with below average prices or in the lower quartile, whilst those in 
the upper quartile, or with above-average prices, or which were price leaders, tend to 
decrease their price.  This holds for occurrences in the market overall (OCO) and those in 
the relevant submarket (OCS).  The evidence is less clear in the upward phase.   
Interpretation and Discussion 
In this section, I explore in more detail the possible reasons for the findings outlined 
above.  I focus most particularly on the network characteristic variables, which are the 
main focus of this analysis, and which provide some of the more counter-intuitive results. 
 
Global constraint (NCHAR2) is negative during the downswing, suggesting that the most 
constrained outlets in the sample have the lowest prices during the downward phase of 
the cycle, and perhaps more importantly that the least constrained have the highest prices.  
The least constrained outlets are generally those which sit between submarkets.  They 
then have higher prices during a downswing, which suggests that these strategic outlets 
are perhaps acting to restrict the „spill-over effects‟ of lower prices in one local market 
spreading to the next.  This is potentially confirmed by the fact that the submarkets 
neighbouring each other have opposite coefficients, which may indicate that the border 
outlets act to reduce information flow between submarkets.    
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Centrality does seem to bring with it better pricing power for the central outlets.  Both 
global (NCHAR4) and local (NCHAR8) centrality have negative coefficients, indicating 
these central outlets have lower prices during the downswing, and are hence leading 
prices downwards.  However, the most central at the local level also have the highest 
prices during an upswing, suggesting perhaps that they lead prices upwards.  This might 
be suggestive of the Majors, where they able to control the more central outlets in each 
submarket, using these more central outlets to initiate price increases in the knowledge 
that the information will spread rapidly through each sub-market.  However, the size of 
the coefficient is very small; indicating that the effect is not substantial.  If the Majors can 
co-ordinate price increases through simply dictating them to all outlets bearing their 
brand (as Wang, 2006, suggests), then this is perhaps not surprising.   
 
The results for local efficiency (NCHAR5) and constraint (NCHAR6) present a 
conundrum.  A positive coefficient on efficiency fits with the remainder of the network 
structure results, as it suggests that those outlets for which the surrounding structure is 
favourable are able to leverage that structure into market power.  In the downswing, 
where this coefficient is significant, such outlets might price-match, rather than 
undercutting; exercising market power in the same way that Eckert (2003) suggests for 
large firms.  The firms with the highest efficiency scores are not the most central,
82
 
suggesting that the centre of each local market is not a locus of market power.  Nor are 
the most efficient outlets owned by the Majors, or overwhelmingly company-controlled.  
This may be an artefact of historical ownership patterns. 
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 Nor are they the most or least constrained; correlation between all three is rather weak. 
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A positive coefficient on local constraint fits less well with the remainder of the evidence 
on structural variables from the regression analyses.  One reason may be that the most 
constrained outlets tend to sit on the periphery of each local market.  This means that they 
are poorly positioned in terms of information flows originating within the given 
submarket, but it also means that they effectively have only one part of their own 
localised market (that shared between pairs of outlets, in the manner of Figure 4.1) in the 
particular sub-market.  The other part often represents customers on the edge of the 
global marketplace, over whom these peripheral outlets can exercise market power.  
Peripheral outlets may be unconcerned at losing daily battles for market share because 
they have access to other customers over whom they do not need to fight.   
 
For such outlets, information generated within each local market may not be particularly 
important and, from this perspective, the positive coefficient is less surprising.  Indeed, in 
the locational choice game, which occurs prior to the pricing choice game analysed in 
this thesis, peripheral locations may be desirable precisely because they do not require as 
much information gathering from and competition in each sub-market. 
 
Thus, one potentially has two different forces at work to drive prices higher.  For firms 
with high efficiency scores, their favourable position within each submarket allows them 
to exploit price information generated within that sub-market to their advantage and 
derive market power from doing so.  Highly constrained firms, by contrast, tend to sit on 
the periphery of each sub-market and price high because they are able to serve customers 
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located outside that sub-market (or even outside the overall market) over whom they can 
exercise market power.  Such outlets are less interested in pricing information generated 
from within the sub-market, because it is of less use to them. 
 
The EGOR results provide some confirmation for the efficiency results above.  The 
outlets with the highest efficiency scores, sitting one or two steps away from the centre of 
each local network, are likely to have a large number of contacts in common with the 
centre, and hence high redundancy scores.  These are the outlets which price higher than 
the centre, ameliorating the price decreases which originate there.   
Sensitivity Analysis 
Apart from the eight different models outlined in Table 6.1, I also undertake extensive 
sensitivity analysis, exploring the consequences of omitting different dummies, and 
omitting subsets of the families of variables in Table 5.1, where this is possible (that is, 
not for the station characteristics, daily or monthly dummies).   
 
The results of these changes in the regression models show differences that are not 
particularly substantial.  Removing individual demand characteristic or occurrence 
variables has almost no effect on the results at all.  Omitting different station 
characteristic dummies has effects on the remainder of the relevant set of station 
characteristics (removing the BP branding dummy instead of Shell, for example), but 
generally few effects on other variables.  Perhaps the most important effect is that, in 
some models Global Efficiency (NCHAR1) goes from being negative and insignificant to 
negative and significant during the downward phase.  
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Cross Sectional Analyses: Median Changes in Price and Spectral Power 
The two cross-section analyses are designed to explore what influences the degree to 
which each outlet has price cycles with an Edgeworth character, by using the median 
change in price proxy as in Lewis (2008), and the extent to which each outlet chooses a 
seven or ten-day cycle.
83
  The latter involves two regressions, one with the spectral power 
of seven-day cycles and one with the spectral power of ten day cycles on the left-hand 
































    (6.10) 
 
where MPCi refers to the median change in price, and SPM1i and SPM3i refer to the 
spectral power of the seven and ten day cycles; that is the amount of price variation 
explained by these two cycles, respectively.  The other variables are as defined in 
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 The discussion in Chapter Five highlights how most retail petroleum outlets mix between seven and ten 
day cycles in their pricing. 
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Equations 6.1 and 6.2, and all of the variables are explained in more detail in Table 5.1 
and the associated discussion in Chapter Five. 
Median Change in Price 
The approach taken here is based upon that in Lewis (2008), who points out that if a 
particular outlet (city in his case) has many small price decreases and a few large price 
increases, then one would expect the median change in price to be less than zero. The 
greater the difference of the median from zero, the more saw-toothed the pattern of 
pricing, or the more Edgeworth its nature.   
 
As with the panel regressions, I test a number of different regression model 
specifications. These are shown in Table 6.5, where again the shaded cells indicate 
inclusion of the relevant variable.  
 
Table 6.5: Median Price Change Regression Models 
  Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 
NCHAR             
SUBM             
BR             
CS             
TP             
DCHAR             
EGOR             
AIC 0.63853 0.31439 0.29674 -0.34386 -0.26584 -0.27298 
SBC 0.86317 0.69949 0.74602 0.2017 0.58459 0.65768 
Hannan-Quinn 0.72936 0.4701 0.47841 -0.12326 0.07803 0.10333 
 
The likelihood ratio test results are presented in Table 6.6 below.  The bold entries 
indicate that the relevant restriction is found to hold statistically. 
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Table 6.6: Median Price Change Regression Models – Likelihood Ratio Test 
Results 
  Model 6 Model 5 Model 4 Model 3 Model 2 Model 1 
Model 6             
Model 5 11.48482           
Model 4 33.2571 21.77228         
Model 3 178.50094 167.01612 145.24384       
Model 2 190.17234 178.68752 156.91524 11.6714     
Model 1 277.59364 266.10882 244.33654 99.0927 87.4213   
 
As indicated in Table 6.6, Model Four is the preferred choice, and its results are 
summarised in Table 6.7. 
 
Table 6.7: Median Price Change – Regression Model Four Results 
Variable Coefficient T-Statistic Variable Coefficient T-Statistic 
Constant -1.04732 -8.25631 BR1 0.05899 0.70147 
NCHAR1 -0.11031 -0.58854 BR2 0.03700 0.72697 
NCHAR2 -0.33715 -1.51988 BR3 0.05093 0.67496 
NCHAR4 0.00426 1.86880 BR4 0.27993 2.74504 
NCHAR5 0.26703 1.59974 BR5 -0.03128 -0.24265 
NCHAR6 0.33809 1.53300 BR6 0.82450 5.79575 
NCHAR8 -0.00083 -0.54209 BR7 -0.01143 -0.10191 
SUBM1 0.05362 1.04624 BR8 0.00815 0.05836 
SUBM2 -0.09129 -1.41096 BR9 0.27001 2.14117 
SUBM3 -0.01592 -0.19248 BR11 0.70771 3.05880 
SUBM4 -0.06958 -1.27080 CS1 -0.00554 -0.08641 
SUBM5 -0.10595 -2.02266 CS2 -0.04707 -0.67879 
SUBM6 -0.11317 -1.83955 CS3 -0.00305 -0.04675 
SUBM7 -0.12746 -1.18920 CS4 0.02073 0.14003 
  
TP1 0.81040 11.73039 
TP3 -0.04194 -0.29146 
TP4 0.00000 0.00000 
TP5 0.29887 2.31416 
TP6 -0.02020 -0.32377 
TP7 0.00000 0.00000 
Centred R^2 0.7490 
R-Bar^2 0.7047 
Regression F Statistic 16.9386 
Log Likelihood 69.7611 
Breusch Pagan Test Statistic 55.0298 
 
 209 
In this instance, the F-test and R-squared results suggest, respectively, that the model is 
valid and fits the data reasonably well.  The Breusch-Pagan test statistic suggests 
homoscedasticity and so I do not use robust standard errors as elsewhere. 
 
The network characteristics appear to have much less influence on median price change 
than was the case for price and margins in the previous analysis.  Now, only NCHAR4, 
global eigenvector centrality, is significant and only then at the ten percent level.  This 
suggests that the more central outlets are the ones with higher median price changes and 
hence the ones with smaller cycle amplitudes.  To the extent that cycles are pro-
competitive, this might indicate central outlets are less competitive, a different conclusion 
from the panel regressions above, albeit one which is less well supported. 
 
The independent brands and Caltex Woolworths, along with the branded independent and 
larger independent types tend to have higher median price changes, and hence cycles of 
smaller amplitude, than the omitted dummies (Shell and company controlled outlets).  
Other brands and ownership/management types are indistinguishable from the omitted 
dummy.  To the extent that these more independent outlets are more competitive, it 
would appear that, whilst cycles themselves may be pro-competitive, their amplitude is 
not positively related to competition.  There are some grounds for this conclusion, as 
firms facing greater competition are unlikely to be able to hike prices as high as those 
facing less competition. 
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Very few of the variables in Table 6.7 above are statistically significant.  It is thus helpful 
to consider what happens if variables are added.  Adding the demand characteristic 
variables, creating Regression Model Five, makes little difference to overall results, and 
indeed, most of the demand characteristics have insignificant coefficients.  Adding the 
EGOR variables and creating Regression Model Six changes little outside the network 
characteristic variables (and indeed, only EGOR2 is statistically significant, and 
positive), but it does make some important changes to the network characteristic 
variables.  NCHAR4 loses its significance, but NCHAR2 (global constraint) becomes 
negative and significant at the five percent level, whilst NCHAR5 (local efficiency) and 
NCHAR6 (local constraint) become positive and significant at the ten percent level 
improving the results of Table 6.7.  These results are consistent with the results of the two 
panel regressions. 
 
The negative NCHAR2 coefficient suggests that more constrained outlets are likely to 
have cycles of greater amplitude, which may be suggestive of outlets sitting at the 
junction points between sub-markets (the least constrained in the dataset) acting to 
attenuate price signals travelling between sub-markets. 
 
The positive NCHAR5 and NCHAR6 coefficients may be the result of similar forces 
describing these two variables in the panel regressions.  That is, the stations with higher 
efficiency scores are able to attenuate pricing signals, whilst the highly constrained 
outlets on the periphery of the network pay less attention to pricing information 
originating in the relevant submarket. 
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I also explore a number of different formulations of the models outlined above omitting 
different branding, type, convenience store presence and submarket.  Overall, the results 
are robust to these model changes. 
Seven and Ten Day Spectral Power 
In this section, I explore the factors which contribute to the choice of cycle lengths by 
each retail petroleum outlet by regressing the same sets of independent variables as in 
Table 6.5 above against the power of the seven and ten day spectra.
84
  The spectra are 
themselves estimates, a product of a trade-off between bias and consistency (see 
previous).  This means they have a non-constant variance and thus I use robust standard 
errors in my estimations discussed below.   
 
The different regression model constructions I consider are the same set of six as for the 
median price regressions, and these are summarised in Table 6.5 above.  The likelihood 
ratio test results for all of these models, in both scenarios, are outlined in Table 6.8.  
Figures in bold indicate acceptance of the restriction at the five percent level, whilst the 
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 I use the margins spectra from Figure 5.11, as these are larger in magnitude given that the relatively 
constant tgp has been stripped out of the price series, causing more variation. 
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Table 6.8: Likelihood Ratio Test Results – Spectral Power Regression Models 
Likelihood Ratio Test Results – Seven Day Price Cycle 
  Model 6 Model 5 Model 4 Model 3 Model 2 Model 1 
Model 6             
Model 5 12.28286           
Model 4 43.76144 31.47858         
Model 3 114.5605 102.27764 70.79906       
Model 2 123.40122 111.11836 79.63978 8.84072     
Model 1 311.29152 299.00866 267.53008 196.73102 187.8903   
Likelihood Ratio Test Results - Ten Day Price Cycle 
  Model 6 Model 5 Model 4 Model 3 Model 2 Model 1 
Model 6             
Model 5 9.71808           
Model 4 56.42188 46.7038         
Model 3 195.66554 185.94746 139.24366       
Model 2 203.7074 193.98932 147.28552 8.04186     
Model 1 436.71754 426.99946 380.29566 241.052 233.01014   
 
In this instance, the ten-day price cycle results strongly favour Regression Model Five, 
whilst the seven-day results provide some evidence that Regression Model Four is more 
acceptable.  In order to compare like with like across the two cycles, I use Regression 
Model Five in both instances.  The differences between the two in terms of coefficients 
for the seven day regressions are not particularly great; with the most important 
difference being that NCHAR2 and NCHAR4 are significant in Regression Model Five, 
but not in Regression Model Four.  Table 6.9 provides an overview of the results of 









Table 6.9: Seven and Ten Day Spectral Power – Regression Model Five Results 
Seven - Day Price Cycles Ten - Day Price Cycles 
Variable Coeff. t-stat Variable Coeff. t-stat Variable Coeff. t-stat Variable Coeff. t-stat 
Constant 15.6935 3.2248 TP1 -7.4207 -4.7725 Constant 10.1932 2.9666 TP1 -7.90027 -7.46104 
NCHAR1 1.3964 0.5901 TP3 -1.1206 -0.7492 NCHAR1 1.2213 0.8730 TP3 -0.39152 -0.42224 
NCHAR2 8.2825 2.2181 TP4 0.0000 0.0000 NCHAR2 6.6673 2.5691 TP4 0.00000 0.00000 
NCHAR4 -0.0820 -1.8182 TP5 -4.6258 -2.3006 NCHAR4 -0.0538 -1.8031 TP5 -4.70191 -3.35201 
NCHAR5 -5.0727 -2.1955 TP6 0.3555 0.4451 NCHAR5 -4.0269 -2.7092 TP6 -0.13542 -0.31789 
NCHAR6 -8.6476 -2.7830 TP7 0.0000 0.0000 NCHAR6 -5.4102 -2.5799 TP7 0.00000 0.00000 
NCHAR8 -0.0124 -0.4499 DCHAR1 0.0031 1.1274 NCHAR8 -0.0081 -0.4388 DCHAR1 0.00378 2.21696 
SUBM1 -0.4146 -0.3849 DCHAR2 4.2475 1.3189 SUBM1 -0.0045 -0.0065 DCHAR2 0.10420 0.04551 
SUBM2 1.3942 1.0280 DCHAR3 0.0045 1.0977 SUBM2 2.0552 2.2799 DCHAR3 0.00174 0.70982 
SUBM3 -4.4610 -2.1161 DCHAR4 -0.0009 -0.9218 SUBM3 -2.8790 -2.0824 DCHAR4 -0.00056 -0.75507 
SUBM4 0.0343 0.0312 DCHAR5 0.0002 0.4606 SUBM4 0.7634 1.2679 DCHAR5 0.00003 0.07540 
SUBM5 0.7627 0.7170 DCHAR6 0.0029 1.3251 SUBM5 1.2644 1.7900 DCHAR6 0.00252 1.56020 
SUBM6 -0.1087 -0.0832 DCHAR7 0.0004 0.2129 SUBM6 0.4372 0.5178 DCHAR7 -0.00071 -0.49998 
SUBM7 4.5183 1.6181 DCHAR8 -0.0023 -0.9720 SUBM7 2.2679 1.5028 DCHAR8 -0.00057 -0.35805 
BR1 -1.8069 -1.7737 DCHAR9 -6.4642 -0.9333 BR1 -9.0679 -10.2682 DCHAR9 1.34370 0.26985 
BR2 -5.1517 -7.0662 DCHAR10 0.0011 0.8162 BR2 -5.1842 -10.2087 DCHAR10 -0.00140 -1.51763 
BR3 -2.4791 -2.5083 DCHAR11 0.0019 1.1635 BR3 -9.1768 -15.7920 DCHAR11 0.00070 0.65442 
BR4 -8.4755 -5.1112 DCHAR12 -0.0026 -1.5559 BR4 -8.1238 -6.2792 DCHAR12 0.00018 0.16694 
BR5 -5.1594 -2.3128 DCHAR13 0.0004 0.2048 BR5 -7.2429 -4.7907 DCHAR13 0.00071 0.49815 
BR6 -12.8443 -12.1843 DCHAR14 -0.0002 -0.2949 BR6 -13.7604 -11.8007 DCHAR14 -0.00084 -2.00682 
BR7 -5.4631 -1.8442 DCHAR15 0.0020 2.3063 BR7 -6.9554 -4.7183 DCHAR15 0.00069 1.06348 
BR8 -7.3549 -4.4694 DCHAR16 -0.0053 -1.9396 BR8 -7.4531 -12.6108 DCHAR16 0.00005 0.02877 
BR9 -8.3313 -4.1622 DCHAR17 0.7583 0.8401 BR9 -8.4403 -5.9852 DCHAR17 0.71491 1.30862 
BR11 -13.3722 -6.4875 DCHAR18 0.3620 2.5098 BR11 -12.9712 -8.8309 DCHAR18 0.36107 3.44100 
CS1 -0.1282 -0.1784 DCHAR19 0.0205 0.0800 CS1 -0.1893 -0.3865 DCHAR19 0.08961 0.50854 
CS2 1.5066 2.0913       CS2 0.3687 0.8726       
CS3 0.6025 0.7780       CS3 0.4473 1.0915       
CS4 -0.7673 -0.4642       CS4 -0.5706 -0.8174       
Centred R^2 0.818533 Centred R^2 0.894139 
R-Bar^2 0.760741 R-Bar^2 0.860426 
Log Likelihood -491.45311 Log Likelihood -405.94114 
 
Both models provide a reasonably good fit to the data in terms of their R-squared figures.  
Serial correlation is not an issue in this cross-sectional dataset and, whilst 
heteroscedasticity may be an issue, the characteristics of the dependent variable force the 
use of robust standard errors in any case. Hence, Breusch-Pagan test statistic results are 
not presented here. 
 
The results above are reasonably consistent with those in the median price change 
regressions.  Again, the globally more constrained outlets are more likely to exhibit price 
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cycles of both durations, but are most likely to be using more seven-day cycles in their 
mix of strategies, which is consistent with cycles having greater amplitude above in that 
here they are shorter. Similar conclusions as drawn above for median changes in price 
might also be drawn for NCHAR5 and NCHAR6 in Table 6.9.  That is, for differing 
reasons (discussed above), more constrained and more efficient outlets will have more 
price cycles in their mix of prices and, here, will favour the shorter cycles more. 
 
NCHAR4 is significant at the ten percent level, and is negative, suggesting that more 
central outlets are less likely to have either kind of cycle and least likely to have ten-day 
cycles.  This is consistent with the median price change results, where such outlets 
exhibited cycles of smaller amplitude, and is similarly weak; alterations to the model 
specification mean this variable loses its significance. 
 
Differences in results for submarkets are not particularly clear, but those for branding are; 
all brands have less cycle power than the omitted dummy, Shell.  Recall from Figures 
5.10 and 5.11 in Chapter Five that the Shell outlets had the highest spectral power across 
these two bands.  This same result is reflected in the branding coefficients. 
 
Branded independents (TP1) and larger independents (TP5) are both likely to have cycles 
of smaller amplitude than the omitted case (TP2 – company controlled outlets), and are 
very slightly more likely to exhibit ten-day cycles. This is consistent with the results for 
median price; the more competitive outlets not only have cycles of smaller magnitudes, 
but they are longer too; albeit by only a little. 
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There are very few demand characteristics that are significant.  The only one which is 
significant across both regressions is the number of competitors within five kilometres 
(DCHAR15), and it is positive.  This suggests a pro-competitive effect of cycles; once 
everything else is taken into consideration, a marketplace with more competitors is likely 
to have evidence of cycles.  The fact that the coefficient is the same for both types of 
cycle suggests that this demand-side factor does not favour one kind of cycle over 
another. 
 
Omitting different variables, particularly the insignificant CS and DCHAR variables 
makes little difference to results, except for NCHAR4, which loses its significance in 
several more restricted versions of the model.  The same is true when different branding, 
type and submarket dummies are omitted, which suggests overall that the results for 
NCHAR4 are rather weak, but those for the other variables are reasonably robust. 
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Chapter Seven: Conclusions 
This thesis examines the retail petroleum market in Australia, with a particular focus on 
the Perth market.  This case study is chosen due to the excellent data which are available 
owing to the requirements of the FuelWatch scheme. Under FuelWatch all retail 
petroleum outlets must submit all of their prices to a regulator.  The comprehensive 
dataset allows me to ascertain in detail how the prices of individual retail petroleum 
outlets are inter-related, and to build this pattern of inter-relationships into a network 
which illustrates the structure of competition in the marketplace.  I then summarise the 
place of each outlet in this structure using measures from mathematical sociology. 
Finally, I put these measures into regressions on price to their influence on pricing. 
 
Chapter One of the thesis provides a general introduction, and Chapter Two provides a 
detailed overview of the current characteristics and historical development of the 
Australian retail petroleum industry.  I include an overview of industry regulation and of 
the sectors immediately upstream from retailing (wholesaling and refining), providing an 
indication on how these influence the retail sector that forms the basis of the case study.  I 
also provide a detailed assessment of the Perth market and the FuelWatch scheme. 
 
Chapter Three is the literature review.  An important characteristic of retail petroleum 
prices in Perth is the way in which they cycle.  The phenomenon known as Edgeworth 
Cycles, has also been observed elsewhere. I provide a brief overview of the theoretical 
and empirical literature in this field.  I also provide an overview of key parts of the rather 
large literature which focuses on retail petroleum markets, paying particular attention to 
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studies whose findings assist in the development of my models and in interpreting my 
results.  Part of this involves looking at the literature developed by different government 
agencies in Australia, which is far larger than the academic literature on retail petroleum 
markets in Australia and which contains useful information for my thesis.  In addition, I 
briefly summarise the literature on spatial markets, focussing on the small part of it which 
forms a precursor to my own work. Finally, I examine some of the literature in geography 
and mathematical sociology, which provide important underpinnings to my use of 
network structure in the empirical models. 
 
In Chapter Four, I develop a simple model of spatial competition in the duopoly case, 
which admits Edgeworth cycles as an equilibrium under conditions which seem likely to 
hold in many cases.  I use the conclusions this model makes about how the price minima 
of two competing firms will be related to develop a rule by which bilateral pairs in a 
network are connected and then use this network to illustrate the structure of competition 
in the marketplace.  The network thus developed can then be divided into sub-markets 
and both the market as a whole and each sub-market can be subjected to statistical tests to 
ascertain whether network structure influences price.  This is not the only way in which 
one could address the issue of network effects on market behaviour,
85
 but it is relatively 
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        (7.1) 
where κij is an indicator function taking the value of one when the firms i and j are connected and zero 
otherwise, and dij being the distance between the two firms.  All of the other variables are as defined in 
Chapter Four.  However, not only is this highly complex, but the solutions are unlikely to be unique.  
Moreover, it does not address the issue of how one determines network shape. 
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simple and arguably reflects the way in which individual sites actually set prices by 
paying most attention to the outlets nearest them rather than the market as a whole. 
 
In Chapter Five, I describe my data in considerable detail.  In this chapter, I also 
construct a network for the Perth retail petroleum market based on its price data, cut the 
network into sub-markets and develop structural summary variables for both the market 
as a whole and its sub-markets.  I also present a series of approaches to ascertain whether 
the sub-market division is reasonable. 
 
To explore the price paths in more detail, I subject them to spectral analysis in Chapter 
Five; the first time, to my knowledge, that this has been attempted.  The results are 
interesting, for they indicate the way in which retail petroleum outlets do not follow a 
neat, regular price cycle, but in fact follow what appears to be a mix of cycles; 
randomising between cycles of (mostly) seven and ten days.  This is more in keeping 
with the theory behind Edgeworth Cycles, but this pattern of cycles has not been 
observed empirically before. 
 
In Chapter Six, I undertake a series of regression analyses, to ascertain whether network 
structure influences price.  I do not test the model developed in Chapter Four directly, but 
rather use it as a means of building the network, using measures from mathematical 
sociology to describe the place of each outlet in this network and thus examining how 
network structure influence choices pertaining to price.  In the first of these, I regress the 
network structure variables, assessed at the level of the whole market and at the 
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submarket level, against retail price and retail margins, including a collection of other 
supply and demand-side variables.  I find that network structure is indeed important.  
Centrality appears to be associated with lower prices in the downswing and higher prices 
in the upswing, whilst local efficiency and constraint appear to be highlighting two 
different sets of outlets which have higher prices for different reasons; market power 
based upon informational advantage for the efficient and the advantages of peripheral 
location for the constrained.  The efficiency results may represent similar forces as 
outlined by Eckert (2003) via price-matching by more powerful firms.  The constraint 
results suggest that information generated in a particular sub-market is not necessarily the 
most valuable aspect of the retail petroleum pricing game being played, and that being 
able to locate on the periphery may deliver advantages as well. 
 
The second set of regression equations endeavours to assess whether network structure 
characteristics influence the shape of the cycle.  In this, I follow a path taken now by a 
few authors in the literature of regressing a number of independent variables against the 
median change in price, and I also use my own dependent variables; the spectral power of 
seven and ten day cycles.  These summarise the degree to which each kind of cycle is 
prevalent in the pricing of a retail petroleum outlet.  One might characterise median 
change in price as summarising cycle amplitude, and the seven and ten day cycles as 
summarising its length.  I find again that the most constrained outlets have attenuated and 
shorter cycles because, in a sense, they have only one foot in the market, whilst the more 
efficient outlets achieve a similar result because they are able to exploit their superior 
position in the information flows generated within a particular sub-market. 
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The results of the thesis may find useful application in competition policy; most 
particularly in merger assessment or other cases where competition policy agencies are 
endeavouring to improve the competitive structure of an industry.  A good example is the 
1995 merger between Ampol and Caltex in Australia.  As part of the terms of that 
merger, the ACCC required the parties to reduce their retail presence by divesting 
themselves of a certain number of retail petroleum outlets in each of Australia‟s state 
capitals.  The ACCC did not specify, however, which outlets should be divested.  To the 
extent that each market has no spatial element, this does not matter.  However, if one can 
characterise the spatial nature of the market as a network, then this allows a much more 
fine-grained appreciation of the distribution of market power within that market.  This, in 
turn, provides competition policy agencies with more information to ascertain which 
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